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ABSTRACT 
 
Paper 1: 
The changing landscape of regional economic development practice:  Findings from a survey of regional 
economic development organizations in US metropolitan areas 
Regional-scale economic development practice has evolved considerably in the past few 
decades.  The change has been influenced by trends in regional governance of many policy spheres, 
particularly the expanding role of the private sector.  It has also been driven by federal support for a 
private sector voice in regional organizations in economic development and related fields like workforce 
development.  As a result, regional economic development policy is shaped by organizations that differ 
considerably from the regional councils and regional planning districts that characterized the 
organizational landscape a few decades ago. Because this new generation of organizations, whose 
members are variously called “regional partnerships for economic development” or “regional marketing 
partnerships,” was created outside of formal government, no systematic national census of them exists.  
This paper presents the results of a census and survey of such organizations, only the second of 
its kind and the first in over a decade. The data show that the number of such organizations continues to 
grow, to the point where they exist in nearly every metropolitan area over a certain size.  The data also 
show that while their focus remains marketing and attraction efforts, the organizations engage in a wide 
range of activities including workforce development, local policy advocacy, business retention, and 
various collaborative efforts with other regional partners.  It also shows that the organizations take 
widely varying forms involving different relationships between the public and private sector, and that 
their association with a particular geographic scope, and sometimes their very existence, is fluid and for 
some continuously negotiated. 
Though only a first look at regional economic development organizations, this paper makes 
several important contributions.  First, it proposes and implements a method of identifying the 
organizations that might be repeated at specific intervals in order to track the existence of them over 
time and by place.  Second, it presents an updated picture of such organizations in terms of basic factors 
like size, budget, and frequency.  Third, it shows that considering the organizations only as “regional 
iii 
 
marketing partnerships” suggests on overly narrow view of them given the many activities in which they 
engage and their expanding role in regional economic development policy. 
 
Paper 2: 
Equal parts location quotients and press releases: the results of a cross-sectional survey of cluster-based 
regional economic development efforts in the US 
In a much cited article from 1990, Levy distinguished between rational model and sales activities 
in local economic development practice.  More recently, the debate around cluster-based economic 
development practice has broken along similar lines.  Clusters are understood as either a critically 
important object of analysis or an updated form of industrial targeting.  This paper, which presents the 
findings from a national survey of regional economic development organizations in the US, shows that 
the sharp distinction made by Levy and those in the cluster debate may be a poor lens through which to 
understand cluster policy and practice, and economic development policy more generally. 
The survey was sent to 234 regional economic development t organizations in the US, and 
yielded 104 responses, for a response rate of 44%.  The findings show that nearly every organization 
claimed to have identified clusters in its region though the clusters vary in sophistication.  The 
prevalence of “advanced manufacturing” and “green tech” clusters suggests that criticism of cluster 
practice is well founded, but seemingly more sophisticated clusters were common.  Furthermore, 
individual organizations often had a mix of what might be termed “real” and “aspirational” clusters, and 
the level of analytical sophistication in different efforts did not explain the variation in cluster types.  
Instead, the findings suggest that cluster-based economic development practice is more complicated 
than simply identifying and targeting certain clusters.  The survey findings show that while targeting and 
marketing activities were the main motivation for cluster identification efforts, small business 
development and workforce development were also important.  Respondents also reported that the 
outputs of cluster analysis affected not only recruiting efforts but also organizational budgets and 
strategic plans, as well as outreach to local firms.   
The general picture that emerges from the findings is one in which cluster practice involves the 
application of “rational” type findings to building local relationships, and where successful local 
relationships are valued jointly for the increased capacity for action they create and as a powerful tool in 
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successful marketing campaigns.  This complicated mix of sales and rational activity that comprises 
cluster-based economic development practice shows Levy’s distinction to be somewhat artificial.  
Cluster-based economic development practice is shown to involve significant parts reasoned decisions 
and unrealistic aspirations, and seems well-suited to encouraging a dual focus on firms currently in the 
region and those which might locate there.  This last finding is likely to be one of the enduring strengths 
of cluster policy, in that it forces economic development organizations to take the concerns of local 
firms seriously while allowing a large role for traditional marketing and recruitment. 
 
Paper 3: 
All Planning, No Strategy: 
Explaining Cluster Policy Decisions of Regional Economic Development Organizations 
 The widespread adoption of cluster-based economic development strategies by regional 
economic development organizations has generated excitement and derision in equal measure.  Cluster 
enthusiasts point to the concept’s potential for encouraging locally-focused development around 
agglomeration economies, and for increasing understanding of regional economies more generally.  
Critics argue that the concept fails to introduce new ideas in to practice, and that it serves merely to 
cloak traditional business attraction efforts in more sophisticated language.  At the heart of this debate 
is the question that this research attempts to address:  does the use of a cluster-based approach add 
anything of value to economic development practice, and if so how? 
 Through a set of four case studies of decisions in two different regional economic development 
organizations, this research attempts to understand how cluster analysis and the cluster concept itself 
informs major decisions by the organizations.  In order to do so, the research rejects the rational 
comprehensive model that dominates much of economic development planning literature and that 
entails multiple unrealistic assumptions about the environment in which economic development policy 
evolves.  It relies instead on a conception of the policy process that assumes neither agreement nor 
cooperation as a precursor to planning, and the idea that plans inform rather than control decisions.  By 
constructing each case from interviews with key informants and reviews of relevant studies, plans, and 
progress reports, the research works backward from each decision to identify how and where the 
cluster concept and cluster analysis informed them. 
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 The study finds that cluster analysis and the cluster concept do inform major economic 
development policy decisions in important ways.  However, the outputs of a traditional cluster 
identification analysis were never sufficient to suggest concrete policy proposals.  Instead, such analysis 
served as the beginning of an extended, multi-year process that involved further research on specific 
clusters and outreach to specific cluster firms.  The final decisions were affected more by information 
and relationships that arose during that process than by the initial analysis.  The eventual decisions all 
embodied the cluster concept to some degree.  In particular, the concept helped organizations identify 
sets of firms that were potential collaborators, understand connections between local forms and those 
in nearby regions, and prioritize limited organizational resources.  In sum, the research shows that 
cluster-based economic development planning approaches can usefully inform economic development 
practice, but that analytical techniques to “identify” clusters contribute only a small part of that value.  
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PREFACE 
 If one were to read in a newspaper that the Smith Valley Regional Development Partnership (not 
a real organization) had engaged in an effort to identify the industry clusters that were present in its 
region, it would likely not come as a surprise.  Similarly named organizations around the US have 
engaged in such efforts many times over the past two decades.  Regional economic development and 
cluster studies have become a mainstay of economic development practice in the US and around the 
world.  The real surprise is that our understanding of what such organizations do, and how something 
like a cluster study does or does not help them do that, is considerably more limited. 
 Economic development policy is practiced at multiple scales: neighborhood, city, county, region, 
state, nation, and internationally.  Dissatisfaction with local economic development policy, in particular 
its reliance on arbitrary political boundaries that slice through labor markets and metropolitan areas, 
has led to calls for economic development policy to be made at a regional scale.  Such calls have been 
answered, at least in part, by a proliferation of regional economic development organizations in the US.  
These organizations, which are different from the councils of governments and regional planning 
councils, focus exclusively on economic development activity.  Because they operate at a scale that lacks 
general purpose government in the US, regional economic development organizations are primarily the 
creation of local public and private sector leaders. 
 Despite the proliferation of such organizations, they have not been the subject of much 
research.  Part of the reason for this lies with the fact that no definitive listing of them exists.  This is an 
oversight that this dissertation begins to remedy, though it represents only a beginning.  Regional 
economic development organizations touch on many issues that are of great interest to academics and 
practitioners alike.  First, as organizations composed of public and private sector members, they are 
potentially more lasting than partnerships organized around individual projects.  Second, as 
organizations closely involved with making economic development policy at what is widely recognized 
as a critical spatial scale – that of the region – they warrant much more study than they have received. 
 One of the most dominant ideas of regional economic development of the past few decades is 
that of industry clusters.  The concept, which is not entirely new, has been the focus of extensive 
research.  However, much of that research has been of two types.  First, there is a great deal of theory 
about how clusters function and what sorts of relationships might drive them.  Though only some of this 
theory has been empirically verified, it nevertheless has produced a great deal of insightful work on 
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regional economies.  Second, there have been a great number of case studies of cluster initiatives.  
These accounts are often purely descriptive case studies that fail to produce generalizable findings. 
 Clusters as economic units are one thing, and cluster policy is another.  From a policy 
standpoint, it would be important to know whether or not the cluster idea has led to better policy and if 
so how.  Such questions cannot be answered through theoretical work on clusters or by case studies of 
cherry picked success stories.  Instead, it is important to look at cross-sectional data of organizations to 
see how clusters and cluster analysis inform their decisions and policies.  Case studies can also serve a 
purpose, but they must be case studies that address how economic development practitioners think 
about and use clusters to make decisions, allocate resources, and make sense of their regional economy.   
 This dissertation is organized into three papers.  They are presented here both in the order in 
which the research was conducted and in what is the most logical flow.  The first two present data from 
a survey of regional economic development organizations, and the third presents the findings from a set 
of case studies of such organizations.  They are summarized briefly below. 
 The first paper presents an analysis of the current state of regional economic development 
organizations in the US.  After a review of the history of regional planning and regional organizations in 
the United States, the paper reviews the compelling arguments for coordinating some economic 
development functions at the regional scale.  It then uses the results of a national survey of regional 
economic development organizations to evaluate to what degree they are meeting the call for 
multifaceted regional economic development activity.  Overall, the data show that the organizations are 
somewhat small and primarily focused on attraction, marketing, and recruitment.  The data also show 
that, with a few exceptions, the organizations to be almost entirely creations of the local public and 
private sector leaders, with little involvement from state or federal economic development programs.  
Finally the paper argues that such organizations areas of operation do not match up with certain 
accepted regional definitions such as commuter sheds.  This last point may have real implications for 
such organization’s ability to coordinate economic development at the regional scale. The second 
paper turns to the issue of clusters specifically.  It examines how regional economic development 
organizations work with clusters including their motivations to do so, specific programs that have been 
designed around clusters, and the nature of the more than 600 clusters reported by respondents.  The 
findings indicate that clusters involve a complicated mix of attraction-focused and locally-focused 
activity.   As used by these organizations, clusters cannot be reduced to simple attraction targets or as 
the results of cluster analysis.  Instead, sets of clusters are composed of “actual” and “aspirational” 
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clusters that are the result of a combination of objective analysis, strategic behavior, and wishful 
thinking.  In a rejection of some of the charges of cluster cynics, the findings indicate that cluster 
practice consists of a great deal of interaction with local firms as well as traditional marketing. 
 The third paper looks more closely at how the organizations use clusters to actually make 
decisions.  Drawing on the findings of a set of case studies of decisions, this paper uses interviews, 
archival research, and reviews of documents to construct a narrative showing how cluster analysis 
shapes and informs important decisions by such organizations, often outside the scope of a focused 
“cluster program.”  The cases are interpreted in light of discussions from planning theory about how 
planning behaviors affect decisions, and the paper presents a compelling argument for abandoning the 
widely accepted rational and strategic planning models in economic development.  The cases show 
clearly that decisions never followed directly from, much less occurred within, formal planning 
processes.  Instead, piecemeal instances of analytical work, meetings and discussions among 
organization staff led over time to decisions about clusters that had significant implications for the 
organizations and the region.  The link between cluster analysis and cluster policy is shown to involve 
continual reflection and experimentation, some of which may provide real revelations that have 
concrete effects on policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The changing landscape of regional economic development practice: 
Findings from a survey of regional economic development organizations in US metropolitan areas 
 
1. Introduction 
 Over the last several decades, planning and urban policy scholars have called for policy issues to 
be addressed at a regional rather than a municipal scale (Rusk 2003).  Arguments for coordinating 
regional economic development policy include the limited capacity of individual municipalities, 
particularly inner cities (Savitch and Vogel 2000), the need for policy interventions to cover functional 
economic units  (Beauregard 1995), and the increase in regional-scale economic competition (Barnes 
and Ledebur 1998).  The United States lacks general purpose governments at the regional scale that 
might coordinate such policy, states being a poor substitute due to their arbitrary borders.  For some 
policy areas, such as transportation, the federal government has mandated the existence of a regional 
organization in metropolitan areas over a certain size (Gerber and Gibson 2009).  No such requirement 
exists in economic development policy. 
As a result, a patchwork of regional economic development organizations (REDOs) has evolved 
to address economic development regionally.  With the exception of those in the few states that have 
coordinated the process, most REDOs are partnerships between the local public and private sectors.  
Despite the significant role played by REDOs in regional economic development policy, they have not 
been the subject of much empirical research.  The first and only national survey of REDOs found 191 of 
them in the US over a decade ago (Olberding 2002a).  Over a decade later, there is still no authoritative 
census of REDOs, and as a result we still know relatively little about their structure and operation. 
This paper makes several contributions.  First it includes a complete census of REDOs currently 
operating in US metropolitan areas with populations between 150,000 and 4,000,000 people.  Second, it 
shows that those organizations are primarily concerned with marketing and recruitment and less so with 
other areas of economic development policy.    Third, it shows that REDOs are largely creations of local 
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public and private sector elites.  The picture that emerges is one of organizations that are not 
particularly well-suited to oversee multifaceted economic development work.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section addresses the historical and theoretical 
context of regional economic development organizations in the United States.  The third section 
introduces the definitions and method used to identify REDOs and implement the census of REDOs.  The 
fourth section describes the resulting census of REDOs that constituted the survey frame.  The fifth 
section presents the results of the survey.  The sixth section contains a discussion of the findings in light 
of prior research.  The seventh section concludes with a brief discussion and presents avenues for future 
research. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 The rationale for and criticism of regional approaches to economic development 
In recent decades, arguments in favor of addressing economic development at the regional scale 
have involved several different rationales that fall into two groups.  The first starts from the premise 
that the region, loosely defined, represents a functional economic unit.  It is therefore more 
appropriate, the logic goes, to make policy for the entirety of the unit, rather than for individual parts of 
it or for groups of several units together.  The second group of arguments addresses concerns of 
efficiency and equity that arise when making economic policy at sub-regional – usually county or 
municipal – scales.  Each is reviewed below. 
The first argument is that regions are more likely than smaller areas to constitute an integrated, 
functional economic unit.  With the growth of suburban cities in the mid-Twentieth Century, 
metropolitan areas became agglomerations of adjacent municipalities which varied in their “function” 
vis-à-vis the metropolitan area.  Each municipality was thus only a small part, such as a bedroom 
community or a job center, of a more cohesive whole.  Economic policy, according to proponents of this 
view, ought to be made at a scale that takes account of all of the relevant functioning parts of a 
relatively coherent economic unit (Beauregard 1995).  This logic is the centerpiece of the US Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB) method of defining core-based statistical areas on commuter flows.  
The idea of regions as functional economic units has been bolstered by newer theories of economic 
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growth and development that give a large role to spatially rooted knowledge and relationships (Storper 
1997; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Porter 1990). 
A second, and related, argument sees regions as fundamental units not of production but of 
competition.  It proponents argue that regions, as opposed to nation states, are now the fundamental 
unit of competition (Barnes and Ledebur 1998).  The logic goes that as barriers to trade across national 
borders fall, national policy and identity will play less of a role in determining the economic prospects of 
individual regions.  Instead, regions will compete directly with each other within and across national 
boundaries.  Though focused on inter-regional rather than intra-regional forces, this argument also 
suggests a role for economic policy at a regional scale. 
 The next set of arguments address equity and efficiency concerns with making policy at sub-
regional scales.  Individual municipalities, particularly inner cities, have experienced population and 
capital flight.  Particularly in declining industrial areas, this has left central cities without the resources 
necessary to combat their decline (Savitch and Vogel 2000).  Because the fates of suburbs and central 
cities are tied together to some degree, this decline is of concern to the entire region.   A regional 
approach to policy, in this view, presents an opportunity to pool resources and bring the capacity of the 
entire region to bear on problems throughout the region, rather than leaving each municipality to its 
own devices. 
   The fourth argument in favor of regional economic policy posits it as a cure for competition 
between local governments for jobs and capital investment.  Regional economic policy is seen as a way 
to minimize such competition (Basolo 2003).  Policies such as tax abatement incentives have been 
shown to be of questionable benefit to communities (Bartik 1991).  They persist due to a range of causes 
including the self-interest of local elected officials and the prisoners’ dilemma faced by individual cities 
(Dewar 1998).  The latter problem in particular is difficult to address except through coordination at a 
regional scale.  One version of this argument places the private sector in a leading role, since members 
of that sector may have less of an attachment to a particular locality within a region (Gainsborough 
2003; Hamilton 2004).  
 Proponents of regional economic development policy are not without their critics.  Imbroscio 
(2006) claimed that proponents of regionalism, particularly Rusk (2003), underestimated the potential of 
locally-based community development policies to improve the lot of declining areas.  Regionalism thus 
had the potential to further marginalize citizens within declining areas, many of whom were already 
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marginalized by their racial or socioeconomic status.  This could happen if regional policy results in the 
interests of less politically powerful parts of the region being eclipsed by those of more powerful arts 
(Turok 2009). Even its proponents warn that regional policy offers only the potential to provide novel 
solutions to economic development problems, and that there is nothing inherently more equitable in 
approaching economic policy at a regional scale (Swanstrom 2006).   
2.2 Antecedents to regional economic development organizations in the US 
 For the purpose of this research, a regional economic development organization (REDO) is an 
organization, with dedicated staff and a budget, whose main objective is the economic development of 
a metropolitan region.  A metropolitan region is defined as comprising one or more urbanized areas 
along with the suburban areas associated with them through commuting patterns.  As such, REDOS are 
organizations dedicated to working on the economic development of a relatively coherent economic 
unit.  As the following section makes clear, such organizations are a relatively recent phenomenon in the 
US. 
The idea of addressing economic development at a regional scale is not new.  Efforts to address 
planning problems at the regional scale can be traced back to the work of the Regional Planning 
Association of America (RPAA).  Started in 1923, the RPAA worked on a variety of projects, such as the 
Appalachian Trail, that spanned multiple political jurisdictions (Parsons 1994).  In 1929, the Regional 
Plan Association of New York developed the first in a series of regional plans for the New York City 
metropolitan area (Johnson 1995). 
More recently, the growth in REDOs in the US is due to intersecting trends in economic 
development practice and regional governance in the US (Olberding 2002a).  The US has never had 
federally mandated general purpose regional government.  As a result, much regional policy-making is 
the result of a process initiated at the local level (Wallis 1993; Norris 2001; Markusen 1996a).  There 
have been several approaches to creating general purpose regional government in the US (Wallis 1994).  
One such approach, consolidation, involved the merging of central city and county governments.  
Though seen in a number of cities such as Indianapolis, Indiana, consolidation is more the exception 
than the rule.  Even where it has been carried out, consolidation on its own rarely results in 
metropolitan scale government since metropolitan areas in most of the US span multiple counties.  A 
second wave of attempts to create regional government resulted in the establishment in many places of 
Regional Planning Commissions and Councils of Governments.  RPCs and COGs dealt with a range of 
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policy areas including economic development.  For the most part, however, they had limited resources 
to start with, only a small portion of which were dedicated to economic development.  
 Early attempts at general purpose regional government showed reluctance on the part of the 
local public sector to cede real power to a regional authority.  True consolidation was rare, and the 
powers of the more common Regional Planning Commissions and Councils of Governments were 
restricted to advisory roles (Rothblatt 1994).  In part, the reluctance of the local public sector to cede 
power to a regional authority reflects the differing interests and priorities of municipalities within the 
same region (Counsell and Haughton 2003; Turok 2009).  Collaboration between local governments is 
also made difficult by continuing competition for development activity (Katz 2000; Savitch and Vogel 
2000; Swanstrom 2001).  A further barrier to regional government has been a reluctance on the part of 
states to authorize it, or to grant it very limited authority (Rothblatt 1994). 
A third wave of attempts at regional government looks beyond the public sector (Savitch and 
Vogel 2000).  A central theme of these efforts has been the distinction between government and 
governance, where the latter includes the full set of actors and institutions involved in governing.  
Regional governance, in this understanding, is something carried out by networks of public and private 
actors involved in voluntary coalitions that act in ways to influence the objects of policy rather than 
control them (Savitch and Vogel 2000; B. G. Peters 1998).  Thus by the 1990’s, there was considerable 
support for the idea that regional policy could and should be made by organizations that were not 
entirely creations of the public sector.  The resulting organizations are largely voluntary and extremely 
reliant on building and maintaining cooperation between members. 
 Though general-purpose regional government is rare in the US, the federal government had 
created regional programs focused on economic development several times in the 20th Century such as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and the Delta Regional 
Commission (Cumberland 1971).  These were singular programs focused on areas that faced extreme 
underdevelopment, however, and not models intended to be widely replicated.  Some states have also 
attempted to create regional economic development organizations, notably North Carolina, but these 
were also more the exception than the rule.  The main Federal program specifically designed to effect 
economic development policy at the regional scale is the Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) 
Economic Development District (EDD) program.  However, unlike the federal transportation programs 
that mandated the creation of Metropolitan Planning Organizations as a condition of securing federal 
transportation dollars, the legislation that created EDDs does not require the creation of a regional 
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organization.  Instead, an organization, new or existing, may be designated a “District Organization” (13 
US CFR 304.2)  As a result, EDDs are managed by a range of public and public-private organizations that 
in many cases engage on a wide range of issues but dedicate scant resources to economic development.  
Hall (2008) found that some organizations managing EDDs exist primarily to secure federal 
infrastructure funds but otherwise keep a low profile.  The Comprehensive Economic Development 
Strategies (CEDS) that must be prepared in order for an EDD to receive funds are only updated every five 
years, and there is no requirement that an organization devote resources to economic development in 
the interim.  In many cases EDDs are managed by organizations with little resources to engage in 
economic development, but who control the EDD as a means of controlling access to a particular stream 
of federal funds. 
The result of these early efforts was that in 1980 most US metropolitan regions lacked REDOs 
(Olberding 2002a).  At the same time approaches to regional government were changing, the practice of 
local economic development was also evolving.  Local economic development practice has been 
described as consisting of three distinct waves (Clarke and Gaile 1992; Bradshaw and Blakely 1999).  The 
first such wave took place in an environment of high federal funding for local development.  Somewhat 
assured of federal support for large projects, local economic development consisted largely of business 
attraction (Clarke and Gaile 1992).  The second wave occurred in response to declining federal support 
for local development projects in the 1970s and was characterized by a more entrepreneurial attitude 
on the part of local actors (Clarke and Gaile 1992; Bradshaw and Blakely 1999; Eisinger 1988).  Though 
attraction efforts persisted, they were joined by revolving loan funds and small business development 
centers, among other initiatives. 
The third wave of economic development practice reflected similar concerns as those found in 
approaches to regionalism.  Specifically, third wave economic development policy included an emphasis 
on partnerships of public and private sector actors working through quasi-autonomous organizations.  
Being located outside of formal government hierarchies, such organizations could take advantage of 
other organizational forms including non-profit organizations.  The funding and leadership of such 
organizations might be from the public and private sectors, in proportions that varied from place to 
place.  The private sector was imagined by some to be more willing to collaborate at the regional scale 
since members were less likely than public sector officials to be tied to specific municipalities (Kanter 
2000).  Empirical work on regional partnerships has supported this claim to some degree (Hamilton 
2004; Olberding 2002a).  The central role of partnerships reflected emerging ideas in governance, but 
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also the emerging theories of economic development that gave a central role to regional networks of 
public and private sector actors and non-hierarchical arrangements (Cooke and Morgan 1998; Porter 
2003; Amin 1999).  The close association between third wave policies and the practice of cluster-based 
economic development underscores this point (Bradshaw and Blakely 1999).  The late twentieth century 
saw the proliferation of REDOS that reflected emerging trends in regional government and governance 
and economic development theory and practice (Olberding 2002a). 
2.3 Research on REDOS in the US 
 Beginning in the 1980’s the number of REDOs grew quickly in the US (Olberding 2002a).  These 
organizations were largely voluntary and included a mix of public and private sector actors.  Despite 
their growth in number, up to 191 by 2002, only a single large sample study of them exists.  That study 
found that they have engaged in a wider set of activities than those commonly associated with EDDs 
including information gathering and analysis, regional marketing, lobbying government for 
infrastructure, and developing strategic plans for the region (Olberding 2002a).  Governing board 
members for the organizations included representatives from the public and private sectors, but the 
data indicated that, in contrast to the largely public sector led RPCs and COGs, guidance of the 
organizations was heavily skewed in favor of the private sector.  Though it gathered fairly general 
characteristics about the organizations, Olberding’s (2002a) study clearly showed the emergence of a 
new type of economic development organization. 
Olberding called the organizations in her study “Regional Partnerships for Economic 
Development,” which she defined as a, “group or alliance formed by local governments, often with the 
help of private sector firms and nonprofit organizations, that has a mission of enhancing the economy of 
a multijurisdictional area.”  There are several problems with this definition.  First, it could be applied to 
older forms of regional government, including RPCs and COGs, which are not really part of the “third 
wave” that Olberding describes.  Some such organizations did find their way into Olberding’s survey 
frame, including the Southwest Georgia Regional Development Center (SWGRDC) (Olberding 2002a).   
The SWGRDC was founded in 1989 as part of an act by the state of Georgia to create regional 
development authorities (Southwest Georgia Regional Commission 2013).  Though founded later than 
some RPCs, the SWGRDC works on a range of issues including land use planning and GIS in addition to 
development (Southwest Georgia Regional Commission 2013). In the time since its founding the state of 
Georgia changed the names of its Regional Development Centers to Regional Commissions, perhaps 
reflecting their more general purpose.  Furthermore, the staff listed on the organization’s website 
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includes multiple people with “planner” or “GIS” in their title but none with “economic” or 
“development.”  Though somewhat anecdotal, this paints a picture of an organization modeled more 
closely on the RPC model than on the more recent wave of economic development organizations 
described by Bradshaw and Blakely (1999) that place an emphasis on private sector involvement and a 
focus on economic development.   
Contrast the Southwest Georgia Regional Commission with the Quad Cities Development Group 
(QCDG), an organization located in the Quad Cities of Iowa and Illinois that was included within 
Olberding’s (2002a) list.  The QCDG was founded in 1969 as the Iowa-Illinois Industrial Development 
Group.  It began as a purely private sector organization, but its members sought public sector 
membership in 1986, and it eventually received about half of its funding from the public sector 
(Allemeier 2013).  The QCDC works primarily on economic development through expansion and 
retention of local business, regional marketing, and as an advocate for businesses in the region 
(Allemeier 2013).  The QCDG was different from an RPC in two important ways.  One, it was led by the 
private sector, even if it eventually created a role for the public sector.  Two, it focused exclusively on 
economic development issues.  Like an RPC or COG, it could be called a partnership, but the nature of 
the partnership is different than in an RPC due to the much larger degree of control by the private 
sector.  This brief comparison shows that the word partnership is of little use in distinguishing between 
these two different types of organizations.  For that reason, I do not use it here. 
A second problem with Olberding’s definition is the inclusion of the term “formed by local 
governments.”  One of the critical differences between older and more recent models of both regional 
governance and economic development is the prominent role of the private sector.  Hamilton (2004) 
described several cases where the private sector played a leading role in regional collaboration.  Any 
definition of newer regional economic development organizations should not be restricted to those 
formed by local governments.  As organizations created outside of government hierarchies, REDOs can 
take advantage of a variety of legal forms including non-profit corporations and 501(c) organizations 
that enable a high degree of variation in the roles of the public and private sector within them.  As 
Federal funds for regional economic development have shrunk through the years, it is only natural that 
the character of regional economic development organizations would adapt. 
This paper adopts the term “regional economic development organization” because it captures 
the primary focus REDOs bring to regional economic development activity and because it allows for 
organizations of varying forms of public and private sector involvement.  Even though some RPCs have 
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led a drive to have their region designated as an EDD, Hall’s (2008) findings suggest that this does not 
necessarily signify an enhanced focus on economic development within those organizations.  An EDD 
designation is not sufficient to turn an RPC into a REDO as defined here.  I do not include explicit 
reference to the private sector in the definition for the following reason.  Although Olberding’s (2002a) 
work showed a dominant role for the private sector, the distinction between “private sector led” and 
“public sector led” is not a clear one.  Funding and directors often come from both, and the very nature 
of regional governance suggests that leadership does not lie solidly on either side.  Olberding’s work 
provided an important first look at REDOs, but the data are now over ten years old.  It seems likely that 
the number of REDOs has grown since then, given their growth in the period immediately prior to 2002, 
but their current number is unknown.  One likely reason for the lack of research on REDOs is the lack of 
a centralized listing of them.  As organizations led by a mix of public and private sector actors that varies 
from place to place, they do not belong to any single larger association such as the National Association 
of Development Organizations (NADO), which counts public sector organizations like Regional Planning 
Commissions and Councils of Governments among its members.  Olberding published her listing of 
organizations from 2002, but their status as organizations chartered outside of the public sector 
hierarchy means that they may also change their names or even their structures more rapidly than other 
regional economic development organizations.  The QCDG, mentioned above, is an example of this 
trend.  In 2009, it changed its name and structure to become Quad Cities First (Allemeier 2013).  This 
study develops and implements an improved means of identifying REDOs, an important first step in 
tracing their growth and development in the US. 
 
3. Developing a census of REDOs 
 The first challenge in conducting a cross-sectional analysis of REDOs is that no authoritative 
census of them exists.  This research began by developing a method of identifying them.  The method 
was designed to identify candidate organizations in US metropolitan areas and then determine whether 
or not the organization satisfied certain criteria with respect to being regional and focused on economic 
development.  Given the many ways in which each of these terms is used, no single definition is likely to 
be universally accepted.  The method developed here is the first attempt of its kind, and is presented 
clearly so that it can be assessed and improved upon in succeeding research. 
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 Prior attempts to identify REDOs used a combination of partial lists of economic development 
organizations from magazines and trade associations, along with internet searches and conversations 
with state economic development officials (Olberding 2002a).  I adopted similar approach, though 
without calls to state officials.  I also focus on metropolitan areas.  As such it leaves out some places that 
have regional organizations.  The metropolitan focus allowed for the use of Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas in the search process, which brought consistency and a degree of comprehensiveness to the 
process.  The method began with a list of metropolitan areas in the US, specifically the OMBs December, 
2009, MSA definitions.  The list was limited in two ways to make the work more manageable.  First, I did 
not include metropolitan areas with more than four million people.  The reason for this is that such 
areas are so large that the organizational landscape might be too difficult to understand clearly, which 
would make it difficult to determine the purpose and role of any one organization.  This left out 14 
MSAs.  I also used a lower cutoff for MSA population of 150,000.  This was done to limit the list in size 
somewhat.  The resulting list included 251 MSAs that in 2010 had a population of 149,075,947, or about 
48.3 percent of the US population.  The largest is Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA, MSA with about 3.4 
million residents, and the smallest is Madera-Chowchilla, CA, MSA with just over 150,000. 
 The second step was to search within each MSA for REDOS.  This was done for each MSA on the 
list by conducting internet searches using key terms including the name of the region, its largest city, 
and the state along with terms like “regional economic development.”  The central role of internet 
searches in this approach might strike some as suspicious, but there is good reason to believe that a 
better data source would be hard to find.  REDOs are economic development organizations that often 
see marketing as a central part of their work (Levy 1996).  This central role of marketing makes it likely 
that REDOs would not miss the potential communication opportunities presented by the internet.  
Olberding’s (2002a) findings corroborate this.  75% of organizations that responded to her survey 
reported having a website, and that was in 1998. A REDO without a website is difficult to imagine today.  
In addition to internet searches, the results for each MSA were cross-referenced with the list of 
economic development organizations maintained by Site Selection magazine (Site Selection Magazine 
2013). 
 Once an organization was identified, it was necessary for it to pass through four filters in order 
to be included in the list of REDOs.  These filters were designed to identify only those organizations that 
make economic development their main focus, that dedicate staff and resources to that end, that 
provide a full range of economic development approaches, and that are truly regional in scope.  In short, 
 11 
 
these filters were designed to ensure that the eventual list of REDOs would contain only those types of 
organizations that conform to the notions of third wave regional economic development organizations 
described in the prior section.  The information used to make each determination was from the website 
of the organization itself or from online media reports.  To determine whether or not an organization 
had economic development as its main focus was fairly straightforward.  The organization’s website 
made the purpose of the organization clear in most cases.  Organizations that were included mentioned 
economic development prominently.  Those that included multiple policy areas other than economic 
development such as environmental conservation or transportation planning were excluded.  This filter 
also ruled out organizations whose websites claimed that they focused on economic development but 
whose staff suggested otherwise.  Some of the RPC-type organizations have begun to tout the 
importance of their work to economic development, likely in response to what Beauregard (1993) refers 
to as the privileged status of “economic” issues in public discourse.  In these cases, the titles of the staff 
made the actual purpose of the orientation clear.  For example, an organization that claimed to focus on 
economic development but whose staff all had titles like “GIS Analyst,” “Planner II,” and “Aging Services 
Coordinator” would not be included in the list.  As a result of this filter, many of the RPCs and COGs 
were eliminated from consideration. 
 The second and third filters were more straightforward.  To determine if an organization 
dedicated staff and resources toward its mission was also straightforward, since in most cases lists of 
staff were available on the organization’s website.  This filter was important because it filtered out 
regional marketing efforts that existed only in website form, without actual staff.  The websites of such 
marketing efforts often resemble those of actual organizations.  However, the absence of staff, or 
directing potential communication to individual county governments, was an indication that there was 
no actual organization in such cases.  The third filter was to determine whether or not the organization 
engaged in a wide range of economic development activities.  The purpose of this filter was to eliminate 
organizations that performed only a single economic development related function such as preparing a 
CEDS for an EDD.  For the most part, organizations that were eliminated by this filter were also 
eliminated through the first filter. 
 After the first three filters narrowed the list of organizations to economic development 
organizations that were focused on economic development, performed multiple economic development 
functions, and had staff, the fourth filter was designed to determine those organizations that were truly 
regional in scope.  This was no easy task, since the term regional is applied in so many different contexts.  
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Olberding (2002a) did not specify the means by which she determined whether an organization was 
regional.  One possibility, defining a regional organization as one that covered an entire county, too 
easily allowed for sub-regional organizations, since metropolitan areas in much of the US often comprise 
multiple counties.  At the same time, it seemed somewhat arbitrary to insist that an organization cover 
an entire MSA in order to be considered regional since MSAs can be quite large, and because their 
boundaries can change every few years.  As a compromise, I came to the following solution.  For 
organizations in MSAs that were composed of a single county, the organization merely had to cover that 
county.  This could potentially undercount the organizations west of the Rocky Mountains, where some 
counties are so large that one could argue that portions of them are still larger than multi-county units 
in the Midwest.  But, it was necessary to use consistent measures.  For organizations in multi-county 
MSAs, the organization had to cover at least two counties, one of which had to be a core county 
identified in the MSA definition.  In addition to ensuring that the organizations were sufficiently 
regional, it also eliminated organizations that covered part of an outer edge of the MSA but that were 
not centered on the metropolitan area.  This filter ended up eliminating many county level organizations 
such as EDCs in regions that were multi-county.  It also meant that in the western US, such organizations 
were more likely to be counted, since the counties there are often large enough to comprise an entire 
MSA.  This filter is imperfect, but it meaningfully differentiates between county level and true regional 
organizations, while still taking account of the fact that in some regions the two are one and the same.  
As with the other filters, the determination of where an organization worked was discovered by looking 
on its website. 
 
4. The census shows that most MSAs have a REDO 
 A thorough search through all 251 MSAs produced a list of 234 REDOs.  These are listed in 
Appendix 1.  In 12.4% (31) of the MSAs, my method failed to find a REDO.  The locations of these MSAs 
are shown in Figure 1.1.  Slightly over 11 percent (28) of all MSAs had two REDOs operating within them.  
In the remaining 77% (192) of the MSAs, the method detected a single REDO.  The list of REDOs shows 
that the vast majority of metropolitan areas (87.6%) examined in this study have a REDO working within 
them.  REDOs were found in 48 states.  The method did not find REDOs in two states, Utah and 
Wyoming, for different reasons.  Both MSAs in Wyoming, Caspar and Cheyenne have total populations 
of less than 100,000 and so were not include in the analysis.  In Utah, none of the three MSAs had a 
REDO. 
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Figure 1.1 – MSAs with no REDO 
 
 
 The method did detect more than one REDO in 34 of the MSAs.  This included some instances 
where two organizations operated in the same geographic space.  In some cases, this was because 
different organizations operated in the same space.  For example, the Toledo, OH, MSA includes four 
counties.  All four are represented by the 13 county Northwest Ohio Regional Economic Development 
Association, a non-profit partnership between the public and private sector that engages in marketing, 
advocacy at the state level, and serves as a forum for discussion between the public and private sectors 
about economic development issues (NORED 2013).  In addition, the Regional Growth Partnership is a 
fully private sector funded organization that works on a variety of economic development issues 
including marketing, innovation in partnership with the University of Toledo, and international trade 
(Regional Growth Partnership 2013).  Since the Regional Growth Partnership lacks public sector 
members, the spatial extent of the area represented by it is less defined.  However, its investors include 
members from several counties in the region, and the organization itself defines the region as 
“northwest Ohio and southeast Michigan” (Regional Growth Partnership 2013). 
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 A different case of multiple organizations within a single MSA is  Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC.  
Two of four counties in the MSA are affiliated with Advantage West, a public-private partnership that 
represents 23 counties in western North Carolina.  The other two counties in the MSA are affiliated with 
the Charlotte Regional Partnership, a similar organization that serves the Charlotte, NC, region.  The 
situation with the Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC, MSA may be due in part to the role that the state of 
North Carolina played in the creation of a statewide system of regional partnerships in North Carolina, 
but this was only one of several examples. 
Since this study did not adopt the same method as that used by Olberding, direct comparison of the 
two lists is not entirely appropriate.  However, these findings confirm the widespread existence of 
REDOs.  This method, which searched more systematically through a set of MSAs, identified more than 
25% more organizations.  The different methods prevent one from concluding that the higher number 
represents growth in the number of organizations, but the earlier work identified a growth trend with 
which these results would fit well. 
 
5. Survey – a snapshot of REDOs in the metropolitan US 
5.1 Survey implementation 
The survey, included as Appendix 2, was sent in early 2012 to the Executive Director or CEO of 
each organization through standard mail, along with a letter directing them to an online version.  
Following Dillman (2000), the implementation consisted of four contacts.  The first three were sent via 
standard US Postal Service and included a pre-notice, the survey itself, and a reminder postcard.  Each of 
these three mailings also included directions for completing the survey online.  The fourth contact was a 
phone call to organizations who had not yet responded in which the respondent or their administrative 
staff were reminded the survey and offered either an additional hard copy or an email with an 
embedded link to the online survey.  The contacts yielded 104 valid responses, for a response rate of 
44%. 
5.2 Most REDOs are small organizations 
 The survey instrument included several sets of questions, one of which was designed to gather 
information about the size, structure, origins, and activities of the organizations.  The respondents 
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indicated that most REDOs were small operations.  The majority had fewer than ten employees and a 
budget of less than five million dollars (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.2 – Distribution of REDO size 
 
Figure 1.3 – Distribution of REDO annual budget 
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5.3 Most REDOs are relatively new 
The results of the survey support earlier research that suggested that the formation of REDOs 
accelerated in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s.  It also shows that such growth continued in 
the first decade of this century (Figure 1.4).  The information in Figure 1.4 is best understood in light of 
information that arose during the compiling of the census of REDOs.  In contrast to established formal 
governments, some REDOs have short life spans.  This volatility likely arises from several factors.  One, 
most REDOs are voluntary organizations whose existence is not mandated by a higher level of 
government.  If their supporters withdraw support, the organization can cease to exist.  As independent 
organizations, REDOs derive much of their funding from voluntary contributions of public and private 
sector organizations whose willingness to contribute may fluctuate over time.  As a result, the 
organization may change over time.  Some of the changes are superficial.  As regional branding becomes 
central to the mission of REDOs, organizations may change their names to reflect evolving regional 
brands.1  In other cases, the organization may be remade entirely, either through turnover in key 
supporters or a decision by them to withdraw support for one organization in favor of an alternative 
one.  A third possibility is that organizations might split off from each other or merge. 
Figure 1.4 – Date when REDOs were founded 
  
                                                          
1
 .  In some cases this can be done through the use of a “trade name”.  The law in most states allows incorporated 
entities to distinguish between a “trade name” (variously termed a “fictitious business name” or a “trade style”) 
under which it operated publicly and a legal name so long as both are on file in the public record. 
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This research turned up several examples of organizational turnover.  A number of organizations 
identified by Olberding in the late 1990s were no longer in existence at the time of this research.  For 
example, Lexington United, formed in 1983 as a stand-alone partnership focused on development in 
Lexington, KY.  In 2004, the organization merge with several others to form Commerce Lexington, a 
regional entity engaged in a wider set of activities (Kelly 2011).  In a separate example in Northeast 
Indiana, regional leaders over time withdrew their support of one organization, Indiana Northeast 
Development, in favor of a new organization with a greater role for the private sector.  In addition, 
between the time that the research was started and completed at least one organization identified in 
the census, the Heart of Florida Regional Coalition, ceased to exist.  In light of this, the founding dates 
reported by survey respondents, particularly those before 1950, may reflect the founding date of the 
earliest organization to which the current one may trace its history. 
5.4 Most REDOs were founded jointly by the public and private sector 
The respondents were also asked about the role of the public and private sector in the founding 
and current operation of the organization.  The most important finding is that the private sector played 
a role in the founding of 84% of responding REDOs (Figure 1.5).  The public sector, though, was involved 
in the founding of 71% of responding REDOs.  This supports the notion that third wave economic 
development organizations are characterized by a greater role for the private sector.  That 29% of 
respondents were founded without the involvement of the public sector indicates how different current 
RDOs are form the earlier generation of publicly sponsored RPCs and COGs.  This result shows that 
anecdotal findings about the central role of the private sector such as those of Hamilton (Hamilton 
2002) are not isolated examples.  Though 55% of REDOs were founded jointly by the public and private 
sectors, nearly half were founded by only one or the other.  This shows the limited use of the term 
“partnership” as applied to REDOs, since it can imply partnerships across various geographies, sectors, 
or both. 
Within each major sector – public and private – survey respondents indicated participation by 
various elements of each (Figure 1.6).  In particular, local governments and chambers of commerce were 
the most common participants in founding REDOs, but trade associations, the wider business 
community, and higher levels of government also played roles in different regions.  Though not 
specifically included as response items in the survey, respondents reported the involvement of utilities, 
foundations, community colleges, and universities. 
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Figure 1.5 – Composition of founders of REDOs 
 
Figure 1.6 – Involvement by various groups in founding REDOs 
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REDOs founded without the involvement of the private sector were slightly less likely to receive funding 
from that sector once the organization was up and running.  These findings suggest that while joint 
public and private involvement at an early stage is not a prerequisite for later joint support, the former 
makes the latter more likely. 
Table 1.1 – Relationship of founding parties to current support in REDO respondents 
 
Public-Private 
Board 
 
Public-Private 
Funding 
Founded by Yes No   Yes No 
Exclusively public 11 5 
 
8 8 
Both 48 6 
 
48 6 
Exclusively private 20 9  22 7 
Total 79 20  78 21 
 
 In many REDOs, the private sector involvement comes primarily through local or regional 
chambers of commerce.  Of the 104 REDOs responding to the survey, 13 were actual chambers of 
commerce.  An additional 17 were formally a part of a chamber, often through an arrangement where 
the CEO of the REDO was also the Executive VP of Economic Development for the chamber.  Of the 
remaining 76 organizations, 10 received funding from a Chamber, 7 shared office space with the 
chamber, and 3 shared staff.  These results indicate that a significant minority of REDOs maintain a 
formal relationship with a local chamber. 
5.5 REDOs are primarily but not exclusively marketing organizations 
 A final set of questions examined the sort of activities REDOs on which REDOs spent time and 
resources.  Of a set of choices, respondents were asked to pick the three on which their organization 
spent the most time and resources (Figure 1.7).  By far the most common activities were regional 
marketing, targeting and prospecting for new businesses that might locate in the region, and site 
selection assistance.  However, a significant number were also involved in workforce development, 
entrepreneurship, and small business development.  This shows that far from being exclusively focused 
on regional marketing, REDOs are engaged in a wide range of economic development policy approaches. 
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Figure 1.7 – Activities of REDOs 
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show considerable variety in the organizations described by the term.  In this section, I discuss several of 
those findings in more detail in light of the regional economic development literature reviewed in 
section two.  
This definition of REDOs developed and adopted in this research reflects my intention to 
recognizes the changes that have taken place in regional economic development organizations over the 
past few decades, yet limit what type of organizations truly constitutes a REDO.  This was not a 
straightforward task.  Both the term “regional” and the term “economic development organization” 
proved difficult to define in practice.  In both cases, the definition used here was a fairly narrow one.  
The idea of the “region’ has been the subject of extensive consideration elsewhere in the literature.  In 
conducting the REDO census, two issues arose that are relevant to those discussions. 
First, the particular geography covered by REDOs often was not coterminous with MSAs.  One 
example of this is the Heartland Regional partnership centered in Peoria, IL, which operated in four of 
the five counties in the Peoria, IL MSA as well as one that was not included in it.  This is a minor 
mismatch, and small enough that the Heartland Partnership was still included in the REDO census.  A 
more common phenomenon is that of regional organizations that cover only one county of a multi-
county MSA.  In smaller regions, such organizations might cover most or all of a functional economic 
unit, thus many of them were included in the REDO census.  In contrast, such organizations operating in 
larger MSAs were much less likely to have a true regional focus. 
Clearly, one’s definition of a region will have a large effect on determining regional 
organizations, and my justification for using MSAs is covered in an earlier section.  It can, however lead 
to surprising results.  For example, in the northwest corner of South Carolina, Spartanburg County 
comprises a single MSA.  The Economic Futures Group of Spartanburg County, a REDO that operates 
throughout the county, was included in the list since it passed all the filters including that of covering 
the entirety of a single-county MSA.  One county over, the Greenville Area Development Corporation 
operates in Greenville County, one of three in the Greenville-Maudlin-Easley, SC MSA.  Though both are 
county-level organizations, only one was included in the REDO census since they operate in MSA of very 
different sizes.  Furthermore, both MSAs are included within the larger Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson Combined Statistical Area.  This latter point further underscores the difficulty of identifying a 
single definition for a region.  As metropolitan areas grow larger and more complex, the OMB has 
moved from a single-level definition of a region to one that contains multiple levels including 
Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, Combined Statistical Areas, and Metropolitan Divisions. 
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The organizations listed in Appendix 1 are thus to some degree a byproduct of my definition of a 
region, but that should not obscure the more fundamental point that in many places, REDOs cover only 
a part of the region as defined as a functional economic unit.  This finding  has implications for the 
potential effectiveness of REDOs.  Following Beauregard’s (1995) argument presented in section two, 
one important justifications for engaging in regional economic development efforts and not just local 
ones is that the region is an “appropriate scale” for addressing economic development policy.  If the 
organizations that are attempting to meet this policy need are not actually operating at the scale of a 
functional economic unit, then it is not clear that they are serving the purpose that many imagine for 
them.   
Regional economic development is also proposed as a potential solution to competition for large 
employers by local jurisdictions.  As noted above, 28 of the regions examined had more than one REDO 
operating within them.  Though regional organizations often lack the direct control over tax incentives 
that serve to make competition between cities and counties so rampant, they are not likely to be totally 
immune to the pressures that drive competition at the local level.  In these 28 regions, REDOs may be 
contributors to local competition rather than solutions to it. 
 One relevant consideration to this discussion is that regions change over time.  Counties that 
were once rural become suburbs, and linked with metropolitan areas in ways that they once were not.  
Since one of the justifications for addressing economic development policy at the regional scale is to 
focus on the entirety of a functional unit, the scale at which problems are addressed ought to change 
over time.  This method allows for that variability to be taken into account.  There will be lags in 
organizational development as the local political culture in a place becomes aware of the need to 
address problems at different scales, but a definition of “regional” that takes such temporal change into 
account is superior to one that does not.  This should not be seen as an argument for defining regions as 
MSAs in all cases.  In other policy areas, such as environmental policy, different definitions such as 
watersheds might be more appropriate.  Given the functional economic argument that underlies MSAs, 
however, they are a reasonable definition for those organizations working on economic development.   
The nature of REDOs allows them to be more responsive to changes in a regional structure over 
time.  Specifically, their voluntary nature allows for additional areas to “join” the region, since doing so 
may only require that a prospective member city or county invest a certain amount of funding in the 
organization.  One of the organizations in the census, the Northeast Indiana Regional Partnership, did 
see several suburban counties join and drop out of the region over the past ten years (Green, 
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forthcoming).  Such a structure might allow for REDOs to be more responsive to changing economic 
structures than general purpose governments whose mandates are derived from legislation.  On a 
darker note, it might also keep cities or counties with fewer resources from being able to access the 
benefits provided by the regional organization. Finally, without the mandate of official government, 
REDOs are reliant upon the continued support of their investors. 
An even more intriguing prospect is raised by the one out of five organizations that lack public 
involvement in their leadership.  Such organizations would not necessarily be tied to a particular 
territory, since their investors lack the territorial mandates of true government.  These regional 
organizations, while centering their efforts on a metropolitan area, might avoid specific decisions about 
whether they “represent” a particular county.  In the case of the Toledo Regional Growth Partnership, 
the absence of public sector involvement allowed the organization to describe its geographic mandate 
rather loosely as northwest Ohio and southeast Michigan.  Though such flexibility is advantageous in the 
face of changing regions, it must to a degree dilute the ability of the organization to speak for an entire 
region or to engage in certain forms of long-range regional planning. 
Determining what constituted an ‘economic development” organization was also difficult.  As 
noted in section 3, this research defined economic development organizations as those that made 
economic development their main focus and dedicated staff and resources to that end.  In the course of 
the research, it became clear that there were organizations, such as regional planning commissions, that 
did engage in some economic development related activity.  However, these organizations usually 
engaged in a wider set of policy issues, and rarely had more than a single staff person (and sometimes 
less) to economic development.  That such organizations were not included in the census should not be 
taken as a dismissal of their efforts.  It is, rather, a reflection of how little such organizations have in 
common with the idealized regional organizations described in the economic development literature.  
The role that such organizations can or ought to play in regional economic development policy was not 
addressed in this research. 
6.2 What is new about REDOs? 
 This study has shown that REDOs are nearly ubiquitous in US metropolitan areas.  The growth in 
their number that began in the 1980’s, as identified in prior studies, has continued through the first 
decade of this century.   In light of the discussion comparing them to earlier types of regional 
organizations, it is fair to ask what exactly is new about REDOs. The findings presented here provide 
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several answers.  First, the private sector has played a considerably larger role in REDOs than it did in 
earlier regional efforts.  This is reflected in the 84% of REDOs that the private sector had a hand in 
starting and the 80% or so of them that currently operate with private sector finding or direction.  At the 
same time, the public sector has still played a considerable role in their formation and operation.   
REDOs organization outside of traditional government, while not new or unique to them, certainly 
facilitated the larger role the private sector has played. 
 The participation of both the public and private sectors in REDOs makes it tempting to refer to 
them all as “public-private partnerships” and leave it at that.  Though it wasn’t the main focus of this 
research, some of the findings as well as several bits of anecdotal evidence indicate considerable 
variation among REDOs with respect to the participation of each sector.  The results of the survey 
suggest that while the private sector is nearly always engaged with REDOs in some way, this 
participation is not of the same character from place to place.  The most notable different is in the role 
of the local chamber of commerce.  This relationship varied from one in which REDOs were officially part 
of the chamber to one in which the chamber was not affiliated in any official aspect.  This variation is 
important because of the easily forgotten fact that the private sector is not homogenous in its interests, 
even within a single region (Curran, Rutherfoord, and Smith 2000; Peck and Tickell 1995).  An 
examination of the boards of directors of several REDOs indicated considerable variation in the relative 
power of the public and private sector.  All of this variation suggests that terms like “partnership” may 
mask important variation among REDOs. 
 A second aspect of REDOs that is novel is the degree to which they reflect changes in federal 
funding for regional economic development.  First and foremost, this is reflected in their shift away from 
Economic Development Administration programs such as Economic Development Districts that provide 
relatively meager funding.  This might be contrasted with something like the metropolitan planning 
organizations, which were designed originally to address transportation issues, and which still funnel 
considerable federal transportation dollars to metropolitan areas.  On the other hand, a significant 
number of REDOs listed “workforce development” as one of their top three activities.  This is likely a 
response to the comparatively greater funding available through federal workforce programs.  
Furthermore, the requirement that regional workforce efforts include a large role for the private sector 
suits REDOs well. 
 This research shows that REDOs merit more careful consideration than they have received to 
this point.  The findings indicate that REDOs represent a new type of organization whose numbers 
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continue to grow in the US.  They are characterized by a much greater role for the private sector, as well 
as a new organizational structure that makes that role easier.  The relative influence of the public and 
private sectors within REDOs seems to vary considerably from place to place.  The findings also show 
that in many places REDOs fall short of the hope for regional economic development organizations that 
serve functional economic units.  Certain aspects of their organization make them more adaptable to 
changes in a region when compared to earlier generations of economic development organizations, 
though whether this will be an asset or a liability remains to be seen. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This study developed and implemented a method of identifying REDOs in the US, and then 
presented the findings of a survey of organization on that list.  This work is novel in that it is the first of 
its kind that looks to identify REDOs without a bias toward the public sector.  As economic development 
practice evolves at the regional scale, tracking such organizations will be a necessary foundation for 
cross-sectional or longitudinal studies of them.  As was noted in the discussion, the shelf life of any such 
list will be limited by the volatility inherent in the REDO organizational landscape.  Methods such as the 
one developed here are useful in part because a census of REDOs will be necessary every few years in 
order to maintain a current list. 
 The definitions of regions and organizations adopted here are not likely to satisfy all interested 
parties.  The purpose in presenting them was to make clear how necessary such a definition was in order 
to bring clarity to organizations that have thus far not been the subject of much research.  Several of the 
organizations included in this research cover areas larger than some states, yet our definition of regional 
includes them as well as single county organizations in small regions.  This research will not be the last 
word on the subject, and a wider discussion about the differences between city, county, multi-county, 
and private economic development organizations would be a benefit to the field.   
 The results of the survey answer several basic questions about REDOs including how they were 
formed and in what sorts of activities they engage.  However, it leaves a number of questions 
unanswered.  Two of these deserve particular mention.  First, the proliferation of regional organizations 
adds a layer to an already complicated organizational field of city and county organizations.  In the ideal 
case, these various organizations would allocate the various economic development needs of the region 
among them, with each taking the lead on the most appropriate policy areas.  Done well, such a division 
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of efforts could yield the benefits of regional cooperation while preserving a voice for smaller 
jurisdictions within the region to address needs specific to them.  On the other hand, it might be the 
case that the overlapping responsibilities lead to confusion, turf battles, or the inefficient duplication of 
efforts.  Additional research will be necessary to fully understand the relationships between economic 
development organizations operating at different sub-state scales. 
Second, REDOs bring together the resources of the public and private sectors, though in 
different proportions and with the involvement of different players.  It remains to be seen whether and 
how the variation in public and private sector involvement in REDOs affects organizations’ behavior and 
capacity to act.  The growing role of the private sector could represent a co-opting of economic 
development policy organizations by a small set of actors that use them to pursue limited self-interest.  
It could also be seen as a necessary palliative to intransigent infighting and competition between local 
governments.  In either case, the ability of regional economic development organizations to affect 
regional economies is unknown. 
 This research has laid the groundwork necessary to begin to answer questions such as these.  
The organizations in Appendix 1 are a benchmark against which changes in the REDO landscape in the 
coming years may be measured.  In addition, it has presented an updated snapshot of REDO activity in 
the US.  Though it raises as many questions as it answers, it will hopefully serve to bring clarity and 
understanding to what has thus far been a rarely examined corner of economic development practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Equal parts location quotients and press releases: the results of a cross-sectional survey of 
cluster-based regional economic development efforts in the US 
 
1. Introduction 
In a much cited article, Levy (1996) drew a distinction between rational model and sales 
activities in local economic development practice.  More recently, the debate around cluster-based 
economic development practice has broken along similar lines.  To some, clusters are a critically 
important object of sophisticated analytical techniques and a crucial determinant of regional economic 
competitiveness.  To others, they are merely an updated form of industrial recruiting, prone to all of the 
worst abuses of that approach.  This paper, which presents the findings from a national survey of 
regional economic development organizations in the US, calls Levy’s stark distinction into question 
through an analysis of cluster practice by regional economic development organization in the US. 
Though clusters have been popular for several decades in economic development, there are few 
cross sectional studies of the practice.  Most literature is in the form of case studies.  While many of 
these are illuminating, they suffer from a lack of generalizability and as a whole they depict far more 
success stories than failures despite anecdotal evidence that the latter are more common.  Furthermore, 
this research attempts to understand not individual cluster initiatives, but rather how organizations do 
cluster-based economic development.  This is an important distinction.  Since regional economic 
development organizations often claim the presence of multiple clusters in a region, it is reasonable to 
approach cluster based practice from the perspective of an organization working with multiple clusters 
rather than through a single (successful) cluster initiative. 
The focus on clusters is timely, but this research was also motivated by a desire to revisit Levy’s 
distinction between selling and rational activities after several decades and in a slightly different 
context.  Clusters are by definition linked to a particular place.  They involve spatially circumscribed 
processes that lend advantages to particular firms.  As such, working with clusters implies at least some 
activity that would not fall within what Levy called sales activities.  On the other hand, the proliferation 
of cluster analysis techniques and cluster consultants has given rise to a cottage industry of cluster 
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identification studies that, while they vary in sophistication, are an example of what Levy termed 
rational activity.  This paper sheds light on current cluster practice and uses the findings as a way to 
reexamine Levy’s seminal paper. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section reviews the literature on the use of 
clusters in economic development practice, and reviews the distinction between marketing and rational 
activities in economic development.  The third section describes the design and implementation of the 
survey.  The fourth section presents the findings of the research.  The fifth section discusses the findings 
and how cluster practice fits into established notions of economic development practice.  The sixth 
section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 The somewhat murky cluster concept 
 The concept of clusters has been a popular one in regional economic development for the past 
few decades.  Popularized in the US by Michael Porter (1990) as an explanation of national economic 
success, the regional variant of the concept is an elaboration upon older concepts such as agglomeration 
economics, industrial districts, and innovative milieu (Bergman and Feser 1999).  Though specific 
definitions vary somewhat, regional clusters are generally described as spatially proximate firms and 
related institutions that generate mutually beneficial synergies in the form of increased productivity or 
innovative capacity.  Exactly how firms in clusters gain advantages over those that are not in clusters 
remains the subject of research and debate, and one that is made more difficult by the many forms that 
clusters themselves can take (Markusen 1996b; Bergman and Feser 1999; Martin and Sunley 2003).  
Thus far, studies have produced only limited evidence of a connection between clusters and higher 
productivity and new firm formation (Porter 2003; Feser, Renski, and Goldstein 2008). 
2.2 The role of clusters in regional economic development policy 
 The persistent questions about the link between clusters and economic growth and 
development have not stopped the spread of the idea in policy circles (Sölvell, Lindqvist, and Ketels 
2003).  Cluster policy discussions wrestle with two related questions.  The first concerns the proper role 
for cluster-based policies in economic development practice.  There is wide agreement that no single 
type of cluster-based policy will be appropriate in all situations because specific clusters vary with 
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respect to their industrial sector, the size and number of firms, and their sources of productivity and 
innovative advantage, among other differences (Bergman and Feser 1999).  Clusters are also dynamic, 
and young and old clusters require different policy responses (Atherton 2003; Maskell and Malmberg 
2007).  The idea that there is no “one size fits all cluster policy” is expressed most clearly in the idea that 
clusters represent a way of thinking about a regional economy, rather than as a magic bullet for regional 
economic development (Feser and Luger 2003; Feser 2009). 
 In light of this last idea, it should come as no surprise that the specific policy actions 
recommended by cluster experts do not sound particularly revolutionary on their surface.  An early 
guide to cluster policy initiatives at the state level classified them according to four broad aims: organize 
service delivery, target investments, strengthen networking opportunities, and develop human 
resources (Rosenfeld 2002).  A later version added innovation, entrepreneurship, and global trade 
(Rosenfeld 2007).  There are all established policy areas of economic development, and the critical 
recommendation is that the policies be organized and oriented toward particular clusters.  At their 
heart, all of the recommended policies are oriented toward strengthening the relationships within 
clusters that do or have potential to yield advantages in productivity or innovation. 
 The above recommendations make only brief mention of the role of clusters in business 
attraction programs.  Rosenfeld (2002) notes that attraction and marketing are still the main reason  
states expend resources to identify clusters.  Research on cluster initiatives in other countries have also 
found this to be the case (Sölvell, Lindqvist, and Ketels 2003).  The reluctance to make attraction efforts 
a centerpiece of cluster policy recommendations is in part a reflection of the cluster concept itself, 
which makes firms that are already in the region the primary focus of policy interest, but it is also a 
reflection of the larger controversy over attraction efforts in general.  Attraction efforts, particularly 
when they involve large subsidies, often fail to provide real benefits in terms of economic growth or 
development (LeRoy 2005; A. Peters and Fisher 2004). 
 The role of clusters in attraction policy is of particular interest for many reasons.  Attraction 
efforts still constitute a major emphasis of economic development efforts, so it is reasonable to examine 
whether or not the cluster concept is affecting that policy area.  This is particularly true at the regional 
scale, where economic development organizations are often created with regional marketing as their 
main purpose (Olberding 2002a).  Critics of the role of clusters in economic development policy have 
argued that by providing a veneer of respectability to attraction efforts, the concept provides cover for 
the worst behavior of less scrupulous economic development officials (Martin and Sunley 2003).  
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Anticipating this critique, Porter (1996) argued that clusters should not be used to promote smokestack 
chasing. 
On the other hand, there are two arguments in favor of using clusters to inform attraction 
efforts.  One, many of the tools that economic development officials already possess are oriented 
around attraction (Rosenfeld 2002).  Shifting those tools toward supporting and growing clusters might 
be easier than creating new policy tools from scratch.  Two, attraction by itself is not necessarily a bad 
thing, though  excessive subsidies provided without guarantees are.  Firms may at times move because 
some new location offers real locational advantages.  Knowing something about what clusters exist in a 
region may help economic development officials evaluate different choices in attraction policy 
(Woodward and Guimaraes 2009).  Furthermore, if a potential new firm is part of an existing cluster, 
then the benefits of its move to the local region may, as a result of agglomeration economies, be greater 
than the benefit to the local firm.  In such a scenario, reasonable location incentives may be good policy.  
This has led some to argue that clusters may play a useful role in attraction efforts (Woodward and 
Guimaraes 2009; Goetz, Deller, and Harris 2009). 
2.3 The relationship between attraction and other economic development policies 
The entire argument about the role of clusters in attraction policy presumes that attraction 
activities are different and separate from other economic development policies.  That notion is made 
popular by the widely used acronym ACRE (for attraction, creation, retention, and expansion) to classify 
economic development efforts.  It was also popularized in Levy’s (1996) article that distinguished 
between what he called rational model activities and sales activities.  Through a survey of local 
economic development practitioners, Levy showed that sales-related activities consumed more of the 
time of and were more highly valued by economic development officials than were so-called rational 
activities like economic analysis.  The sales activities Levy described were not exclusively related to 
attraction, and he rightly noted the need for economic developers to publicize their work in their own 
area.  Nevertheless the findings of the survey supported the notion that in economic development sales 
and marketing were a distinct aspect of practice. 
More recent work on economic developments calls into question the usefulness of the 
distinction between sales and rational, and by extension attraction and other activities.  Levy himself 
noted that the type of information necessary for rational planning was not necessarily different than 
that necessary for sales activities, and thus that some forms of data collection might serve both 
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processes.  In addition, the rational model itself has been criticized for decades as being a poor 
description of how policies are made (Lindblom 1959; Mintzberg 1994).  Regional economic 
development is widely understood to be shaped by public and private actors, and the institutions 
produced by the interactions between the two (Amin 1999; Cooke and Morgan 1998).  These notions 
imply that practice cannot assume the level of control over the economy that the rational model 
implies, and that sufficient information for creating policy is not apt to be produced simply by the 
location quotients so derided by Levy.  Instead, knowledge about the regional economy, whether it is to 
be used for attraction, business development, or workforce training, must come from interaction 
between economic developers and the many different parts of the regional economy.  This idea is 
central to the cluster concept, which places not simply local firms but local interactions as the focus of 
policy. 
2.4 Can clusters bridge attraction with other forms of economic development practice? 
The cluster concept and its related analytical techniques can certainly provide information that 
is useful to marketing campaigns.  However, secondary data sources offer only limited information 
about clusters, and those that offer more are so technically sophisticated as to be out of reach for many 
economic development organizations.  To address this, cluster policy entails interaction with the cluster 
itself to produce basic information and policy proposals.  This interactive form of data gathering does 
not fit well within either piece of Levy’s sales versus rational model distinction, nor does it clearly fall 
under attraction or locally-focused policy.  It could easily serve both.  As one example, canvassing local 
industry for “success stories” to be used in a marketing campaign might produce conversations about 
poor infrastructure, a lack of trained workers, or other issues.  The survey results reported below begin 
to shed some light on whether or not this is in fact happening in regional clusters initiatives in the US. 
 Whether used with an inward or outward looking focus, the focus of cluster efforts may be 
extant or potential clusters.  As mentioned above, there is some consensus that clusters in the short 
term cannot be grown by attracting a few new firms to a region.  However, the variety in types of 
agglomeration economies and the difficulty of observing them in practice leave a fair amount of room 
for policy experimentation.  In other words, certain types of attraction may be justified in support of 
clusters.  Given the dominance of attraction-focused activity in economic development, this leaves a 
great deal of room for using the possible presence of a potential cluster, or the difficult to disprove 
existence of a loosely-defined one, as a justification for all sorts of marketing and recruitment activities.
 As a sort of shorthand description of a regional economy, clusters may also be useful in regional 
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branding efforts.  The brands may serve as a signal to those within and outside the region about the 
economy, and more importantly about what local leaders imagine or hope the economy to be.  Such 
signals would be useful in coordinating activity within and between regions.  Additionally, they may 
serve as signals to those who control important resources such as grants.  From a public policy 
perspective, whether used in outright attraction or as a signal the degree to which a named cluster is 
present in a region may not be the most important issue to consider.  It may be more important to 
determine whether or not the act of naming that cluster yield positive benefits to the regional economy 
in the form or greater capacity through coordination or the provision of additional investment.  The 
caveat to this understanding of clusters in public policy is that the people and organizations that use the 
cluster concept as described here need to be aware that they are doing so.  This may not always be the 
case, particularly when cluster analysis prepared by consultants is used uncritically by regional 
organizations. 
 
3. Survey design and implementation 
3.1 Research Design 
This research employed a cross-sectional design operationalized by a survey of 231 REDOs 
operating in US metropolitan areas.  Because of the relatively small size of the population, the survey 
was sent to all organizations.  The survey instrument was used to collect data on whether organizations 
were familiar with clusters in their region, as well as how those clusters were identified and with what if 
any purpose in mind.  In addition, for those organizations that were closely involved with a cluster 
identification effort, the instrument collected data on the ways in which that process affected the 
activities of the organization.  The research was designed to explore the proposition that clusters might 
usefully inform both attraction activities and locally-focused initiatives. 
3.2 Survey Instrument  
The survey instrument, included as Appendix 1, consisted of 55 questions designed to collect 
data on the experiences of each organization with respect to cluster-based economic development 
policy along with general information about the basic characteristics and functioning of the 
organization.  Most questions were closed-ended, though they did allow respondents to choose multiple 
answers.  Following Dillman’s (2000) advice, cognitive interviews were conducted prior to the pilot test 
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with several economic development professionals with significant knowledge and experience with 
cluster-based economic development policy.  Such cognitive interviews help check for comprehension 
and meaning of individual survey questions, as well as logical flow throughout the survey instrument. 
3.3 Survey Implementation 
The survey was pilot tested in late 2011.  The full survey was sent in early 2012 to the executive 
director or CEO of each organization through standard mail, along with a letter directing that individual 
to an online version.  Following Dillman (2000), the implementation consisted of four contacts.  The first 
three were sent via standard US Postal Service and included a pre-notice, the survey itself, and a 
reminder postcard.  Each of these three mailings also included directions for completing the survey 
online.  The fourth contact was a phone call to organizations who had not yet responded in which the 
respondent or their administrative staff were reminded the survey and offered either an additional hard 
copy or an email with an embedded link to the online survey.  The contacts yielded 104 valid responses, 
for a response rate of 44%. 
3.4 Representativeness of the survey 
 The 44 percent response rate was modest, but not unreasonable for a survey of organizations.  
Because the survey was sent to the entire population, the response data may reflect sample bias.  For 
this reason, inferential statistics were not used in the analysis.  Nevertheless, the respondents are widely 
representative geographically and by organization size. 
 
4. Findings 
 The survey responses yielded data on the motivations to engage in cluster analysis, the sorts of 
activities in which the organizations engaged with respect to clusters, and the names of specific clusters.  
For those respondents who were involved in a cluster identification effort, the survey data include 
information on specific analytical methods.  All 104 of the respondents claimed to be aware of clusters 
within their respective regions.  Of those 104, 94 of the respondent organizations had been involved in 
an effort to identify clusters in their region. 
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4.1 Motivations to engage in cluster identification efforts 
 The survey data show that engaging in cluster identification efforts is in general motivated by a 
desire to know more about the regional economy, as opposed to in response to pressure from funders 
or partner organizations (Table 2.1).  However, when asked if the cluster identification effort was 
designed to inform a particular program, 91 of 94 organizations answered in the affirmative.  When 
asked to indicate which programs in particular, respondents chose attraction-related programs like 
marketing and site selection at higher rates than most other programs (Table 2.2).  The one exception to 
this was workforce development, which was identified as often as the attraction related programs. 
Table 2.1 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Which, if any, of the 
following was a motivation for the cluster identification effort?” (n=94) 
Motivation Percent 
A desire to better understand the regional economy 92.6 
A planned revision to previously identified clusters 47.9 
Inception of a new program by the organization 58.5 
It was part of a grant application 22.3 
A partner organization wanted to identify clusters 37.2 
Other similar organizations were identifying clusters in their regions 23.4 
 
Table 2.2 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Which program(s) was 
the cluster identification effort designed to inform or support?” (n=91) 
Program Percent 
Site selection assistance 80.2 
Recruitment 94.5 
Financing for firms new to the region 28.6 
Financing for expanding or relocating firms already in the region 34.1 
Management expertise and advising 37.4 
Small business development 46.2 
Workforce development 89.0 
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4.2 The number and type of clusters reported 
 Respondents were asked to name the specific clusters in their region.   Though all respondents 
reported clusters in their region, the number of clusters reported ranged from 1 to 10, the latter being 
the highest allowed by the survey instrument (Figure 2.1).  About half of respondents reported five or six 
clusters.  There was no connection between the size of a metro area and the number of clusters 
reported.  The total number of clusters for all 104 respondents was 675. 
Since there is no unique standard way to describe clusters, the reported cluster names are open 
to some degree of interpretation.  As described above, the degree to which named clusters represent 
extant cluster in a region is often an unresolved issue.  The survey asked respondents to “list the clusters 
[their] organization was aware of in [their] region.”  Though this suggest a preference for extant clusters, 
it is not known if repondents interpreted it as such, or if they would be able to make such a 
determination about each of “their” clusters without assistance.  The clusters reported by respondents 
reflect their own understandings of the term.  The names may serve as signals to as much as a means of 
describing the firms in area.  In spite of the necessary interpretation, it was possible to compare clusters 
from different regions.  There were 436 unique cluster names.  The clusters themselves were a mix of 
general and specific.  The most frequently reported cluster was “Advanced Manufacturing” which was 
reported by 21 respondents.  “Health Care” (or “Healthcare”) was a close second, with 20 reported 
clusters by that name. 
Such clusters appear to be quite loosely-defined, but there were many more clusters that were 
defined more narrowly.  Levy (1996) evaluated the specificity of different targets by the number of digits 
in the NAICS code, such that a 3-digit target was considered to be more narrow than a two-digit target.  
A similar technique was used with the clusters, though it involved more interpretation.  All of the 675 
clusters were coded into three groups.  The first group consisted of those that were less-specific.  These 
were clusters that closely matched a two-digit NAICS category.  An example would be the “health care” 
and “advanced manufacturing” clusters mentioned above, which closely resemble NAICS codes 62 
Health Care and Social Assistance and 31-33 Manufacturing.  The second group consisted of those that 
were more specific, such as “electrical equipment and appliances” and “food packaging.” The third 
group included a number of clusters that lacked specificity but seemed designed to reflect popular 
targets for attraction and investment, specifically those oriented toward “high technology,” the “green 
economy,” and “creative fields.”  The numbers of clusters in each group are shown in Table 2.3. 
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Figure 2.1 – Variation in the number of clusters reported 
 
Table 2.3 – Number of clusters by specificity level and type 
Specificity Number 
More specific (similar to three-digit NAICS) 281 
Less specific (similar to two-digit NAICS) 132 
Less specific, and oriented 
toward popular targets 
High Technology 5 
Green Economy 15 
Creative 3 
 
Individual organizations did not tend to have a preponderance of either specific or less specific 
clusters.  Instead, most organizations had a mix of both.  For those 91 organizations reporting four or 
more clusters in their region, the average share of more specific clusters was 62 percent, and the 
distribution was not bimodal.  The specificity of clusters varied within most organizations. 
4.3 Cluster identification methods 
 The 94 respondents whose organization had participated in a cluster identification effort were 
asked whether or not they have been personally involved with the cluster identification effort.  Seventy-
eight reported that they were, and from these the survey instrument collected data on analytical 
methods and the process of identifying clusters.  Respondents were asked about which sources of 
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information and analytical approaches were used, and the results are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  The 
choices provided in Table 2.5 are the result of feedback received while developing the instrument.  The 
question was designed to include choices that would be relevant to respondents with varying degrees of 
familiarity with industry cluster analysis while still capturing important differences. 
Table 2.4 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Which, if any, of the 
following provided information used to identify clusters?” (n=78) 
 
Information source Percent 
A systematic analysis of the regional economy 96.2 
Discussions among organization’s staff 89.7 
Discussions with experts on the regional economy outside of the organization 84.6 
Discussions with political leaders in the region 70.5 
Advocacy from members of the clusters themselves 67.9 
 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 suggest that most cluster analysis involved multiple methods.  Quantitative 
analysis of industry and occupational data was cited by nearly all respondents, but discussions with staff, 
local experts, and political leaders were all common.  Supply chain linkages were cited by two-thirds of 
respondents, though the survey did not attempt to ascertain the specific details of any particular 
method.  Unsurprisingly, social network analysis was not cited by many despite its relevance in cluster 
theory.  Though many possibilities were explored, no significant connection between the data sources, 
analytical methods and the types of clusters emerged. 
 All 94 organizations that had been involved in cluster identification efforts were asked who else 
had been involved in the effort.  The results, shown in Table 2.6, show that both the private sector and 
individual firms were closely involved with most identification efforts.  Local governments were also 
major players. 
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Table 2.5 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Which, if any, of the 
following analytical methods were used to identify clusters?” (n=78) 
 
Analytical method / approach Percent 
Quantitative analysis of regional occupational data 94.9 
Quantitative analysis of regional industry data 96.2 
Analysis of supply chain linkages between local industries 60.3 
Analysis of social and professional connections between firms in the region 32.1 
Location quotients 75.6 
Bubble charts 44.9 
 
Table 2.6 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Were any of the 
following people or groups involved in the cluster identification effort?” (n=94) 
 
Other organization Percent 
External contractor or consultant hired by your organization 72.3 
Local government representatives 66.0 
State government representatives 52.1 
Representatives of individual firms 73.4 
Trade associations 34.0 
 
4.4 Ways of working with clusters 
 Though respondents cited attraction-related programs as a key motivator for cluster 
identification efforts, the respondents reported doing more than just marketing the clusters.  For 
example, respondents reported that working with representatives of the cluster in about the same 
frequency as they reported advertising clusters on their website (Table 2.7).  While the survey did not 
ask the nature of the working group, the formation of such a group has the potential to produce 
information useful in attraction programs and in those focused on local firms.  About half of 
respondents also reported that their organizational resources were allocated, at least in part, to specific 
clusters (Table 2.8).  The respondents also reported tracking results by cluster, and the results included 
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not only things like jobs created and leads generated, but also the number of meetings held with cluster 
firms (Table 2.9). 
Table 2.7 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Has your organization 
worked with clusters in any of the following ways?” (n=104) 
Engaged in the following Percent 
Advertised or marketed clusters on its website 74.0 
Designed specific programs to meet the needs of individual clusters 76.0 
Formed a working group with representatives of a cluster to address the needs 
of that cluster 
81.7 
Worked with state officials to address the needs of a particular cluster 79.8 
 
Table 2.8 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Does your organization 
coordinate its operations around the clusters in any of the following ways?” (n=104) 
Coordination type Percent 
Specific staff are assigned to focus on specific clusters 51.0 
Specific funds are allocated toward specific clusters 45.2 
 
Table 2.9 – Share of respondents answering in the affirmative to the question “Does your organization 
track any of the following metrics by specific cluster?” (n=104) 
Tracked by Cluster Percent 
Leads / potential prospects generated 70.2 
Jobs created in region 79.8 
Direct or leveraged financing for attraction, expansion and relocation 47.1 
Meetings held with cluster representatives 61.5 
 
 In addition to the general questions reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, the 94 respondents whose 
organizations had participated in a cluster identification effort were asked if and how the process of 
identifying clusters affected their organizations’ operations.  The difference between these and the data 
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reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 is that these questions ask specifically about the result of conducting 
cluster analysis.  The results, shown in Table 2.10, support the notion that cluster practice is about more 
than just attraction, though that certainly is an important part.  The activity that was most usefully 
informed by the cluster identification was attempts to reach out to local firms.  Branding and recruiting 
were a close second. 
Table 2.10 – Respondents’ responses about how output of cluster analysis was used (n=94) 
Did the output of your analysis inform . . . Not much 
(Score=1) 
Somewhat 
(Score=2) 
A great deal 
(Score=3) 
Average 
score 
Your last three major recruiting efforts 17 25 37 2.25 
Your last effort to reach out to local firms 8 27 46 2.47 
Your last three small business trainings 22 16 6 1.64 
Your last effort to brand your organization 20 27 25 2.07 
Your last budget planning meeting 16 30 28 2.16 
Your last effort to brand your region 15 27 33 2.24 
Your last review of progress toward your goals 13 38 30 2.21 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Clusters involve more than just marketing and attraction 
 The survey data provide some support for the idea that economic development organizations 
are using the cluster concept for more than just attraction.  Efforts to identify clusters in a region are 
motivated by a desire to learn about the economy, and specifically a desire to inform attraction and 
workforce development activity.  These two policy areas were cited by the vast majority of respondents, 
but small business development was cited by nearly half of them.  Clusters seem to be of interest 
beyond simply as a means of targeting attraction efforts.   
The popularity of workforce development as a motivation was somewhat surprising, but might 
be explained in several ways.  On the one hand, it may still be all about attraction, and the organization 
may simply be interested in collecting information about regional labor skills and training programs that 
they could use in marketing campaigns.  On the other hand, the relationship between workforce and 
economic development has been the focus of a great deal of policy interest over the past few years 
(Renski 2009; Harper-Anderson 2008).  The interest of the respondents may reflect this trend.  However, 
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this small number of respondents that cited a grant application as a motivation for identifying clusters 
indicates that the popularity of workforce as a motivation is all about chasing grant money.  Finally, it 
may be some combination of the two that truly does use the cluster idea to bridge attraction and selling 
with locally-focused “rational” efforts.  For example, the organizations may be partnering with local 
workforce boards to develop training programs that meet the needs of certain local firms and at the 
same time using the existence of such programs to promote the region. 
The type and number of clusters reported also suggests that cluster-based policy is a hybrid of 
rational and sales activities.  Most regions claimed to know of five or six clusters.  There is no particular 
reason why such a number would be the average number of clusters in any given region, especially 
given the many different analytical approaches that were used by respondents.  Furthermore, one 
would expect that larger, more complex economies would yield more clusters, and this was not the 
case.  On the other hand, many respondents used the clusters to allocate staff and financial resources, in 
which case five or six seems like a workable number for a small organization.  Fifteen clusters would 
demand too much time and attention, and one would be a case of placing all of ones eggs in a single 
basket. 
The fact that individual regions had a mix of narrowly and less narrowly defined clusters also 
suggests that in any region, some of the clusters reflect significant, specific local concentrations of 
activity, whereas other clusters serve to round out the cluster list and perhaps attract flashy new 
industries like green energy.  Such cluster lists would likely be the result of a mix of objective cluster 
analysis and a range of operational, political, or other concerns.  The prevalence of more narrowly-
defined clusters supports Levy’s argument that not all sales activities are a waste of time, since they may 
introduce information into the notoriously imperfect market for industrial sites.  Clusters do seem well-
suited to this purpose.  Here again, cluster practice bridges rational and sales type activities, as well as 
the attraction versus local focus.  
5.2 The importance of local firms in cluster policy 
 As Levy noted, sales activities can be locally focused.  Economic development organizations, 
particularly regional organizations that rely on voluntary contributions, must publicize their work within 
their region to maintain support.  This is clearly the case with cluster policy.  Contact with local firms was 
cited as the area most informed by cluster identification efforts.  Furthermore, more respondents had 
formed a working group with cluster members than had advertised clusters on their websites.  While 
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recruitment and attraction may be the main motivation to engage with clusters, in practice cluster 
efforts involve a great deal of interaction with local firms. 
 As with the case of workforce development, it may be that all of the effort that goes into 
contacting local firms is geared toward collecting information for marketing campaigns.  The data gained 
through the survey cannot help answer this question.  Even if that were the intent of those who formed 
the working group, it seems unlikely that economic development officials would be able to control the 
process.  Conversations between local firms and economic development officials might lead to all sorts 
of policy proposals and collaborative efforts.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the private sector 
would agree to participate in a group that was only focused on attracting new firms to the region.  
Though cluster theory suggests that local firms might benefit from successful attraction efforts through 
external agglomeration economies, that fact may not be apparent to the private sector.  Such benefits 
are notoriously diffuse and difficult to trace, and it seems unlikely that they would provide sufficient 
motivation to work with the economic development community.  Presumably, the private sector would 
demand that additional topics be addressed if their participation is wanted.  The importance of the local 
private sector in cluster efforts is another indication that such efforts are not simply about sales or 
attraction, even if they are initially motivated by them. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The data presented here come from the first large survey of cluster-based efforts by regional 
economic development organizations in the US.  They show that while most economic development 
officials initially see clusters as a way to inform marketing and attraction efforts, workforce 
development and even small business development programs are also imagined beneficiaries.  
Furthermore, once organizations begin to work with clusters, most of them form some sort of ongoing 
collaboration with local firms that likely informs both attraction and more locally-focused efforts.   
Clusters reported by the respondents seem to be the result of a mix of objective analysis and more 
pragmatic concerns.  Furthermore, most organizations have settled on around five or six clusters, 
suggesting that the importance of clusters is as much in their use in operations as in their ability to 
reveal information about the regional economy.  Finally, while “advanced manufacturing” and similarly 
obtuse clusters were common, most clusters were more narrowly defined. 
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Such narrowly defined clusters are perhaps the best example of how cluster-based economic 
development bridges the divide described by Levy.  Narrowly-defined clusters are likely the result of 
some analysis, though the methods used may vary.  This would place their identification squarely within 
the “rational” side of Levy’s divide.  However, the motivation for the rational activity is to improve sales 
activities.  As mentioned, Levy noted that certain types of data were necessary for rational and sales 
activities, but cluster-based economic development is shown here to be about more than just data 
collection.  Interactions with the local private sector are not likely to remain limited to discussions about 
attraction. 
Levy’s main argument was that the rational model was a poor description of how economic 
developers conducted their work, but in juxtaposing rational activities with sales he set up a straw man 
argument.  The fact that the rational model does not explain economic development practice does not 
lead to the conclusion that practice is all about sales.  Selling the region and the organization are an 
important part of economic development practice, but practice cannot be entirely understood through 
that lens.  Clusters are a perfect example of why this is so.  Clusters (hopefully) involve at least some 
“rational” analysis.  The results of that are then used to sell the region to potential cluster firms not yet 
located there, but they are also used to build relationships with particular sets of local firms.  This, too, is 
a type of selling, but it is oriented toward collaboration.  That collaboration may also yield information 
that is useful in external sales, but it may also lead to discussions of local policy.  Levy’s criticism of the 
idea that economic development is dominated by rational model type activities is well-founded, but in 
collapsing the rest of economic development into the somewhat simplistic notion of sales one misses 
the way in which the two types of activity are interrelated. 
6.1 Limitations of the research 
 The survey data presented here are all self-reported, and as such should be understood to 
reflect some degree of bias on the part of respondents.  In addition, the 44% response rate, which is not 
low for organizational surveys of this type, introduces response bias as well.  The work is also limited in 
that it takes an explicitly organizational focus.  Regional economic development in the US involves 
multiple organizations including metropolitan planning organizations, economic development districts, 
and counties.  This reflects only the understanding of regional organizations with a specific economic 
development focus. 
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 While limiting the generalizability of the research, the focus on regional economic development 
organizations actually makes the results more surprising.  Such organizations are in many cases primarily 
marketing organizations.  The fact that they are using the clusters to inform locally-focused efforts 
suggests that the practice is not unique.  If the organizations in the survey use clusters to inform locally-
focused efforts, then other organizations with less of a marketing focus are even more likely to do so. 
 Finally, the research was limited by the difficulty of drawing conclusions about the nature of a 
cluster from its name.   This is a poor way to understand clusters, but the variety of analytical methods 
available for identifying clusters and the lack of a widely accepted unique way of defining them makes it 
the only available option.  The problem is made more difficult by the fact that the survey respondent 
was the CEO, and not the research director of the organization, or the hired consultant who defined the 
clusters.  For this reason, only very general distinctions such as less and more defined were applied to 
the identified clusters. 
6.2 Future research 
 This research has shown that cluster-based economic development practice is more than a 
cover for attraction, as some critics have argued.  However, it leaves many questions unanswered.  First, 
the working groups that most organizations set up remain a mystery.  It remains to be seen if such 
groups end up producing lasting collaborations or providing the capacity to address different economic 
development challenges.  The focus on only a single type of organization also leaves open the question 
of how organizations devoted to infrastructure planning or open space preservation work with clusters, 
or if they do at all.  Lastly, because the data were collected though a survey, a great deal of nuance in 
how the organizations actually worked with clusters remains elusive.  More qualitative research on how 
organizations use clusters would likely shed light on the practice. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
All Planning, No Strategy: 
Explaining Cluster Policy Decisions of Regional Economic Development Organizations 
 
1. Introduction 
In the past two decades, regional economic development organizations (REDOs) have expended 
considerable time and resources pursuing cluster-based approaches to regional economic development.  
This research aimed to determine if and how the cluster concept and cluster analysis informed decisions 
though a set of four case studies on decisions made by REDOs.  Proponents of the cluster concept have 
made a compelling case for its potential to guide regional economic development policy.  On the other 
hand, critics have pointed to persistent ambiguities and unresolved conflict over analytical practices to 
argue that the concept has limited utility in practice.  Despite the popularity of the concept, there is 
relatively little research that specifically addresses what if any contributions the cluster concept makes 
to practice. 
A central argument on which this research is based is that some of the criticism of how the 
cluster concept is applied in practice is driven by adherence to faulty conceptions of planning that 
remain in wide circulation in economic development practice.  The main culprits are the rational and 
strategic planning models, both of which it will be argued are poorly suited to the institutional 
constraints faced by REDOs.  In place of the strategic planning model, the research relies on developing 
notions of planning that posit a looser connection between planning and decisions, acknowledge the 
limits of formal analytical methods, and yet preserve a role for intentional planning behaviors rather 
than taking the route of attributing all decisions to the bugbear of “political forces.”. 
In doing so, the research is better able to appraise the real role that the cluster concept offers to 
REDOs.  The research is significant for three reasons.  First, it shows that the cluster concept does, in 
some cases, provide information and understanding relevant to the decisions of REDOs.  Second, it 
demonstrates how improved conceptions of planning are useful in making sense of how ideas like the 
cluster concept inform regional economic development practice. Third, the research documents the 
behavior of an increasingly popular locus of economic development policy making – quasi-public 
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regional economic development organizations.  These findings contribute specifically to the literature on 
clusters as well as to the wider literature on economic development practice. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  Section two presents a review of the concept of clusters.  
Section three presents a critical appraisal of models of planning in economic development and discusses 
the implications of improved models for our understanding of the cluster concept in practice.  Section 
four covers the research design, the method of identifying cases, and data collection.  Section five 
introduces the cases themselves.  Section six presents the findings of the research.  The final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The troubling application of the cluster concept 
 The cluster concept as theorized by Porter builds on the concept of industrial districts that dates 
back to the work of Alfred Marshall (Bergman and Feser 1999; Harrison 1992).  Porter’s initial idea was 
that firms in national industries with available productive factors, robust demand for their products, the 
presence of related industries, and multiple competing firms were likely to be more competitive than 
their counterparts in other areas (Porter 1990).  This “diamond” of competitiveness, along with a 
competent government and a little luck, would lead firms to be more innovative and more productive 
than their counterparts in other countries.  Though some of the ideas Porter expressed were not 
entirely new, he expressed them in the language of business strategy rather than pure economics (Feser 
and Luger 2003).  Due, at least in part, to the accessibility of the concept, clusters have become one of 
the most popular economic development ideas in the US and around the world at the regional as well as 
national scale (Green, in review; Sölvell, Lindqvist, and Ketels 2003) 
Despite its popularity, the application of the cluster concept and the analytical techniques 
associated with it has been difficult for several reasons.  The concept itself, especially when applied at a 
regional scale, contains unresolved ambiguities.  The ambitiousness of the concept – a comprehensive 
explanation of why some sets of firms succeed while others fail – and the limited availability of data 
have conspired to make the process of cluster identification quite difficult in practice.  These problems 
have raised serious doubts about the potential for the cluster concept and cluster analysis to inform 
policy decisions (Martin and Sunley 2003).  A review of both the concept and its application shows that 
real insights are possible, though the means by which that insight shapes decisions is best understood 
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through a conception of planning, covered in the following section, which has yet to gain widespread 
acceptance in the economic development literature. 
2.1 Lingering uncertainties about the cluster concept 
The simplicity of the diamond of competitiveness is somewhat misleading.  Several of its corners 
allude to entire constellations of complex ideas without taking a position as to which are more or less 
relevant.  For example, the importance of related and supporting industries is widely appreciated, but 
there are a great number of potential relationships between firms and industries.  Without specifying 
which are the most important, this merely rehashes the argument for the importance of agglomeration 
economies including the localization economies of Marshall and the urbanization economies of Jacobs 
and others.  Within each of these ideas, there has been a great deal of debate about what relationships 
– shared labor pools, scale economies in purchasing, access to specialized services, or others – are most 
important (Parr 2002; Feser 2002).  Initially, Porter used the strategy, structure, and rivalry corner of the 
diamond to highlight the important role competition within an industry played in spurring productivity 
and innovation (Porter 1990).  In subsequent work, he expanded his conception of industry dynamics to 
recognize the importance of cooperation between firms in clusters (Porter 1998).  The great number and 
type of factors that underlie the four corners of the competitiveness diamond have made attempts to 
apply the cluster concept to policy decisions considerably more difficult. 
 Porter’s original conception of clusters described national industries.  Despite its affinity with 
the concept of industrial districts, the application of the cluster concept to the regional scale is not 
without problems.  Several of the explanations for national competitiveness do not translate cleanly to 
the regional scale.  For example, at the national scale the links between the main cluster industry and its 
related and supporting industries do not presume spatial proximity of those industries within the nation.  
Following the logic of agglomeration economies, clusters at the regional scale are often assumed to 
benefit from links that are explicitly spatial.  Bergman and Feser (1999) distinguish between regional 
concentration in national industry clusters, which do not explicitly rely on regional agglomeration 
economies for their competitiveness, and true “regional industry clusters” that do.  Further complicating 
the picture is the fact that different sources of agglomeration economies – knowledge spillovers, labor 
markets, and inter-firm trade relationships – operate at different geographic scales (Feser 2002).  The 
potential for cluster forces in a particular region is thus dependent on the entire gamut of agglomeration 
economies, but also on the linkages between firms within the region and larger nationally competitive 
clusters (Bergman and Feser 1999). 
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One other unresolved issue that arises from a shift from a national to a regional perspective is 
the role of competition within an industry.  Porter (1990) argued that national clusters benefit from 
competition between firms within them.  Whether such competition is necessary for regional clusters to 
be competitive has not been entirely resolved.  On the one hand, one or two large firms may benefit 
from their location in a region with related and supporting industries and a productive labor force.  On 
the other hand, there is some evidence that small firms in regions with a highly concentrated industrial 
structure are less able to capture the benefits of agglomeration economies (Drucker and Feser 2012; 
Chinitz 1961). 
 As with the forces in the diamond, the term competitiveness masks considerable ambiguity.  
Porter defines competitive firms as those who are more productive and more innovative than others 
(Porter 1990).  Both productivity and innovation are important drivers of firm success, but pursuit of one 
may at times come at a cost to the other.  New industries require considerable product innovation until 
products become homogenized, at which point process innovation, and the productivity gains it brings, 
becomes more critical.  As product life cycles come to an end, product innovation again plays a major 
role in firm success (Klepper 1996; Schumpeter 1947; Vernon 1966).  Porter (2003) argues that 
industries that sell outside the region are the most important for regional growth, since they often have 
higher productivity and generate more patents than other industries.  This reduces the issue of 
competitiveness to the much simpler one of export base.  This makes the problem of identifying 
competitive (i.e. exporting) industries much simpler, but it conflates important issues.  A positive 
regional balance of trade is a good thing, but the long term health of the region might benefit from the 
actions of small, innovative firms that do not yet export their products. 
 The number and variety of sources of competitiveness, as well as the different ways firms can be 
competitive, has resulted in the proliferation of industrial groups identified as clusters.  Various scholars 
have attempted to bring order to the concept with limited success.  Markusen (1996b) attempted to 
distinguish between the different types of clusters based on industry structure and ownership and 
proposed a four-part typology of clusters, but it has not been widely adopted.  Other scholars have 
attempted to narrow the idea to a particular feature such as knowledge creation (Malmberg and 
Maskell 2002).  At the same time, others are working to expand the concept even further to take 
account of more recent concepts such as social networks (Motoyama 2008).   
 Porter’s original contention was that clusters were responsible for national level 
competitiveness because they produced advantages to the firms within a particular cluster.  There is 
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very little work on whether clusters, broadly defined, result in positive economic outcomes at the 
regional scale, but there are a few studies that examine the relationship using a more limited definition 
of a cluster.  Porter found that regions with a higher share of employment in exporting clusters had 
higher average wages, suggesting that there is a link between exporting clusters and productivity (Porter 
2003).  A separate study found a relationship between the presence of clusters that used advanced 
technology and new business formation (Feser, Renski, and Goldstein 2008; Feser and Koo 2000).  The 
latter study found no connection between the clusters and regional employment growth.  This limited 
research on the relationship between clusters and regional economic outcomes indicates that while 
clusters may drive new business formation and higher productivity, these do not necessarily lead to 
regional employment growth.  Furthermore, each study examined the relationship for only one type of 
cluster which leaves unresolved the question of whether clusters, in the general sense, have any 
connection with regional economic success. 
The simplicity of the cluster concept is misleading.  It relies upon a great variety of causal 
mechanisms to explain competitiveness without doing much to adjudicate which ones are more 
important.  The application of the concept to the regional scale raises additional unresolved issues, 
specifically how and at what scale advantageous inter-firm relationships operate.  Finally, the proposed 
result of clusters – more competitive firms – equivocates between several desirable but conflicting 
properties.  Perhaps as a result of this lack of definition, empirical verification of the link between 
clusters and regional economic performance has been elusive.  As the next section shows, the looseness 
of the concept has created considerable problems for its application to economic development practice.  
2.2 The challenges of identifying clusters in practice 
The popularity of the cluster concept with policy makers may result in part from outsized claims 
about them, but the important role that external agglomeration economies play in producing regional 
clusters provides a solid rationale for public intervention.  The benefits of such economies constitute a 
good which is to some degree non-excludable and non-rival.  Such goods are not likely to be provided 
efficiently through market mechanisms (Bartik 1990; Moore 1978).  The cost to a region of a clustered 
firm leaving the region may be greater than the loss of the production associated with the firm itself 
because its loss would also lower the productivity of other firms in the cluster.  Such a result could 
happen if the exit of the firm decreases the local supply of some labor skill (through migration or job 
switching) thus increasing the costs to other firms of locating workers with that skill.  Because of this 
potential, public intervention might be warranted to preserve regional clusters.  In similar fashion, the 
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potential gain from recruiting an additional cluster member, whether a firm or other supporting 
element, might be greater than the set of activities provided directly by the newcomer. 
The difficulty in applying the cluster concept to regional economic development boils down to 
two issues.  The first is the challenge of identifying which if any particular competitiveness forces or 
agglomeration economies exist in a particular region at a particular time.  Practitioners have attempted 
to meet this need through cluster analysis.  The second is the challenge of building the capacity to take 
meaningful action.  While these are conceptually distinct, in practice they blur together.  The remainder 
of this section deals with issues of cluster analysis, while issues of the capacity to act are addressed in 
section 3 below. 
There is a great deal of debate surrounding methods of cluster analysis.  Ideally, regional cluster 
analysis would identify spatially proximate sets of firms that were more innovative or more productive 
as a result of one or more of the competitiveness forces identified above.  Thus far, most if not all 
methods of cluster analysis fail to reach this standard.  While spatial proximity is simple to establish, the 
competitiveness forces are more difficult to establish empirically.  Connections between the latter and 
productivity and innovation in a particular locale are quite difficult to establish, in no small part because 
they imply a causal connection that requires difficult to obtain counterfactual evidence. 
 Most cluster analysis falls into one of two types (Bergman and Feser 1999).  The first consist of 
those analyses that search for clusters through all or most of a regional economy, which some have 
termed meso-level analyses (Bergman and Feser 1999). These analyses usually rely heavily on secondary 
data and quantitative methods to identify which clusters are present in a particular region.  The second 
type, termed micro-level analysis, consists of in-depth study of a particular cluster in a particular place.  
These often rely on primary qualitative data to understand the different elements of the cluster and 
how they interact.  There is considerable variation within both approaches, but most cluster analyses 
can be placed easily in one or the other group. 
 Meso-level approaches offer the prospect of a thorough search of the entire economy.  They 
also may be less susceptible to local bias or political influence since they do not focus on an specific 
cluster chosen in advance (Bergman and Feser 1999).  Meso-level approaches vary widely in their 
sophistication and methodological defensibility.  At the simplest, they consist of using location quotients 
to measure the relative concentrations of groups of firms in a region.  This approach is particularly 
indefensible when the industry groups analyzed are major industrial sectors defined via output such as 
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“manufacturing” or “professional services” (Martin and Sunley 2003; Bergman and Feser 1999; 
Woodward and Guimaraes 2009).  More sophisticated approaches measure the regional concentration 
of sets of industries that have been constructed to take account of interdependencies between them.  
Examples of these include Feser and Bergman’s (2000) set of clusters based on national inter-industry 
trading patterns and Porter’s (2003) clusters based on co-location and trading pattern.  Feser’s (2003) 
set of occupational clusters is a similar to these except it links occupations based on shared skills.   
More sophisticated meso-level  analytical approaches that rely on statistical techniques to build 
clusters out of regional industry data do exist, but they have not been widely adopted in practice 
(Bergman and Feser 1999).  The more popular approach of identifying clusters via measures of 
concentration of pre-defined sets of industries may serve as an updated form of a regional economic 
base study (Isserman 2005).  As a snapshot of the regional economy, such studies are apt to be useful.  
As a means of identifying clusters, they suffer from their reliance on a priori defined geographic areas 
and sets of industries.  The former diminishes their ability to capture cluster dynamics operating at 
different scales.  The latter restricts the analysis only to one aspect of competitiveness (i.e. value chain 
linkages or knowledge spillovers); diminishes the capacity to capture regionally idiosyncratic cluster 
dynamics; and risks missing groups of firms with low relative concentrations but significant 
agglomeration economies (Martin and Sunley 2003; Bergman and Feser 1999).  Meso-level approaches 
also often fail to distinguish between concentrations that consist of one or two large firms and those 
that are made up of many smaller firms (Woodward and Guimaraes 2009; Martin and Sunley 2003). 
Micro-level analysis allows for exploration of only a single cluster, but because it relies upon 
local knowledge and data, it is not restricted to pre-defined industry groupings.  This gives micro-level 
analysis the potential to capture regional idiosyncrasies through primary data collection on interactions 
between individual firms and institutions, as in some cluster “asset mapping” exercises (Austrian 2000).  
On the other hand, such studies require that the particular cluster be determined beforehand which 
limits the likelihood of discovering new or emerging clusters.  This has the potential to be a serious 
problem given the likely influence of large industries in the regional economic development and the 
associated myopia they induce in regional policy (Maskell and Malmberg 2007; Bergman and Feser 
1999).  Micro-level analysis thus has some of the potential to make up for the shortcomings of meso-
level approaches, though at considerable risk of a loss of objectivity. 
 Neither type of analysis is apt to be superior in all cases.  Bergman and Feser (1999) suggest that 
meso-level analyses may be usefully followed by a set of micro-level studies if the output of the former 
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guides the choice of the latter.  Neither type of analysis is likely to confirm the presence of sets of firms 
that are more innovative or more productive as a result of one or more of the competitiveness forces 
identified above due to the difficulty in establishing such causal links.  Instead, meso level analysis is apt 
to provide evidence of groups of firms with the potential to be more competitive than those elsewhere.  
Micro-level analysis is apt to find more detailed information about the situation of and connections 
between firms and related institutions in a region.  Both have some potential to be useful to policy-
makers. 
2.3 Cluster policy in theory and practice 
 If clusters are potential sites of undervalued agglomeration economies, then cluster policy 
would ideally be framed around support for the continued presence of the cluster through some 
combination of subsidies, support for those elements of the cluster under public control, and 
communication with members of the cluster to ensure that specific problems might be addressed as 
they arose.  In practice, meso-level studies rarely provide the detail necessary for such policy on their 
own.  Instead, they produce sets of potential clusters which provide policy-makers with a short-list of 
portions of the regional economy that might merit further attention.  The one large survey of clusters 
initiatives found that the most common activity associated with cluster efforts is further study of the 
cluster in question (Sölvell, Lindqvist, and Ketels 2003).  Micro-level analysis is likely to produce detailed 
information about the regional economy, though in practice it may sidestep entirely the question of 
whether or not the industries in question are a cluster.  Many policy recommendations that invoke the 
cluster concept could rightly be characterized as regional industrial policy with only tenuous links to the 
cluster idea.   
At present, there are few studies that directly examine the ways that cluster analysis leads to 
cluster policy.  Meso-level studies, often of a fairly unsophisticated sort, have certainly played a role in 
industrial targeting, leading some to dismiss the concept as industry targeting by another name (Buss 
1999; Martin and Sunley 2003).  However, it is not clear that all targeting is bad policy.  Smokestack 
chasing and an exclusive focus on attraction efforts make poor policy, and cluster studies can provide 
cover for such activity.  On the other hand, as a means of weighing the likely benefits to a region of 
different firms seeking public subsidies, cluster analysis might play a useful role in a new form of 
targeting that is free of much of the practice’s poor past record (Woodward and Guimaraes 2009).  
Finally, if targeting involves working with firms already in the region, as opposed to attraction efforts, it 
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may provide a useful means of directing limited resources toward their most productive use (Wiewel 
1999; Goetz, Deller, and Harris 2009).   
In focusing regional efforts and providing details about the regional economy, meso- and micro-
level analysis may also provide economic development officials with some of the tools needed to begin 
collaborations with local industry.  Problems requiring attention may be identified in micro-level studies. 
Alternatively, the act of conducting the study, which entails some contact between the economic 
development community and the private sector, may help to build rapport between the two groups.  
Such rapport is widely recognized as an important component of successful policy, particularly at the 
regional scale, which in the US lacks general purpose government.  Working together to address small 
problems can be a viable alternative to more technocratic approaches to economic development 
(Easterly 2007).  Interaction between different sectors also makes it more likely that tacit knowledge 
and collaborative relationships will play a role (Briggs 2008; Healey 2006).  Rosenfeld (2005) has argued 
that clusters are in fact one manifestation of what Cooke and Morgan (1998) term the associative 
economy. 
There are a great number of case studies of clusters and cluster policy in the literature.  Many of 
these provide a great deal of detail on the analytical techniques used to identify clusters but remain 
vague about the resulting policies (see Kleinhenz (2000) for an example).  On the other hand, Rosenfeld 
(2007; 2000) describes a number of state and regional policies focused on clusters without going into 
detail on how the clusters were determined in each case.  This latter work makes a strong case that 
cluster-based policies can have positive outcomes, but in many cases the policies could just as easily be 
termed “industrial policies.”  Their strength lies in targeting policy toward the needs of local industry, 
often with the input and support of that industry, but whether the industry is any kind of cluster as 
defined above is beside the point.  One can imagine that in many cases, policy-makers could have 
designed the policies without relying on formal analysis of any kind, and simply targeted their policies 
toward the largest or most productive industries in the region.  The link between cluster analysis and 
cluster policy remains murky. 
Feser and Luger (2003) provide the most telling evidence of how the output of cluster analysis 
feeds into policy decisions.  They found that the results of a statewide, regional scale meso-level analysis 
of high technology clusters, which were presented in regions around the state, spurred discussions 
among regional leaders that accomplished two things.  First, it brought to light clusters that the formal 
analysis had missed.  Second, it spurred conversations between public and private sector leaders that 
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identified barriers to growth which themselves might be the focus of regional policy.  This provides some 
empirical validation for the role that cluster analysis might play in developing policy in an associative 
economy. 
2.4 Conclusion – unresolved issues 
 The cluster concept remains popular in theory and practice, despite resting on a great many 
disparate ideas whose relative importance and potential interactions are not well understood.  The 
popularity of cluster analysis is certainly due in part to the proliferation of well-paid consultants whose 
work is often of questionable value (Martin and Sunley 2003; Lagendijk and Cornford 2000).  The 
concept does entail a rationale for public intervention, and some types of cluster analysis – both meso- 
and micro-level – offer the potential of real insight.  Accounts of cluster policies often fail to show any 
real link between analysis and policy, and instead describe thoughtful policies targeted toward local 
industry.  The question remains whether or not the cluster concept adds value to these sensible 
prescriptions.  If it does, it would likely be through a process that is more iterative than direct, providing 
an impetus for further research and collaboration rather than a clear set of policy prescriptions.  The 
following section draws on theory from planning, policy sciences, and management science to shed light 
on that process. 
 
3. Misconceptions about planning in economic development 
 In economic development practice, the dominant conception of how codified concepts and 
formal analytical techniques affect decisions is that found in the strategic planning model (SPM).  Such 
models are prominently featured in standard books on the subject (Blakely and Green Leigh 2010; Blair 
and Carroll 2008; Stimson, Stough, and Roberts 2006).  The U.S. Economic Development 
Administration’s Economic Development District program requires participating regions to prepare 
Comprehensive Economic Development Strategies (CEDS), which involve a similar process.  If there is 
skepticism about the ability of such planning efforts to affect policy, it does not seem to have diminished 
the willingness on the part of organizations to invest time and resources in preparing plans or on the 
part of funders to require them.  The SPM describes the connection between planning behaviors and 
decisions as a linear series of distinct steps where planning behaviors control decisions.  It also requires 
a level of certainty and commitment at the start of a planning process that is rarely found in economic 
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development.  The alternative models described below are not widely known in the economic 
development field, but they provide a more plausible description of planning and decisions. 
3.1 Problems with the SPM in economic development 
 Economic development organizations operate in the context of a great deal of uncertainty – 
about the current state of the economy (due to data limitations), about the likely future of the economy, 
about their own ability to affect that future, and about the relative desirability of potential 
interventions.  Decisions economic developers  are called upon to make have the characteristics – 
imperfect foresight, indivisibility, irreversibility, and interdependence with other decisions – where 
planning is apt to be useful (Hopkins 2001).  Planning by economic development organizations often 
results in the creation of formal planning documents, but even when it does not they engage in planning 
behaviors which Hopkins (2001) defines as behaviors oriented toward producing knowledge about 
present conditions, possible courses of action, and preferences about ends and means.   
In economic development planning, the SPM model is often applied to the entire economic 
development process, through and including implementation (Blakely and Green Leigh 2010; Stimson, 
Stough, and Roberts 2006).  It exists in both simple and more elaborate forms.  Blair and Carroll (2008) 
present the simplest version, with only three steps.  The six-step SPM advocated by Blakely and Green 
Leigh (2010) contains a more detailed program consisting of the following steps: 
1. Data gathering and analysis; 
2. Selecting a local economic development strategy; 
3. Selecting local development projects; 
4. Building action plans; 
5. Specifying project details; 
6. Overall development plan preparation and implementation. 
At the other end of the spectrum one finds Stimson et al. (2006).  Their 14-step model is heavily 
programmed, even specifying specific analytical techniques including industry cluster analysis.  Stimson 
et al. suggest that movement between steps might not be strictly sequential, an improvement over 
other versions of the SPM in economic development, but their models still includes numbered steps.  All 
three versions retain the main element of the RPM and SPM: programmed steps that keep goal setting 
and analysis separate from and antecedent to decisions and commitments to act. 
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The SPM relies upon several implausible assumptions about how planning behaviors are related 
to one another and to policy decisions.  In programming out a single linear process, the SPM implies that 
planning behaviors ought to culminate in very specific detailed commitments to action.  To ensure that 
end the SPM, following its close cousin the rational planning model (RPM), essentially requires that each 
step in the model; be completed prior to the next.  Once goals are known, the current situation can be 
assessed.  Once present conditions are known, alternative courses of action can be identified and 
considered.  In this way, each step produces information that is complete and sufficient for the 
completion of the next one.  One problem with this approach is that steps are rarely complete or 
comprehensive, since the cost of collecting and analyzing all of the necessary information is cognitively 
and operationally prohibitive (Lindblom 1959; Beauregard 1995).  Another problem is that the steps 
themselves are difficult if not impossible to isolate from one another.  Goals and values cannot be 
completely worked out prior to analysis of present conditions, and the evaluation of different courses of 
action may result in shifting goals and values (Lindblom 1959).  As a result, the distinct, programmed 
steps that the SPM relies upon to connect planning behaviors to decisions are nearly impossible to 
realize in practice.  They may be possible in the course of a smaller, very specific project, but that is a 
very different context than the larger policy context to which the SPM is commonly applied. 
Even if the issues above could be overcome, the SPM would still be ill-suited to the context of 
regional economic development because it requires considerable commitment from relevant 
stakeholders at the beginning of the process.  Regional economic development organizations in the US 
lack a strong mandate.  They are often quasi-independent organizations operating with limited 
resources (Olberding 2002a).  They therefore need to partner with other organizations in order to 
achieve policy goals.  Examples of partner organizations include local governments, other regional 
organizations, and state economic development agencies.   Requiring commitment of collaborators at 
the beginning of a planning process is a difficult proposition.  Such processes begin when final policies 
are not fully known, and as a result commitment from potential collaborators is low (Levin 1976).  
Commitment and specificity increase up to the point of the policy being enacted.  Along the way, some 
collaborators may withdraw their support entirely as a result of a specific decision, while others may join 
the process for the same reason.  In this environment, the early commitment required by the SPM is 
unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Following Bryson (1988), both Stimson, Stough, and Roberts (2006) and Blakely and Green Leigh 
(2010) specify identification of and mobilization of, in the words of the latter “the organization or group 
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of institutions responsible for implementing or coordinating the economic change” as a prerequisite of 
the SPM.  It is difficult to imagine that the private sector would not be part of such a group, particularly 
when the focus is on industry clusters.  If so, it may be that the relevant organizations or groups are not 
known until after some initial analysis has taken place, either because the private sector is not well 
organized in a particular place or because those private sector organizations that do exist fail to 
represent the relevant sectors or firms.  Given the many different forces that drive firms in a cluster, 
even the relevant geographic extent might be uncertain in the early stages of a project.  The SPM as 
presented is thus mired in a catch-22 where those elements that are required at the beginning of a 
planning process are likely to result from the process itself. 
The persistence of the SPM in the economic development literature is due in part to a lack of 
familiarity with alternative models.  Instead of providing plausible alternatives to the SPM, critics of it 
merely note that it is doomed to failure by either political or market forces.  The former can certainly be 
formidable, as Logan and Molotch (1987), Stone (1989), and Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) among 
others have shown.  The failure of the SPM is a failure of a particular account of the link between 
planning behaviors and decisions, but it is not tantamount to a declaration that all planning behaviors 
are pointless.  Planning behaviors are one way to operate in systems where political and market forces 
are powerful (Mandelbaum 1979).  What is needed within economic development is an alternative 
explanation of how they are connected to decisions. 
3.2 Alternative planning models and their implications for cluster-based economic development 
 The alternative to the SPM presented here includes ideas from planning and management 
theory.  The most important premise is that planning is not about controlling decisions (Mastop and 
Faludi 1997; Hopkins 2007).  Plans are a useful tool for operating in complex environments where 
preferences, capabilities, and contexts are in flux.  They work by providing information that is relevant 
and useful at critical decision points (Hopkins 2001). Planning behaviors can be useful because they 
allow for the analysis and consideration of current conditions, possible courses of action, potential end 
states, and of multiple interdependent decisions at one in a setting apart from that in which decisions 
are made.  Plans may indicate intended course of action, but they are by nature intentions and not 
decisions.  Decisions are made in real time, outside of the protected settings in which planning 
behaviors occur.  Planning, when done well, relies on analysis to produce information.  Decisions are 
based on synthesis of information, including that from plans, together with whatever other information 
is deemed relevant at the time (Mintzberg 1994).  Strategies, defined as recognizable patterns of action 
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across multiple decisions, do not require detailed programming.  They may emerge from competent 
decisions informed but not prescribed by planning behaviors (Mintzberg 1994). 
 If planning is about informing rather than controlling decisions, then plans must work through a 
different process than the strict, programmed linear steps of the SPM.   Hopkins (2001) described the 
following five ways that plans could inform decisions: 
 Agendas – lists of things to do; 
 Policies – if-then rules for actions; 
 Visions – images of what could be; 
 Designs – fully worked out outcomes; and 
 Strategies – sets of contingent actions. 
Each of these makes explicit differing amounts of technical information, goals, and intentions to act, 
though in varying proportion and level of detail.  All involve consideration of the future.  Of the five, a 
strategy is the only one that would roughly fit the conception of how plans work found in the strategic 
planning model.  Policies and agendas alone might fall short of the comprehensiveness that the strategic 
plan requires.  Visions and designs might lack intermediate decisions and a detailed work plan.  Though 
they fall short of the comprehensive programming of the SPM, each has the potential to inform 
decisions. 
 The differences between this conception of planning and the SPM can be summarized as 
follows.  Though planning behaviors are the same as those included in the SPM, they are undertaken in 
a less programmed process.  Plans do not control decisions, but rather inform them as described.  
Decisions are acknowledged to happen outside the controlled confines of formal processes, where plans 
provide only some of the relevant information.  Finally, planning processes do not require a priori 
commitments to action from all relevant parties since the identities of some of those parties and the 
specific details about goals and values will be unknown at the outset and will emerge and develop as 
planning behaviors are undertaken and decision situations are confronted. 
 This conception of planning helps to develop several propositions about how the clusters 
concept and formal cluster analysis might shape the decisions of regional economic development 
organizations.  The first is that cluster analysis, alone or in concert with other analytical techniques, is 
not likely to lead unambiguously to fully described policies.  Cluster analysis, as one example of a 
planning behavior, may provide useful information to decision makers.  For example, the clusters 
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identified in a meso-level analysis might be used as an agenda-type plan.  Such an agenda could focus 
later research efforts, as Bergman and Feser (1999) and Sölvell et al. (2003) noted, but it could also be 
used to prioritize limited resources available for marketing efforts or for outreach to local firms.  Outside 
of any formal plan the information from micro-level or meso-level analysis might still produce 
information about present conditions in the form of potentially important links in the regional economy.  
Such information might be useful in creating visions of possible future states, evaluating proposals, or 
recognizing emerging structural changes.   
None of the above hypothesized mechanisms by which cluster analysis could inform decisions 
requires a strong prior commitment to action in order to prove useful.  REDOs’ need to collaborate in 
order to achieve policy goals will also affect the details of cluster policies as much as the output of 
cluster analysis.  Therefore, commitment to a particular cluster may be contingent upon finding willing 
collaborators.  Furthermore, the need to secure partners may mean that the identity of clusters may 
change over time, as the set of collaborators may define the appropriate policies.  From the perspective 
of a cluster analyst, this may be anathema, but the variety of potential linkages that exist in a particular 
region is likely to be large enough that the membership and geography of clusters will change depending 
on the specific policy approach in question.  Thus the need to “identify” clusters may in practice be 
subservient to the need to correctly match particular policy interventions to particular sets of firms.  The 
commitment of potential collaborators cannot be guaranteed at the outset, but will emerge through the 
process of policy design, pilot projects, and early implementation. 
 These propositions also suggest possible tensions in the conduct and use of cluster analysis as 
an analytical frame and as a marketing tool.  This tension is not unique to the cluster idea, and was first 
described in economic development by Levy (1996).  As an analytical tool and planning behavior, the 
results of cluster analysis are contingent on further confirmation and elaboration, as well as the 
operational constraints noted above.  As a marketing tool, the output of cluster analysis is expected to 
be clear, definitive and immutable.  A desire on the part of a REDO to promote a consistent image of the 
region may hamper efforts to use cluster analysis to make sense of the regional economy.  On the other 
hand, clusters that change with additional research and project development are not a solid foundation 
upon which to build a regional brand. 
 These alternative conceptions of planning also shed light on how best to observe the means by 
which the cluster concept informs the decisions of REDOs.  Most importantly, one cannot begin with 
formal analysis or planning documents since they do not lead unambiguously to policy decisions.  
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Instead, one ought to start from the decisions themselves, which will likely be shaped by information in 
plans and by other information deemed relevant at the time (Hopkins and Schaeffer 1983; Hopkins 
2007).  This focuses the research on an actual decision rather than on an intention expressed in a plan.  
From there, one can trace backward to see if and how prior planning behaviors including cluster analysis 
affected those decisions, and at the same time account for the presence of other sources of information 
and context.  This approach offers less insight into which cluster initiatives are superior, but it will shed 
light on the effect of the cluster concept is in the practice of economic development.  Further, it will take 
the environment in which economic development is practiced as a starting point for research, fraught 
with politics and uncertainty though it may be, while not simply attributing the whole of economic 
development policy to that environment. 
 
4.  Design of the research 
 This research is designed to investigate if and how the cluster concept informs the decisions of 
REDOs.  The research consisted of four cases studies, each of a different decision, in a multi-case holistic 
design (Yin 2009).  The cases were chosen through a multi-step process out of a survey of REDOs in the 
US conducted in the winter of 2012 (Green forthcoming).  Because of the popularity of the cluster 
concept, it was assumed that in many cases what were deemed cluster policies were in fact traditional 
economic development policies that had been branded as cluster policies to make them appear current.  
Instead the chosen cases were those in which preliminary research showed significant reliance upon the 
cluster concept, and were what Flyvbjerg (2001) called critical cases.  If upon completing the research, 
the cluster concept could not be shown to have usefully informed any of these decisions, then it would 
be fair to conclude that it had little chance of doing so elsewhere.  The opposite finding would confirm 
the proposition that the concept had the potential to inform decisions, and would allow for evaluation 
of the propositions described in section 3.2.  The data for the cases consisted of interviews with those 
familiar with the decisions and review of documents that yielded considerable detail on the events 
leading up to the decision and its more immediate context. 
4.1. Case study selection 
 The decisions that served as the focus for the cases were identified through a multi-step 
process.  The first was a national survey of REDOs in the US that asked about the organizations’ 
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experiences with the cluster concept and cluster policy.  The 104 valid responses were evaluated using 
following five criteria: 
1. Greater than average resources expended on learning about clusters in their region, such as 
through multiple rounds of analytical work; 
2. Clusters that were more narrowly defined, such as “aerospace manufacturing,” than 
general, such as “advanced materials”; 
3. Claims to have used the cluster concept in more than one policy area, such as workforce ; 
4. Thoughtful responses to open-ended questions about the advantages and limitations of the 
cluster concept; 
5. Expressed willingness to participate in a case study. 
The purpose of the first four criteria was to identify those organizations where the cluster concept and 
cluster analysis was most likely to have informed decisions.  The purpose of the fifth was more practical.  
The data necessary to conduct each case study was heavily dependent on interviews with key 
participants. If organizations were not willing to participate in the research, then the case study would 
have been impossible.  However, this does not weaken the design because the cases are critical ones as 
described above, though it may limit somewhat the generalizability of the conclusions about how the 
concept affects those decisions. 
The application of the above criteria yielded a list of four organizations considered most likely to 
produce useful decisions for cases.  The second step was to contact each organization and speak to the 
person who actually completed the survey, and who in each case became the primary contact for the 
case.  The purpose of this initial contact was to establish whether or not the organization was still willing 
to participate in a case study and to begin to identify decisions that might serve as cases.  Of the four 
organizations, one was eliminated because they no longer were willing to participate in the research, 
and a second was eliminated due to potential conflict of interest with the research team.2  The 
remaining two organizations were suitable and cooperative.  Preliminary interviews with the primary 
contact were used to identify cases (decisions) made by each.  The decisions were identified by asking 
the interviewee to consider what the most important recent decisions of the organization had been, and 
to identify important decisions involving clusters.  After discussing the details of each, it was possible to 
                                                          
2
 The Principal Investigator had been involved with performing some cluster-related analytical work for the 
organization, which might have made it difficult to have honest communication about the value of that analysis. 
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identify three decisions in one organization and one in another, for a total of four cases. The decisions 
were all relatively recent, within the last five years. 
4.2. Data collection and analysis 
 The primary methods of collecting data were through semi-structured interviews with key 
informants and analysis of documents.  Interview subjects were identified though conversations with 
the initial contact at the organization, but additional subjects were identified through the interview 
process itself.  Identified subjects included those with a long history at the organization, those in key 
leadership positions, and those with intimate knowledge of the cases in question.  Leaders or 
representatives of affiliated organizations that were involved with or affected by the decisions were 
included as well.  In general, the organizations were quite small, so identifying relevant individuals was 
fairly straightforward.  All interviews but one were conducted during site visits to the organizations 
which lasted about four days each and occurred during the spring of 2012.   
Interviews were recorded and transcribed.  Some documents were identified before each site 
visit, and additional ones were provided by interview subjects.  The transcripts, documents, and 
research notes comprised the corpus of data used to create each case report.  Table 3.1 summarizes the 
data sources for each case.  In preparing the case report, considerable triangulation was possible by 
comparing the accounts of a decision from different sources and by comparing data from the interviews 
to data in documents.  The strategy for analyzing the cases was a mix of what Stake (1995) calls direct 
interpretation and categorical aggregation.  The former draws interpretations from the analysis of an 
individual case, whereas the latter involves an attempt to draw conclusions from the cases in aggregate.  
For this research, the individual cases were analyzed on their own terms first, and then compared. 
Table 3.1 – Data sources used in the cases 
Organization Interviews Documents 
  Produced Internally Not Produced Internally 
  Organizational Research Research  Media 
NE Indiana 
(3 cases) 
9 interviews 
with 7 people 
6 annual reports 
(2006-2011); 
1 plan 
10 studies 6 studies 6 newspaper 
articles 
Rockford 
(1 case) 
9 interviews 
with 8 people 
7 annual reports 
(2005-2011); 
3 plans 
11 studies  1 newspaper 
article 
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5. Cases of decisions 
5.1. Background on the cases 
 The four decision cases come from two separate organizations, three in one and one in the 
other.  The Northeast Indiana Regional Partnership (NEIRP) operates in ten counties centered on Ft. 
Wayne, Indiana.  The Rockford Area Economic Development Corporation (RAEDC), which operates in 
Winnebago County, IL, on its own and in Rockford and adjacent Boone County through the Rockford 
Region Economic Development District.  Each organization conducted a meso-level study of the regional 
economy (the NEIRP in 2007 and the RAEDC in 2006), though each organization equivocated between 
referring to the result of the studies as targets versus clusters.  In the ensuing years, each organization 
conducted additional research in the form of micro-level studies of individual clusters.  The specific cases 
are presented in brief below, and in greater detail in Appendix 1. 
5.2 The NEIRP’s decision to frame a major grant proposal around a specific cluster 
 In February 2009, a coalition of community and economic development organizations including 
the NEIRP submitted a successful $20 million proposal to the Lilly Family Foundation, a major 
philanthropic organization.  The proposal, called Talent Opportunity Success 2015 (TOpS 2015), focused 
on developing the region’s workforce and was organized around meeting the needs of a 
defense/aerospace cluster and included four main programs:  
 $5.7 million to create new workforce development programs targeted to the needs of the 
defense / aerospace and other high tech manufacturers in the region and train 1,200 workers; 
 $2.6 million to outfit an advanced manufacturing training center at Ivy Tech Community College 
with machines and automated systems that were in use by manufacturers in the area; 
 $4.5 million to create two centers of excellence at the campus of Indiana University-Purdue Ft. 
Wayne (IPFW), one in systems engineering and one in wireless communications; 
 $5 million to create STEM education centers in high schools throughout the region. 
TOpS 2015 got underway in 2009, and was well underway at the time the research was conducted. 
From early in the process, there was some enthusiasm for focusing the proposal around 
clusters.  Early versions of it had included funding for cluster specialist positions at the NEIRP along with 
several additional programs that were eventually dropped.  These other programs included a regional 
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marketing campaign, a scholarship program for local students, and a commercialization center at the 
Northeast Indiana Innovation Center among others.  To a large extent, they reflected the various desires 
and interests of the many different groups that had come together to submit the proposal.  These 
included the Greater Ft. Wayne Community Development Foundation, the NEIRP, the local Workforce 
Investment Board, IPFW, the Northeast Indiana Innovation Center, and the organization now known as 
the Regional Chamber of Northeast Indiana. 
The decision to narrow the focus on a single cluster was a response to the Lilly Family 
Foundation’s request for a more focused proposal that was supported by a single compelling case for 
action.  The revised proposal required the elimination of the above programs, a process that many 
described as quite difficult.  The decision to focus the proposal on the defense/aerospace cluster 
specifically was the result of an understanding of the importance of that particular group of firms to the 
Ft. Wayne regional economy.  A number of cluster-based plans and studies dating back to 2003 and 
conducted at the state and regional level had noted the presence of defense/aerospace firms in the 
state and the region.  For the most part, these distinguished between those that specialized in 
communications technology, such as Raytheon (formerly Magnavox), and the aerospace firms like BAE 
Systems and Northrup Grumman.  The former were referred to variously as “Communications / 
Technology / Defense,” and “Information Technology / Telecommunications.”  The latter were called 
“Aerospace” or sometimes simply grouped into the catchall of “Advanced Manufacturing.” 
In 2007, the NEIRP commissioned a target industry study from a consultant.  The method of 
defining targets was woefully obtuse, but did rely on some techniques familiar to meso-level cluster 
analysis including measures of concentration of industry- and supply-chain-based clusters.  The final 
report listed five primary targets and ten secondary targets, and among the latter were “Tactical 
Communications” and “Aviation Aerospace.”  The NEIRP, in discussing the study, decided that these two 
groups were really part of a single “defense aerospace” cluster of defense oriented, engineering 
technology heavy manufacturing firms.  The NEIRP decided to focus on six targets: the five primary ones 
and “defense/aerospace.”  NEIRP staff also began to use the terms “targets” and “clusters” 
interchangeably, though in interviews all staff noted misgivings about doing so. 
The proposal to the Lilly Family Foundation could have been based on any one of the six 
clusters.  The decision to focus on the defense / aerospace firms hinged on the availability of a 
compelling case for action to support the industry in the region, and on the ability of the industry itself 
to organize and play a role in the proposal process.  The compelling case was that the Ft. Wayne regional 
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economy still had a significant share of manufacturing employment due to the presence of the defense / 
aerospace firms that insulated it from the declining auto industry.  Because the firms did so much 
defense work, they were unlikely to be moved offshore and they were somewhat insulated from 
economic downturns.  With the impending retirement of Baby Boom generation workers, the firms 
would need a steady supply of skilled workers.  If the Ft. Wayne region failed to develop or attract such 
workers, the firms would likely leave the area.  This was the rationale for the final proposal, which 
addressed provided technical education and workforce training at all levels. 
That compelling case was made at times by the industry itself, which was becoming more 
organized at the time of the proposal.  Several executives were involved through the Corporate Council 
and the NEIRP, and the defense / aerospace industry was soon to form the Northeast Indiana Defense 
Industry Association.  According to one interview subject, a critical step in winning the grant was a set of 
interviews that the Lilly Family Foundation did with executives in the local defense/aerospace industry.  
Their support in private interviews as well as on the proposal team was important in convincing Lilly to 
fund the proposal. 
The other clusters on which the NEIRP were focused as a result of the 2007 study – logistics, 
financial services, food processing, advanced manufacturing and medical devices – lacked either the 
compelling narrative, the involvement of executives, or both.  While there was not a systematic 
evaluation of each in terms of its appropriateness for framing the proposal, the choice of the defense / 
aerospace cluster provided the necessary data and support.  In addition, the technical nature of the 
industry allowed for the inclusion of programs like STEM education that had support in state and 
national policy circles, endearing the proposal to funders and reviewers. 
 Despite its reliance upon the defense /aerospace cluster, the proposal also made clear that the 
programs would produce immediate benefits for advanced manufacturing, which overlaps with the 
defense/aerospace cluster but includes firms in medical devices as well as upstream manufacturers that 
sell to a variety of sectors.  As the TOpS 2015 program has been implemented, it has become clear that 
the connection to the defense/aerospace cluster was more rhetorical than substantive, a sentiment 
confirmed by the director of the Talent Initiative in an interview.  As another interviewee put it, “I 
almost wish we'd stop saying that it is about defense.  Because people think it is only about defense.  It 
was merely the compelling argument that we could use to convince Lilly that this was the right thing to 
do.”  Whether the defense industry has benefitted from the Lilly grant is still an open question.   
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5.3 The NEIRP’s decision to partner with OrthoWorx, a REDO for an adjacent region 
 In early 2012, the NEIRP decided to set up a formal relationship with Orthoworx, an economic 
development organization in Kosciusko County.  Kosciusko County is adjacent to the ten counties 
represented by the NEIRP, and its largest city, Warsaw, is home to three of the largest medical device 
manufacturing companies in the world.  The partnership took the form of mutual investment in each 
organization by the other.  The CEO of Orthoworx is eligible to vote for members of the governing board 
of the NEIRP, and the CEO of the NEIRP sits on the Strategic Advisory Board of Orthworx.  This decision 
was an important step toward ending a long period of mutual suspicion and a lack of collaboration 
between the two regions. 
 The NEIRP had wanted to promote the presence of the medical device cluster in Warsaw but 
found it difficult to do so for the simple reason that the three large medical device firms – the most 
visible part of the cluster – were not technically within the region covered by the NEIRP.  Early NEIRP 
promotional materials advertised the proximity of the large firms in Warsaw, as evidence of the region 
as a favorable location for medical device firms and the wider biotech sector, though the effort was 
geared toward attracting firms to the ten counties the NEIRP represented. 
 When the NEIRP was being created to replace the previous regional economic development 
organization, Warsaw County was invited to join.  The NEIRP is funded by yearly contributions of both 
public and private investors.  Their investments are managed separately and the governing structure 
maintains a privileged position for the public sector.  Each year, counties must decide whether to 
continue their support.  As a result, the area covered by the NEIRP has fluctuated over the years 
between nine and eleven counties.  At no point, however, was Kosciusko willing to join.  Interview 
subjects in both counties claimed that this was due to suspicion on the part of some in Kosciusko County 
that Ft. Wayne was trying to steal the medical device firms away.  Those in Warsaw also note that the 
city is located almost half way between Ft. Wayne and South Bend, is part of the latter’s media market, 
and is grouped into a region with the latter by the Indiana Economic Development Corporation.  From 
the perspective of Warsaw, it was not self-evident that they ought to join with Ft. Wayne on regional 
development work. 
 The conclusion in the 2007 target industry study that medical device firms should be a target 
made the NEIRP take notice.  As mentioned, the methods used to identify the targets were murky, but 
the conclusion together with the interchangeable ideas of target and cluster raised a new hope that the 
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NEIRP region might have a significant medical device cluster even without counting the firms in Warsaw.  
This hope was fanned in 2008 by a study of the entire biomedical industry in the NEIRP region 
conducted by the Indiana Health Industry Foundation.  That report, which used extensive industry-
specific knowledge rather than secondary data, found 91 establishments in the medical device industry.  
The NEIRP began to include those companies in its marketing materials, while still highlighting the 
region’s proximity to Warsaw.  The NEIRP also sponsored three studies each in 2009 and 2011 on the six 
targets / clusters.  The study on the medical device cluster in the region was conducted in 2009, and was 
designed to determine once and for all if there was any real potential for a medical device cluster in the 
NEIRP region.  The study concluded that, “. . . it is immediately self-evident that many [. . .] companies 
[in the NEIRP region] already belong to a cluster – the medical device cluster centered in Warsaw.”  It 
presented evidence that many of the firms in the NEIRP region did business with the medical device 
firms in Warsaw, as well as with other sectors inside and outside the region. 
 The finding was a disappointment to NEIRP staff.  The study went on to recommend that the 
NEIRP focus on the wider biomedical industry, essentially disentangling considerations about how the 
organization might support that industry from preoccupations about whether or not the region had a 
viable medical device cluster.  It recommended that the NEIRP “should concentrate its efforts on both 
supporting the existing Warsaw medical device cluster and developing and growing its own pockets of 
opportunity in life science.”  The idea of supporting Warsaw presented problems.  The NEIRP did not 
officially have a mandate to work in Kosciusko County, and the tension between the two made 
collaboration difficult. 
 The eventual change was due in a large part to the creation of a new organization, OrthoWorx, 
in 2009.  The small organization had only four staff by 2012, and was charged with working with the 
large medical device firms in Warsaw to promote the industry.  The new organization had less of the 
history of suspicion about Ft. Wayne.  In addition, the organization saw the 2009 study mentioned 
above, and that went some way toward reassuring staff that the NEIRP were aware that support for 
Warsaw was in their own interest.  At the same time, as part of an effort to develop a training program 
at their local community college, OrthoWorx staff met with NEIRP and community college staff in Ft. 
Wayne.  Though some representatives of both organizations had known each other before, the 
discussions around training in manufacturing were noted by several people as the first time that 
collaboration between the two organizations had seemed possible.  This was encouraged by individuals 
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in the NEIRP who represented counties lying between Ft. Wayne and Warsaw, and for whom such 
collaboration seemed more natural, and by a regional bank that invested in both organizations. 
 In 2011, OrthoWorx and the NEIRP invited each other to their respective meetings as guests, 
and also began to occasionally meet informally.  The decision to formalize the relationship grew out of 
the understanding that while they represented different political entities, they were linked through the 
medical device industry.  Both are aware that the big three companies in Warsaw are the anchor of the 
industry and that their continued health and presence is critical to people and companies throughout 
the larger region.  Further, OrthoWorx staff acknowledge that the presence of Ft. Wayne provides urban 
amenities that Warsaw simply cannot offer, and that such amenities are important for attracting and 
retaining employees at companies in Warsaw.  As an example, speaking of recent plans to revitalize the 
riverfront in Ft. Wayne one interviewee mentioned that an OrthoWorx staff person had said that such 
investment on the part of Ft. Wayne was critical to Warsaw’s ability to attract and retain the talent that 
they need to support that industry.  Throughout the interviews, both groups played down questions of 
geography and instead pointed to the relationship as a strategic partnership.  The collaboration between 
OrthoWorx and the NEIRP is still quite new.  They first attended each other’s board meetings as 
members in early 2012.  There hadn’t yet been any major new initiatives as of mid-2012, but the fact 
that they are partnering at all is a major step.   
5.4 The NEIRP’s decision not to pursue a stand-alone logistics cluster 
 The NEIRP has decided, evidenced by a lack of concerted action, not to pursue transportation 
and logistics as a cluster.  Transportation and logistics was one of the five first tier targets in the 2007 
study.  As with the other first tier targets and defense / aerospace, transportation and logistics was the 
subject of an individual study.  The results of that study led the NEIRP to conclude that while 
transportation and logistics would remain a viable target for parts of the region, the firms in that sector 
of the economy did not possess the characteristics of a cluster. 
 The transportation and logistics study, which was released in 2011, examined a wider range of 
industrial sectors and occupations related to transportation and logistics than had the 2007 target study.  
The justification for this was that logistical expertise and functions had become integrated throughout 
supply chains as the latter have become more fragmented.  As a result, the 2011 study examined the 
transportation, warehousing, and wholesaling sectors.  The authors found that these industries included 
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over 10% of regional employment in 2009.  They also found above average concentrations of trucking 
and warehousing, which had location quotients of 5.1 and 2.0, respectively.   
The study concluded with three main findings.  The first was that despite the size of the 
transportation and logistics sectors, the northeast Indiana region had no real advantage as a logistics 
hub compared with many similar areas in the Midwest.  The second was that the logistics industry in the 
region was for the most part attached to local manufacturing more than it was a stand-alone industry.  
The third was that logistics firms in the region would face a shortage of workers in the near future, even 
though many of the jobs paid higher wages than other jobs available to low-skilled workers.  The study 
recommended addressing the workforce shortages and investing in transportation infrastructure in the 
region. 
 NEIRP staff described the organization’s response to the study as follows.  First, since the 
logistics firms that were in the area were there due to the region’s proximity to other places rather than 
local economies of scale, the presence of Interstate 69 would likely continue to attract some number of 
distribution centers.  Aggressive marketing to logistics companies would be wasteful.  This response 
shows the degree to which the concepts of target and cluster were intertwined at the organization.  The 
second response was that in the absence of a motivated partner like OrthoWorx or the Northeast 
Indiana Defense Industry Association, it would be difficult to work with the local industry.  The other 
response on the part of the NEIRP was the realization of how important good transportation and 
logistics firms were to the manufacturing in the region.  Several staff pointed out that the best way to 
work on issues of transportation and logistics was to address them with respect to the defense, medical 
device, and other manufacturing firms with which they were already working.  From the standpoint of 
cluster theory, the result of the study was that transportation and logistics was really a related and 
supporting industry of local manufacturing rather than a cluster in its own right. 
 As a result, though the NEIRP continues to consider transportation and logistics a target, it has 
not expended further resources on it as a stand-alone cluster.  The one staff person working specifically 
to address the needs of local clusters did not see transportation and logistics a main focus of their work.  
One final result of the study was that its other sponsor, the local Workforce Investment Board, designed 
several workforce training programs to meet the anticipated labor shortage.  Some programs were 
designed with local manufacturing firms.  The lack of action with respect to transportation and logistics 
was limited to the NEIRP itself. 
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5.5 The RAEDC’s decision to create the Rockford Area Aerospace Network 
 In late 2009, the Rockford Area Economic Development Corporation (RAEDC) amended their 
bylaws to allow for the creation of a cluster-specific initiative to address the needs of the aerospace 
industry in Rockford.  The initiative, called the Rockford Area Aerospace Network (RAAN), got started in 
2010, and was the result of several years of effort by the RAEDC and the private sector in the region.  At 
the time the research was conducted, the RAAN had seventeen members, and had created a larger 
group of over 200 aerospace firms in the region. 
 As did the NEIRP, the RAEDC engaged several studies of local industry including a target industry 
study and individual micro-level cluster studies.  The RAEDC had received funding from Winnebago 
County for three micro-level studies.  The first two, which examined logistics and food processing, were 
conducted before the target industry study was completed.  One finding of the target study, which came 
as somewhat of a surprise to the RAEDC staff, was that the region might successfully attract aerospace 
firms to the region based on the number that were already present.  Aside from the three large firms 
that were well known, the RAEDC had not paid much attention to the aerospace industry to that point.  
Based on that finding, the RAEDC decided to focus the third micro-level study on the aerospace firms in 
the region.  That study, released in June of 2006, found 89 firms in the aerospace sector including 
dozens of small companies that traded with one another.  The aerospace study also found that the area 
lacked a robust technical education system to supply those companies with skilled manufacturing 
workers.  In a short time, the aerospace industry went from some obscurity in the eyes of the RAEDC to 
one that might make a plausible target to one that might have concerns the region should address. 
 Around the same time as the publication of the report on the aerospace industry, the RAEDC 
was coming to the realization that several other clusters were less promising than they had hoped.  This 
raised the possibility of a more concerted focus on aerospace.  The RAEDC did not embark on a major 
new aerospace initiative right away.  Instead, several staff of the organization began to ask about the 
industry in casual conversations with industry officials.  One particularly important such conversation 
took place in late 2006 between RAEDC staff and Jeff Kaney, the CEO of a small local aerospace firm.  
The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss some business incentives programs, but in the course 
of the meeting RAEDC staff mentioned their new interest in the aerospace industry.  Kaney asked them 
to stay after the meeting to talk further, and later asked why the RAEDC didn’t take a more active role in 
regional industry, even mentioning some models of clusters initiatives with which he was familiar. 
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 Seeing the interest in such an approach coming from someone in the private sector, the RAEDC 
decided to reach out to the CEOs of the two largest aerospace firms in the region to discuss the 
possibility of collaboration between the industry and the RAEDC.  The companies in question were 
investors in the RAEDC, but the meeting still took months to set up since the large firms did not have a 
history of working together.  The meeting, held in late 2007, consisted of a discussion between 
executives of several of the larger aerospace firms along with representatives of the local community 
college.  It generated a wide range of ideas about the state of the aerospace industry and ideas about 
how the RAEDC might go about bolstering it in the region.  The larger firms had a number of suggestions 
for strengthening the position of the upstream suppliers, from working with them to bid for larger 
contracts to training on doing business with the federal government.  In the course of the meeting, it 
became clear that the larger firms might support initiatives to assist smaller aerospace firms in the 
region since they relied upon those firms for necessary inputs.  Surprisingly to RAEDC staff, at least one 
executive claimed that even attracting additional large firms similar to their own was not a threat since 
it would only bring more qualified engineers in the area. 
 Soon after that meeting, several other events in the region also built excitement around 
aerospace.  In 2008 Embry-Riddle University decided to build its third campus in Rockford.  In that same 
year, the RAEDC learned that Rockford was being considered as a location for a major aircraft 
manufacturer as a result of some advocacy by the private sector.  The RAEDC visited the headquarters of 
the company in late 2008 with a delegation of staff and local leaders, and was able to make what they 
felt was a compelling pitch.  Though Rockford was not chosen as the location for the plant, the fact that 
they had been seriously considered further bolstered their excitement about aerospace in the region. 
 By the end of 2008, the RAEDC was determined to create some sort of program to support what 
was now being called the aerospace cluster in Rockford.  By early 2009, the RAEDC was meeting 
regularly with a steering committee of aerospace industry leaders.  At one meeting, Jeff Kaney, the 
aerospace CEO, asked about the possibility of handing over some of the leadership to the private sector.  
Though RAEDC staff felt that it was in the interest of the region to support the aerospace cluster, the 
RAEDC bylaws did not have any means of establishing independent committees focused on individual 
industries.  As one interviewee put it, the RAEDC was supposed to work with all industries.  To build 
support, and to make sure that they had the support of their investors, the RAEDC staff brought the 
issue to their board, who voted to amend the bylaws and allow for the creation of industry-specific 
committees that could be chaired by private sector investors in RAEDC.   
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 With the organizational infrastructure in place, the Rockford Area Aerospace Network (RAAN) 
was started in 2010 with Jeff Kaney as Chairman.  More than just a committee, the RAAN is almost a 
separate organization dedicated exclusively to the aerospace industry in the wider Rockford region.  
Though the organization is nominally part of the RAEDC, it has considerable autonomy.  One example of 
this is in the structure of its members.  In order to officially be a member of RAAN, firms must be 
investors in the RAEDC, be within 75 miles of Rockford, and get the majority of their revenue from 
aerospace.  At the time of the research, the network had about 17 members including the four largest 
firms in the region and a collection of mid-sized suppliers.  In addition to this core group, RAAN has set 
up the Rockford Aerospace Cluster, a wider network for aerospace firms in the Rockford region that 
required no membership fee and served mainly to keep track of as many of the aerospace firms in the 
region as possible. 
 At the time of the research, the RAAN was still new, but it had 17 members and was aware of 
around 200 firms through the wider Rockford Aerospace Cluster network.  The wider network had even 
allowed an organization representing forty or so aerospace firms in northern Wisconsin to join since the 
firms it represents did business with firms in Rockford.  In addition to networking, the RAAN has been 
involved in technical education in the region.  One interviewee stressed that the members of RAAN were 
not interested in being a networking organization, but that they were all motivated by a concern about 
the supply of skilled labor.  The RAAN and several of its member companies, along with the RAEDC and 
local educational institutions have collaborated on the Joint Institute of Engineering Technology – 
Aerospace (JiET-A) program.  JiET-A brings together classes at local community colleges, Embry-Riddle, 
and nearby Northern Illinois University and internship programs at aerospace firms to create a pipeline 
of aerospace engineers that can supply labor to aerospace firms in the region. 
 
6. Analysis and Discussion 
 This research aimed to understand how REDOs used cluster analysis and the cluster concept to 
inform decisions through a set of detailed case studies of decisions by such organizations.  This section 
presents the key findings of the research. 
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6.1 Meso-level analysis sets the agenda 
 All of the cases presented were informed at some point by a meso-level study that aimed to 
identify target industries.  The short lists of economic sectors that such studies produced were used by 
both organizations to prioritize outreach and further study.  This is an important class of decisions on its 
own, since it is a decision about how to best allocate limited staff time (for outreach) and financial 
resources (for research studies).  In the case of the NEIRP, the list of targets actually became an agenda 
for future research.  All five top tier targets and the additional defense / aerospace target were the 
focus of individual studies.  At the RAEDC, the target study was used to identify the aerospace industry 
as the subject of the final study for which funding was available.  This finding sheds some light on Sölvell, 
Lindqvist, and Ketels’ (2003) finding that the most common activity of cluster initiatives is research.  It 
also supports Isserman’s (2005) finding that cluster studies were an updated form of an economic base 
study.  On their own, the meso-level studies provided little in the way of the sort of information around 
which one could design a policy.  Instead, they served as a useful snapshot of the regional economy that 
could be useful in determining where to devote additional time and energy. 
6.2 Micro level cluster studies provide more actionable information 
 In contrast to the meso-level studies, micro-level studies of individual clusters provided specific 
information that was useful in creating policies and identifying specific cluster dynamics.  Studies of 
aerospace in Rockford, and logistics and defense / aerospace in Northeast Indiana identified a shortage 
of qualified workers as a concern.  In each of these cases, the REDO or one of its partners worked to 
design a workforce training program to help address the need.  The NEIRP study of the logistics industry 
also found that it was not particularly competitive compared to similar industries in nearby regions.  This 
was not used to design a program, but rather to avoid designing one.  A marketing campaign to attract 
logistics, which would use limited resources, was a possible course of action.  The NEIRP decided, on the 
basis of the study, to expend the resources elsewhere while still working with logistics firms that 
expressed interest in the region. 
6.3 Cluster studies of both types were useful planning behaviors 
 The cases showed multiple examples of cluster analysis serving a useful purpose.  First and 
foremost, both types of analysis produced surprising results that set the REDO in question on a new 
path.  One example from the RAEDC was the finding of the size of the local aerospace industry.  Though 
RAEDC staff were aware of several large aerospace firms in the area, they did not think of the industry 
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as having a deep presence in the region until the target industry study drew attention to it.  An RAEDC 
staff person described a conversation with the author of the study as follows. 
 “[I called him and asked], ‘Why would you suggest that we focus on aerospace when we only 
 have two companies?’  And he kind of laughed at me, and he said I think you need to do a better 
 job researching your market before you assume that you only have two companies.  I thought, 
 OK, maybe we need to take a more in depth look.” 
That conversation led the staff person to advocate using the remaining research funding to look into the 
aerospace industry, which confirmed the initial finding and helped the RAEDC realize that in addition to 
the known large aerospace firms, the region had a considerable collection of smaller suppliers going up 
the supply chain.  That gave them the confidence to begin talking to the aerospace industry, and it gave 
them some specific information about the workforce needs of the industry around which to frame early 
discussions. 
 The micro level studies also presented surprising findings.  The NEIRP micro-level study of the 
medical device cluster was cited by several interviewees in Ft. Wayne and Warsaw as instrumental in 
changing perspectives on the relationship between the two regions.  AS one NEIRP staff person put it,  
 “I remember the date that [he] came to me and told me, ‘you need to read this report and read 
 this conclusion here that we are not a medical device cluster.’  And I had to digest it a little bit 
 and think.  What does that mean to us if we now admit that we, northeast Indiana, are not a 
 cluster without  Warsaw.  And it just heightened the intensity of my interest of cultivating a  
 relationship with that community.  It changed my perspective on the urgency of us having a 
 productive relationship with them.” 
The act of wrestling over what to do about such findings was an important step in the road to the 
decisions presented in the cases.  The conversations that resulted from the findings, though not directly 
observed by the research, were invoked explicitly and implicitly by interview subjects. 
 One reason that the cluster analysis produced surprising results was fairly obvious.  It expanded 
the focus of the REDOs beyond the large employers in the area.  In the case of the Rockford aerospace 
industry, this resulted in an awareness of what might be a true cluster rather than just one or two large 
firms.  In the case of the medical device clusters in Indiana, it led to the realization that there was a 
significant concentration of small firms in the NEIRP region that were closely tied to the large firms in 
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Warsaw.  While such findings are not unique to cluster analysis, they are an important aspect of 
competent cluster analysis. 
In addition to surprising findings, the cluster concept itself served a useful purpose in planning 
by REDOs.  Section 3 described Hopkins’ (2001) typology of how plans worked – as agendas, policies, 
visions, strategies, and plans.  As shown above, lists of “important” industries in the region, defined as 
targets or clusters” can serve as agendas fur further action.  The cluster concept, as a frame for action, 
was also useful in creating visions of the future.    While those visions were rarely spelled out in formal 
planning documents, they were alluded to in conversations with interview subjects.  Such visions served 
as a powerful motivation for action.  One example of this is the vision of Rockford as a region with a 
significant aerospace industry.  This idea, which was not widely held ten years ago, became possible 
through research on the industry and conversations between the RAEDC and industry leaders.  It 
became an organizing idea toward which formidable resources were expended. 
6.4 Cluster planning was rarely if ever strategic planning 
 Though the planning behaviors associated with clusters did result in informal agendas and 
visions, and even sometimes in policies, they never took the form of detailed strategies.  Formal plans of 
any kind played a very small role in either organization.  Formal strategies and programmed strategic 
planning processes of the type espoused by Bryson and economic development academics were 
nonexistent.  The reasons for this are those alluded to in section 3.  First, there was never any possibility 
of agreement between all parties involved in a decision at the beginning of a process.  This was because 
there never was any formalized process in which one could identify a beginning.  The decisions did not 
represent the end or middle of a formal process so much as an important point where action was 
undertaken.   
Furthermore, in many cases the key parties emerged in the course of conducting analysis and 
interacting with others in the region.  Jeff Kaney, the leader of the RAAN, was not involved in the 
process of studying the aerospace industry in Rockford.  That research led to informal conversations, 
during one of which he emerged as a potential collaborator.  As the ideas about how the RAEDC could 
support an aerospace cluster in Rockford became more concrete, Jeff Kaney took a greater role.  Other 
important players, such as the executives at the larger firms, were reticent to get involved with the 
RAEDC early on.  They eventually did so, but then took only a small role in RAAN.  This finding clearly 
supports Levin’s (1976) conception of planning processes.  Support is low early on when ideas are vague.  
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As decisions become more defined, the commitment of those still involved goes up, with the end result 
being a small group of actors highly committed to a specific course of action. 
In addition to key individuals, opportunities emerged over time that could not be foreseen.  The 
decision to frame the successful Lilly Family Foundation proposal around the defense aerospace cluster 
drew heavily on the results of prior planning behaviors by the NEIRP including analysis and outreach.  It 
could not, for obvious reasons, have been foreseen as a result of those behaviors.  Though an extreme 
example, this highlights the role that unforeseen opportunities play in the work of REDOs.  Their limited 
capacity to act makes them reliant upon the resources of others, whether granting agencies or private 
sector partners. 
 A further reason for the lack of formal strategic planning is more specific to clusters.  As 
mentioned in section two, the geographic extent of clusters can be difficult to determine.  In a meso-
level analysis, there is often a need to define an area before the analysis can occur.  This approach fits 
well with the strategic planning requirement that all parties be identified and committed at the start of a 
process, but it ignores important aspects of both clusters and regional economic development.  First, 
since the links between cluster members operate at different scales, the geographic extent of a cluster 
may be impossible to determine without analysis.  This is not simply a problem of imposing political 
boundaries on analysis, as many have noted, but rather the problem of putting any a priori geographic 
boundaries on cluster analysis which at its core is about identifying important economic linkages. 
The most obvious example of this is seen in the study of medical devices by the NEIRP.  If the 
purpose of the study was to understand the medical device industry in the NEIRP region, then a key 
purpose of the study was to determine if and how those firms were connected to the ones in Warsaw.  
To demand that the geographic extent of the study be determined before the study has taken place, as 
opposed to starting from the center of the region – Ft. Wayne – and seeing where various connections 
lead is a case of putting the cart before the horse.  For this reason, micro level studies, which due to 
their partially qualitative nature allow for more flexible regional and industrial definitions at the outset, 
offer advantages over meso-level studies.  If one were to further study the aerospace industry in 
Rockford, it is conceivable that the companies in northern Wisconsin that recently joined the cluster 
organization might be of interest.  Geographically, they are somewhat distant, but by their own actions 
they have demonstrated that an economic relationship might exist. 
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6.5 The cluster work of RREDOs is an instance of collective action for public goods 
 Despite emerging outside of formal planning processes, the decisions of the REDOs in this study 
played an important role in coordinating actions in support of public goods.  As described in section two 
above, the benefits of clusters are a collective good that is non-rival and non-excludable from the 
perspective of any single establishment.  The decisions in the cases, along with the policies to which they 
gave rise, led to an increase in the supply of these goods.  Both the Lilly Family Foundation grant and the 
RAAN resulted in programs designed to increase the supply of skilled labor.  The RAAN also provides 
training for Rockford region aerospace companies on doing business with large aerospace firms and the 
federal government.  This has the potential to increase the capacity of local firms, and to make them 
more resilient to fluctuations in demand. 
 Another important collective good that was generated by the cluster work is in building the 
capacity to act.  As mentioned above, the cluster idea was a useful frame for creating informal visions of 
the future.  The coalitions that evolved in the run-up to the decisions presented here represent an 
important resource for the region.  The lack of regional government in the US means that regions are 
often fragmented.  Instances of regional collaboration of the type documented in this research build an 
environment of trust and reciprocity, and perhaps a stock of goodwill that might be drawn upon in 
future initiatives. 
6.6 Limitations of the research 
 The cases documented here were chosen carefully to reflect the most likely places where REDOs 
were using the cluster concept and cluster analysis to make decisions.  There are, however, some 
limitations.  First, the meso-level studies employed by the organizations in this research were not 
specifically designed to identify clusters.  As target studies, they were designed to identify the best 
candidate industries for recruitment efforts.  The idea that such target studies would be used to identify 
clusters is anathema to purists, but may be widespread in practice.  This may be less of a problem that it 
seems on the surface, because the logic behind what would constitute evidence of a potential target is 
not wholly different from the logic behind what would constitute evidence of a potential cluster (Goetz, 
Deller, and Harris 2009).  Both rely on a significant presence of the firms in question in the region.  
Bergman and Feser (1999) advise that meso-level cluster analysis include a scan of the entire economy, 
avoid sticking only to major industries, and avoid characterizing clusters solely by product.  The meso-
level target studies mentioned here did not adhere to all such recommendations, but they did include a 
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fairly comprehensive analysis and they did delve deeper into the economy rather than merely 
establishing employment counts by two-digit NAICS sectors. 
 It may be that more sophisticated meso-level analysis would have led to more information 
about the regional economy.  It is hard to imagine that meso-level analysis would have yielded the same 
insights as the micro-level studies described in this research, but it remains a possibility.  Further 
research should examine the strengths of different sorts of cluster analysis for informing decisions and 
policy.  The method and design of this research may provide a model for future research on this topic. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 REDOs have expended considerable time and resources pursuing cluster-based approaches to 
regional economic development.  This research aimed to determine if and how the cluster concept and 
cluster analysis was informing decisions.  It has shown that criticism of such practices is to some degree 
unwarranted.  The unresolved theoretical issues that still plague the cluster concept have not prevented 
cluster analysis from providing REDOs with useful and sometimes surprising information about their 
regions.  The cluster concept has also been a useful frame for mobilizing coalitions of public and private 
sector actors around specific goals and policies.  This supports Isserman’s (2005)  claim that cluster 
studies are the new economic base study and Feser and Luger’s (2003)description of cluster as a mode 
of inquiry.  It calls into question Bergman and Feser’s (1999) argument that cluster analysis is best 
conducted in response to a specific problem.  The cases presented here show that cluster analysis, 
particularly micro-level analysis, can bring important problems to light. 
 The research has also shown that REDOs face considerable institutional constrains that make 
the strategic planning poorly suited as either a prescriptive or descriptive model of practice.  REDOs face 
limited capacity to act alone and they lack the strong mandate of general purpose government.  As a 
result they rely heavily on collaboration, particularly with the private sector, in order to design and 
implement policies and programs.  These constraints make the assumptions of the strategic planning 
model, particularly those that require early commitment of all parties, extremely unlikely.  Add to this 
the uncertainty about the nature of clusters in any specific place, and it is clear that the process that 
leads from cluster-based planning behaviors to distinct sets of actors committed to a course of action 
messy, iterative, and almost entirely unprogrammed.  This confirms the proposition that strategic 
planning is a poor lens through which to view regional economic development planning. 
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 Finally, this research has shown that cluster analysis has the potential to improve on earlier 
methods of basic regional analysis by placing the emphasis on important economic connections without 
respect to political boundaries.  Cluster analysis, particularly micro-level analysis may allow for a 
bottom-up picture of a cluster to develop organically by tracing the connection between different 
elements of the public and private sector.  The resulting cluster can then be a catalyst for coordinated 
action.  Going further, there is no reason to expect that two different clusters, even two centered on the 
same place, will have the same geographic extent.  Cluster-based regional economic development thus 
has the potential to spur multiple overlapping yet distinct collaborations that would be more responsive 
to the needs of each cluster without superimposing a top-down designated regional entity responsible 
for all economic development in the region. 
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APPENDIX A 
Organizations included in the survey frame 
(Listed alphabetically by Metropolitan Statistical Area name) 
 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Akron, OH Greater Akron Chamber 
Albany, GA Southwest Georgia Regional Development Center 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY Center for Economic Growth 
Albuquerque, NM Albuquerque Economic Development 
Alexandria, LA Greater Alexandria Economic Development 
Authority 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ Lehigh Valley Economic Development 
Amarillo, TX The High Ground of Texas 
Anchorage, AK Anchorage Economic Development Corporation 
Ann Arbor, MI Ann Arbor SPARK 
Appleton, WI Fox Cities Economic Development Partnership 
Asheville, NC Advantage West Economic Development Group 
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ Atlantic County Community Development 
Corporation 
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ Southern New Jersey Development Council 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC Central Savannah River Area Regional Commission 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC Economic Development Partnership of South 
Carolina 
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX Greater Austin San Antonio Corridor Council 
Bakersfield-Delano, CA Kern County Development Corporation 
Baltimore-Towson, MD Economic Alliance of Greater Baltimore 
Bangor, ME Eastern Maine Development Corporation 
Barnstable Town, MA Cape Cod Commission 
Baton Rouge, LA Baton Rouge Area Chamber 
Bellingham, WA Northwest Economic Council 
Bend, OR Economic Development for Central Oregon 
Billings, MT Big Sky Economic Development 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL Birmingham Business Alliance 
Bloomington, IN Bloomington Economic Development Corporation 
Bloomington-Normal, IL Economic Development Council of the 
Bloomington-Normal Area 
Boise City-Nampa, ID Boise Valley Economic Partnership 
Boulder, CO Boulder Economic Council 
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA Kitsap Economic Development Alliance 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX Brownsville Economic Development Council 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Buffalo Niagara Enterprise 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Burlington, NC Alamance County Economic Development 
Foundation 
Burlington-South Burlington, VT Greater Burlington Industrial Corporation 
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL Fort Myers Regional Partnership 
Cedar Rapids, IA Priority One 
Charleston, WV Charleston Area Alliance 
Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC Charleston Regional Development Alliance 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC Charlotte Regional Partnership 
Charlottesville, VA Thomas Jefferson Partnership for Economic 
Development 
Chico, CA 3CORE 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN Cincinnati USA Partnership for Economic 
Development 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH Greater Cleveland Partnership 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH Cleveland Plus 
College Station-Bryan, TX Research Valley Partnership 
Colorado Springs, CO Colorado Springs Regional Economic Development 
Corporation 
Columbia, MO Columbia Regional Economic Development, Inc. 
Columbia, SC Central SC Alliance 
Columbus, GA-AL Valley Partnership 
Columbus, OH The Columbus Region 
Corpus Christi, TX Corpus Christi Regional Economic Development 
Corporation 
Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL Economic Development Council for Okaloosa 
County, Florida 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL Quad Cities First 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL Quad Cities Regional Economic Development 
Authority 
Dayton, OH Dayton Development Coalition 
Decatur, AL North Alabama Industrial Development Association 
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL Volusia County Department of Economic 
Development 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO Metro Denver Economic Development Corporation 
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA Greater Des Moines Partnership 
Dover, DE Kent Economic Partnership 
Duluth, MN-WI Arrowhead Regional Development Commission 
Duluth, MN-WI APEX 
Eau Claire, WI Momentum West 
El Centro, CA Imperial Valley Economic Development Corporation 
El Paso, TX El Paso Regional Economic Development 
Corporation 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN Economic Development Corporation of Elkhart 
County 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Erie, PA Erie Regional Chamber and Growth Partnership 
Eugene-Springfield, OR Lane Metro Partnership 
Evansville, IN-KY Northwest Kentucky Forward 
Evansville, IN-KY Economic Development Coalition of Southwest 
Indiana 
Fargo, ND-MN Greater Fargo Moorhead Economic Development 
Corporation 
Fayetteville, NC North Carolina's Southeast 
Flint, MI Gennessee Regional Chamber of Commerce 
Florence, SC North Eastern Strategic Alliance 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO Northern Colorado Economic Development 
Corporation 
Fort Smith, AR-OK Fort Smith Regional Alliance 
Fort Wayne, IN Northeast Indiana Regional Partnership 
Fresno, CA Economic Development Corporation serving Fresno 
County 
Fresno, CA California Central Valley Economic Development 
Corporation 
Gainesville, FL Heart of Florida Regional Coalition 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI The Right Place, Inc. 
Greeley, CO Upstate Colorado Economic Development 
Green Bay, WI Advance 
Greensboro-High Point, NC Piedmont Triad Partnership 
Greenville, NC North Carolina's Eastern Region 
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC Upstate South Carolina Alliance 
Gulfport-Biloxi, MS Gulf Coast Business Council 
Hanford-Corcoran, CA Kings County Economic Development Corporation 
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA Capital Region Economic Development Corporation 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT Metro Hartford Alliance 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT Central Connecticut Economic Development 
Alliance 
Holland-Grand Haven, MI Ottawa County Economic Development Office, Inc. 
Honolulu, HI Enterprise Honolulu, O'ahu Economic Development 
Board 
Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA Terrebonne Economic Development Authority 
Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux, LA South Louisiana Economic Council 
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH Ashland Alliance 
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH Huntington Area Development Council 
Huntsville, AL Huntsville Regional Economic Growth Initiative 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN Indy Partnership 
Iowa City, IA Iowa City Area Development Group 
Jackson, MI Enterprise Group of Jackson, Inc. 
Jackson, MS Greater Jackson Alliance 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Jacksonville, FL JAXUSA Partnership 
Jacksonville, NC Jacksonville Onslow Economic Development 
Janesville, WI Rock County Development Alliance 
Janesville, WI Greater Beloit Economic Development Corporation 
Joplin, MO Joplin Regional Partnership 
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI Southwest Michigan First 
Kansas City, MO-KS Think KC 
Kennewick-Pasco-Richland, WA Tri-City Development Council 
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA Regional Alliance for Economic Development 
Kingston, NY Ulster County Development Corporation 
Knoxville, TN East Tennessee Economic Development Agency 
Knoxville, TN Knoxville Oak Ridge Innovation Valley, Inc. 
Lafayette, IN Greater Lafayette Commerce 
Lafayette, LA Acadiana Economic Development Council 
Lake Charles, LA Southwest Louisiana Economic Development 
Alliance 
Lancaster, PA Economic Development Company of Lancaster 
County 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI Lansing Economic Area Partnership 
Laredo, TX Laredo Development Foundation 
Las Cruces, NM Mesilla Valley Economic Development Alliance 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Nevada Development Authority 
Lexington-Fayette, KY Bluegrass Alliance 
Lexington-Fayette, KY Commerce Lexington, Inc. 
Lincoln, NE Lincoln Partnership for Economic Development 
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR Metro Little Rock Alliance 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN Greater Louisville, Inc. 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN One Southern Indiana 
Lubbock, TX Lubbock Economic Development Alliance 
Lubbock, TX South Plains Association of Governments 
Lynchburg, VA Region 2000 Partnership 
Macon, GA Middle Georgia Regional Commission 
Madera-Chowchilla, CA Madera County Economic Development 
Commission 
Madison, WI Thrive 
Manchester-Nashua, NH Regional Economic Development Center of 
Southern New Hampshire 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX Rio Grande Valley Partnership 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX McAllen Economic Development Corporation 
Medford, OR Southern Oregon Regional Economic Development 
Inc. 
Merced, CA Merced County Economic Development 
Corporation 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI Milwaukee 7 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI Greater MSP 
Mobile, AL Mobile Area Chamber of Commerce 
Modesto, CA Stanislaus Economic Development and Workforce 
Alliance 
Monroe, MI Monroe County Industrial Development 
Corporation 
Montgomery, AL Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce 
Montgomery, AL Central Alabama Regional Planning and 
Development Commission 
Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI Muskegon Area First 
Myrtle Beach-North Myrtle Beach-Conway, SC Myrtle Beach Regional Economic Development 
Corporation 
Naples-Marco Island, FL Economic Development Council of Collier County 
Florida 
New Haven-Milford, CT REX Development 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA Greater New Orleans, Inc. 
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI Southwest Michigan Planning Commission 
Norwich-New London, CT Southeastern Connecticut Enterprise Region 
Ocala, FL Ocala Marion County Economic Development 
Corporation 
Oklahoma City, OK Greater Oklahoma City Partnership 
Olympia, WA Thurston Economic Development Council 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA Greater Omaha Economic Development 
Partnership 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL Metro Orlando Economic Development 
Commission 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL Central Florida Partnership 
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI Oshkosh Area Economic Development Corporation 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA Economic Development Collaborative - Ventura 
County 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL Economic Development Commission of Florida's 
Space Coast 
Panama City-Lynn Haven-Panama City Beach, FL Bay County Economic Development Alliance 
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Pensacola Bay Area Chamber of Commerce 
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL Florida's Great Northwest, Inc. 
Peoria, IL Heartland Partnership 
Peoria, IL Economic Development Council for Central Illinois 
Pittsburgh, PA Pittsburgh Regional Alliance 
Pittsburgh, PA Pittsburgh Technology Council 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA Greater Portland, Inc. 
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY Hudson Valley Economic Development Corporation 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation 
Pueblo, CO Pueblo Economic Development Corporation 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Racine, WI Racine County Economic Development Corporation 
Raleigh-Cary, NC Research Triangle Regional Partnership 
Reading, PA Berks Economic Partnership 
Redding, CA Shasta County Economic Development Corporation 
Reno-Sparks, NV Economic Development Authority of Western 
Nevada 
Richmond, VA Greater Richmond Partnership, Inc. 
Roanoke, VA Roanoke Regional Partnership 
Rochester, MN Rochester Area Economic Development, Inc. 
Rochester, NY Greater Rochester Enterprise 
Rockford, IL Rockford Area Economic Development Council 
Rocky Mount, NC Carolinas Gateway Partnership 
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA Sacramento Area Commerce and Trade 
Organization 
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI Saginaw Future 
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI Great Lakes Bay Regional Alliance 
Salem, OR Strategic Economic Development Corporation 
Salinas, CA Monterey County Business Council 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA San Diego Regional Economic Development 
Corporation 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network 
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA Economic Vitality Corporation 
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA Sonoma County Economic Development Board 
Savannah, GA Savannah Economic Development Authority 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre, PA Great Valley Technology Alliance 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA North Louisiana Economic Partnership 
Sioux Falls, SD Sioux Falls Development Foundation 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI Project Future 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI Southwestern Michigan Economic Growth Alliance 
Spartanburg, SC Economic Futures Group 
Spokane, WA Greater Spokane, Inc. 
Springfield, IL Q5 Quantum Growth Partnership 
Springfield, MA Economic Development Council of Western 
Massachusetts 
Springfield, MA Pioneer Valley Planning Commission 
Springfield, MO Springfield Business and Development Corporation 
St. Cloud, MN St. Cloud Area Economic Development Partnership, 
Inc. 
St. Louis, MO-IL St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association 
State College, PA Centre County Industrial Development Corporation 
Stockton, CA San Joaquin Partnership 
Syracuse, NY Centerstate Center for Economic Opportunity 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area Regional Economic Development Organization 
Syracuse, NY Central New York Regional Planning and 
Development Board 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL Tampa Bay Partnership 
Toledo, OH Northwest Ohio Regional Economic Development 
Association 
Toledo, OH Toledo Regional Growth Partnership 
Topeka, KS Go Topeka Economic Partnership 
Trenton-Ewing, NJ Growth Partnership of Central Jersey 
Tucson, AZ Tucson Regional Economic Opportunities, Inc. 
Tulsa, OK Tulsa Metro Chamber 
Tuscaloosa, AL West Alabama Regional Commission 
Tyler, TX Tyler Economic Development Council 
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA Solano Economic Development Corporation 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ Cumberland Development Corporation 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance 
Visalia-Porterville, CA Tulare County Economic Development Corporation 
Waco, TX Waco McLennan County Economic Development 
Corporation 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA Greater Cedar Valley Alliance 
Wichita, KS Greater Wichita Economic Development Coalition 
Worcester, MA Worcester Regional Chamber of Commerce 
Yakima, WA Yakima County Development Association 
York-Hanover, PA York County Economic Development Corporation 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA Mahoning Valley Economic Development 
Corporation 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA Youngstown/Warren Regional Chamber 
Yuba City, CA Yuba Sutter Economic Development Corporation 
Yuma, AZ Greater Yuma Economic Development Corporation 
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APPENDIX B 
Survey Instrument 
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APPENDIX C 
Extended Descriptions of the Cases 
1. Background to the Northeast Indiana Regional Partnership Cases 
 The Northeast Indiana Regional Partnership (NEIRP) was formed in 2006 as a 501(c)(6) 
organization, and joined soon after by the Northeast Indiana Fund (NIF), a 501(c)(3) partner.  The effort 
to create the NEIRP was led by the Ft. Wayne Corporate Council3, a private sector organization that was 
then beginning to expand its focus beyond Ft. Wayne and Allen County.  Several publicly-funded 
regional economic development organizations preceded the NEIRP, but they had limited resources.  To 
start the NEIRP, the Corporate Council led a drive to raise funds, primarily from major firms in the region 
though with an important early financial pledge form the mayor of Ft. Wayne.  The drive brought in $8 
million, which exceeded expectations.  In order to guarantee the support of the public sector, the NEIRP 
sought support from counties and major cities as well, with the idea that the organization would cover 
the geographic region covered by counties that pledged support.  Though counties further away from 
the city of Ft. Wayne were somewhat wary of joining a regional organization that had strong roots in the 
core city of the region, the NEIRP succeeded in garnering the financial support of nine counties that 
covered the northeast corner of the state (Figure C.1).  In the ensuing years, one additional county 
joined as well, bringing the total to ten.  The board of directors is a mix of public and private sector 
leaders, but certain powers are reserved for a local economic development organization (LEDO) council. 
 For much of its existence the offices of the NEIRP have been on the same floor as those of 
several other regional organizations including the regional office of the Indiana Economic Development 
Corporation, the regional Workforce Investment Board, and the Community Research Institute of 
Indiana Purdue Ft. Wayne University.  Though it was initially conceived as a marketing organization, the 
NEIRP and the NIF have over the years expanded into additional program areas such as education and a 
focus on local clusters.  At the time of this research, the combined NEIRP and NIF employed 17 staff: six 
focused on marketing and recruitment, five in administration and support, and six in other initiatives. 
 The NEIRP engaged in a process of identifying clusters in the region beginning in 2007, though 
the process began with a study commissioned from an outside consultant to identify target industries 
for attraction efforts.  The NEIRP also had access to six prior studies that identified clusters at the state  
                                                          
3
 The organization is now renamed the Regional Chamber of Northeast Indiana.  
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Figure C.1 – the original nine county area of the NEIRP 
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or regional level.  Using a unique methodology that took into account various industries’ representation 
in the region, employment growth in the region, and whether firms in the industry had announced 
expansions in the state or region, the marketing study recommended an emphasis on five first tier 
industries and eleven second tier industries.  The recommended targets were groups of NAICS industries 
at the 3, 4, 5 and 6 digit level.  The study neglected to make clear how such industry groups were 
determined. 
 Noticeably absent from the first tier was the local defense and aerospace industry, which 
included firms like BAE Systems, Raytheon, ITT, and Northrup Grumman.  These firms had a long history 
in the area, still employed thousands of employees, and were thought of as a critical piece of the 
regional economy by many NEIRP staff.  In reviewing the results of the marketing study, NEIRP staff saw 
that what they considered a single industry had actually been divided into two industries in the second 
tier, “tactical communications” and “aviation / aerospace.”  The NEIRP decided to use the five first tier 
target industries, and to group the two second tier into a “defense / aerospace” industry, giving them a 
total of six industries that they began to call their clusters (Table C.1).  NEIRP staff were aware that in so 
doing they had blurred the distinction between target industries and clusters, but rather than conduct 
an additional study designed to identify clusters they decided to focus their resources on learning more 
about the industries that had been identified in the marketing study.  In 2009 the NIF, with the help of 
several other local foundations, commissioned studies of three of the six industries.  In 2011 they 
commissioned studies of the other three.  NEIRP staff referred to these studies as cluster studies, as did 
the studies themselves.  In many ways they fit Bergman and Feser’s (1999) description of micro studies 
of pre-defined clusters.  The studies, prepared by several different authors, varied in quality, but all 
included specific information on the specific nature of firms in the region and recommendations of how 
to support them. 
Table C.1 – The NEIRP target clusters as of early 2012 
 
Studied in 2009 
Medical devices 
Defense / Aerospace 
Food Processing 
 
Studied in 2011 
Advanced manufacturing 
Insurance 
Logistics 
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In addition to the studies, the NIF created the position of Manager of Industry Cluster Initiatives 
with some funding from another local foundation.  The position has by most accounts been a 
challenging one.  The purpose of the position was to encourage cooperation between firms in the 
identified clusters and to eventually get them to form their own organization.  Independent of the 
NEIRP, the firms in the defense and aerospace industries in the region had done just that in 2010 by 
forming the Northeast Indiana Defense Industry Association.  The perception that a stand-alone 
organization is essential to a successful cluster initiative has wide support among NEIRP staff, but thus 
far efforts to bring this about have been inconclusive.  However, as the following cases show, decisions 
about clusters did not always come under the purview of the Manager of Industry Cluster Initiatives. 
2. Strategic Planning by the NEIRP 
 The NEIRP did adopt a five-year strategic plan in 2007.  The 58-page document was prepared by 
a member of the NEIRP’s advisory board, group of non-voting board members who are called upon to 
provide advice and guidance.  The plan includes a review of major indicators like growth and wages, as 
well as a focus on trends in managements and technical field as well as manufacturing.  It addresses the 
organizational landscape as well.  All told the plan includes dozens of recommendations, including a call 
for continual revisiting of the document.  By all accounts, the plan played little role in most decisions 
over the ensuing years.  It was officially adopted by the board, but it rarely if ever came up in 
conversations about later decisions.  In describing this, one interviewee claimed that the plan was done 
because the organization needed one to seem credible at the time, but that it had very little ownership 
even within the organization.  This is not to say that the recommendations were wrong.  Another 
interviewee said that in reviewing the 2007 plan years later, a lot of it made more sense to him than it 
had at the time.  Another interviewee claimed that the plan had not received much funding, and so was 
only able to do so much.   
 The plan included a recommendation that the NEIRP focus on clusters in region, among other 
things, but the proposed clusters were the targets from the 2007 target industry study in their original 
form without the addition of defense aerospace.  The plan also recommended engaging a cluster 
specialist for each, to learn more about them.  In one way, the recommendations were followed, in that 
the NEIRP did contract for studies of the industries and hired a Manager of Industry Cluster Initiatives.  
In another sense, though, the funding of the studies could also be understood as a follow-up to the 
targeting report as amended by the decision to add the defense / aerospace cluster, a chain of events 
that does not include the 2007 plan. 
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 In addition to the 2007 plan, the studies commissioned in 2009 and 2011 about each of the 
clusters include both analysis and recommendations, and are in some respects plans.  Those in 2009 are 
explicitly framed as “strategic plans,” and contain SWOT analyses and other hallmarks of the strategic 
planning model.  The 2011 studies also include recommendations as well as a summary document that 
frames work on all of the clusters in the region around five pillars: Competitive Business Climate, 
Entrepreneurship, 21st Century Talent, Infrastructure, and Quality of Life.  Though it does not include 
much in the way of analysis, the summary report includes discussion of all of the mentioned clusters, 
and breaks advanced manufacturing into the more meaningful sub-clusters of wire and vehicle 
manufacture.  None of the recommendations in either set of reports appeared to have much buy-in 
from the NEIRP, though the 2011 report was released not long before the research took place. 
3. The Lilly Family Foundation grant and talent initiative 
 In 2008 the Lilly Family Foundation, a large charitable foundation that has funded a number of 
initiatives in Indiana, contacted the Community Foundation of Greater Ft. Wayne, a non-profit working 
throughout Allen County, about submitting a proposal for a 5-10 million dollar grant to help with 
economic development in the community.  Rather than submit the proposal alone, the Community 
Foundation decided to convene a group of regional leaders, and to submit a proposal on behalf of the 
region.  The initial group that put together the proposal included representatives of many regional 
organizations including the Community Foundation, the Corporate Council, the NEIRP and NIF, the WIB, 
the Northeast Indiana Innovation Center (NIIC), and IPFW among others.  From the beginning, there was 
some support for focusing the proposal around clusters generally, but the initial proposal contained 
more of a list of desired programs that reflected the makeup of those present including scholarships, a 
commercialization center for the defense industry at the NIIC, and a regional marketing campaign to 
attract high-skilled workers.  It also contained a proposal for research on clusters and cluster specialist 
staff positions to be housed at the NIF. 
 The initial response from Lilly was that the proposal was too scattered.  So, the group met again 
to consider how to make the proposal more focused.  During this process, it was announced that the city 
of Columbus, Indiana, had received a 38 million dollar grant from Lilly.  The NE Indiana group went to 
Columbus to learn about the process there, an experience that helped them realize that they could 
submit a proposal larger than the original 5-10 million dollar solicitation from Lilly.  After further 
researching which elements of their proposal would fit wider state priorities, the group sent a series of 
revised proposals to Lilly, each of which was rejected for containing too many disparate pieces.  Lilly also 
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told the group that they needed to identify a compelling case to support the proposal, as opposed to 
just a list of desired programs. 
 As the group refined the proposal, they drew on information about state level priorities from 
their consultant in Indianapolis.  Through that route, they learned that although Lilly initially claimed to 
be unwilling to fund K-12 education, they, along with the Governor, were interested in improving STEM 
(science, technology, engineering, and math) education in high schools.  As a result, the proposal 
eventually contained a proposal for six new high schools focused on technical education.  They also 
began to develop the arguments for what would become their “compelling case.”  That argument went 
as follows.  NE Indiana has experienced declining per capita income, as compared to that of the US, 
since the mid-1990s, from 96% of the national average in 1995 to 81% in 2006.  In part, this resulted 
from a decline in manufacturing employment, but in comparison to regions that were harder hit by the 
decline in the auto industry, NE Indiana still had 25% of its employment in manufacturing related 
industries in 2006.  The establishments in the defense / aerospace cluster were a significant share of this 
remaining manufacturing employment.  However, the defense / aerospace cluster needed high-skilled 
workers, especially as long-term employees in the baby boom generation began to retire.  The grant 
proposal stated, 
“The question is not whether these companies will fill these job opportunities, but whether they 
will find the talent required to meet the demand and grow right here in northeast Indiana. This 
is the compelling near-term opportunity that must be seized.” 
A further reason for a focus on the defense sector, in 2008, was that it was considered to be less likely to 
be affected by economic downturns.  The proposal is presented as a strategy to support the economy of 
NE Indiana by providing a sufficient number of adequately trained individuals to ensure that the defense 
/ aerospace cluster would remain a major regional employer. 
The penultimate proposal was a 40 million dollar proposal designed to assist workforce 
development focused around technical education, including programs in high schools, colleges, and 
continuing education.  The Lilly Foundation responded favorably to the larger proposal, but asked that 
the group cut it down to 20 million.  The resulting process was difficult, according to nearly every 
interviewee familiar with it, since the group decided to remove some of the proposed programs in their 
entirety in order to keep others largely intact. 
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 The successful 20 million dollar proposal, called Talent Opportunity Success 2015 (TOpS 2015) 
included funding for four main program areas: 
 $5.7 million to create new workforce development programs targeted to the needs of the 
defense / aerospace and other high tech manufacturers in the region and train 1,200 workers; 
 $2.6 million to outfit an advanced manufacturing training center at Ivy Tech with machines and 
automated systems that were in use by manufacturers in the area; 
 $4.5 million to create two centers of excellence at IPFW, one in systems engineering and one in 
wireless communications; 
 $5 million to create STEM education centers in high schools throughout the region. 
After adding $2.1 million for governance and evaluation of the program, which would be run with 
oversight from the Community Foundation and the NIF, the total of the proposal was $20 million.  TOpS 
2015 got underway in 2010, and was in the midst of its term at the time this research was conducted. 
 According to one interview subject, a critical step in winning the grant was a set of interviews 
that Lilly did with the executives of the local defense/aerospace industry.  These were individuals that 
had been cited in the proposals, and some of them had been involved with creating the proposal, but 
the Lilly staff wanted to interview them in private.  Their responses were instrumental in convincing Lilly 
to fund the proposal.  According to one executive, others in the aerospace industry had been supportive 
of the talent initiative because they were very aware of the impending need for qualified workers.  In 
addition, the executive claimed that the business community had an interest in well-coordinated 
regional efforts, since they were often asked to assist or support such initiatives. 
 Despite using the defense /aerospace cluster as a justification, the proposal also made clear that 
the programs would produce immediate benefits for advanced manufacturing, which overlaps with the 
defense/aerospace cluster but includes firms in medical devices as well as upstream manufacturers that 
sell to a variety of sectors.  The proposal also mentions that the workforce programs might be used for 
other segments of the economy in the future, and that the high school programs had the potential to 
benefit nearly any company in the region.  As the program has been implemented, it has become clear 
that the connection to the defense/aerospace cluster was more rhetorical than substantive, a sentiment 
confirmed by the director of the Talent Initiative in an interview.  As one interviewee put it, “I almost 
wish we'd stop saying that it is about defense.  Because people think it is only about defense.  It was 
merely the compelling argument that we could use to convince Lilly that this was the right thing to do.” 
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 Whether the defense industry has benefitted from the Lilly grant is an open question.  There is 
little reason to believe that the industry received any direct benefit, since most of the grant funded 
general technical education across the region.  Indirectly, more trained workers might lower costs by 
driving down wages or lowering the search costs of hiring, but that connection is more tenuous.  
Furthermore, in the current recession, Raytheon has cut dozens of engineering jobs at the Ft. Wayne 
site.  This would seem to undercut the explanation that a lack of engineers is currently a major problem 
facing the industry, but if the firms expand as the economy recovers the TOpS program may make that 
expansion easier.   Overall, the benefits from the Lilly grant in the short term do not seem tied to a 
particular industry. 
 Further, the defense industry does not have much direct control over the NEIRP or the TOpS 
process.  As a major employer in the region, the industry certainly has the ear of policy makers, and the 
large defense firms have been members of the regional chamber for many years.  But, they do not 
control the regional chamber of commerce, and their executives have not served on the NEIRP Board.  It 
was only in 2010 that the first defense firm supported the NEIRP with a monetary contribution, and then 
it was only Raytheon that did so.  The defense industry wields influence in the region, but it does not 
create policy unilaterally. 
 Three things contributed to the use of the defense / aerospace cluster as a frame.  First, taken at 
face value, the argument makes considerable sense.  The defense / aerospace cluster is one of the 
largest, highest wage employers in the region, and it is involved not only in manufacturing but also 
research and development.  Having recently experienced the decline of the auto industry, NE Indiana 
policy makers are acutely aware of the tenuousness of any enterprise in the area.  When such an 
important regional industry notes that they will need employees with certain skills, and that they are 
unsure of the availabilities of such skills in the regional workforce, a reaction from policy makers is 
expected.  This, however, brings up a second reason for the defense / aerospace focus, namely that the 
proposal’s authors were in close communication with representatives of the defense / aerospace cluster 
as the proposal was being prepared.  The larger defense / aerospace firms in the region were also fairly 
well organized.  Several interviewees, including an executive in the industry, noted that the firms did a 
fair amount of subcontracting and hiring each other’s workers.  Though it was not in formal existence at 
the time of the Lilly proposal, the industry would eventually form the Northeast Indiana Defense 
Industry Association (NIDIA) in 2010.  The industry was thus ready and able to provide the relevant 
information and arguments that the Lilly Foundation would find compelling.  The third explanation for 
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the defense /aerospace focus is that the technical nature of the industry allowed for the inclusion of 
programs like STEM education that had support in state and national policy circles, endearing the 
proposal to funders and reviewers. 
 To conclude, the Lilly Family Foundation proposal was framed around, and in some sense 
targeted toward the defense / aerospace cluster.  This provided focus to the proposal, and the authors 
already had the necessary connections to the cluster to provide compelling information about its needs.  
It also ensured that there would be supportive voices within the business community.  However, the 
focus was at least in some sense a rhetorical one, since the programs within the proposal stand to 
benefit firms and industries outside of the cluster.  Further, in many ways the proposal could be read as 
an attempt to revamp the quality of technical education at all levels within the region.  It thus addresses 
a problem that had been noted by the NEIRP as early as its 2007 strategic plan.  The proposal also shows 
the effects of the Lilly Family Foundation’s desire for a focused proposal, in that it contains only four 
initiatives.  Finally, in running the proposal through the NEIRP and NIF, the TOpS program supported the 
NEIRP’s expanding focus on economic development activities other than marketing. 
4. The evolving partnership with OrthoWorx 
In early 2012, the NEIRP decided to set up a formal relationship with the economic development 
organization in nearby Kosciusko County, Indiana, in order to support the medical device cluster that 
straddles both regions.  Kosciusko is home to three of the largest orthopedic device manufacturers in the 
world, but it is outside of the counties represented by the NEIRP.  The relationship involved mutual 
investments by each organization in the other, and some influence for each on the other’s board of 
directors. The relationship came after years of sometimes troubled relations between the two regions. 
 Though the city of Ft. Wayne and Allen County are in most ways the economic hub of NE 
Indiana, there are other significant concentrations of industry in the region.  The most striking of these is 
the city of Warsaw, Indiana, which is located in Kosciusko County, just outside the area represented by 
the NEIRP.  Warsaw is home to three of the largest orthopedic device manufacturers in the world, De 
Puy, Zimmer, and Biomet, known locally as the “big three”, which together account for about a third of 
the global market share of the industry (BioCrossroads 2009).  This is especially surprising given the 
small population of Warsaw and Kosciusko County, which in 2010 had 13,559 and 77,358 residents, 
respectively.  Compared to Ft. Wayne and Allen County – population 253,691 and 355,329, respectively 
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– Warsaw is quite small.  In 2007, the health and bio-medical industry4 accounted for 10,095 (31%) of 
the 32,106 private sector jobs in Kosciusko County, and the medical device industry alone accounted for 
5,979 jobs (BioCrossroads 2009).  The presence of that sector, which includes research and 
manufacturing, drove tiny Warsaw to file patents at the rate of 76 per 10,000 people from 2006-2008, 
roughly 15 times the national average (BioCrossroads 2009).   
The presence of such a large and innovative collection of firms just outside of the counties that 
constituted it was both a blessing and a curse for the NIERP.  One the one hand, proximity to such an 
industry held opportunities for attracting businesses to NEIRP counties and for building on existing 
connections to the medical device industry within those counties.  On the other hand, the fact that most 
of the firms and employment in medical devices were not formally represented by the NEIRP meant that 
they lacked the means and mandate to work closely with the industry.  According to current NEIRP staff, 
they – and historically Ft. Wayne and Allen County – wanted to be able to claim the presence of a 
biomedical cluster as a way to market the region to prospective companies in that industry. 
 Interviewees from Warsaw and Ft. Wayne claimed that the two had not worked together on 
economic development in recent memory.  The relationship between the two was uneasy, as Warsaw 
was often suspicious of its larger neighbor.  Though this research did not uncover any recent attempts 
by Ft. Wayne to attract any of the Big Three away from Warsaw, interviewees from both places 
characterized community leaders in Warsaw as having a sense that Warsaw had what Ft. Wayne wanted 
and that Ft. Wayne was trying to take something from Warsaw. 
 Going back to 2003, economic development plans by counties and others in the Ft. Wayne area 
had noted the presence of a life sciences industry in the region.  According to a 2003 plan prepared by 
the Northeast Indiana Corporate Council, such an industry “might include orthopedics and medical 
devices, biomedical research and development, pharmaceutical manufacturing, agribusiness, 
nanotechnology and molecular manufacturing (Stafford, DeTore, and Wixted 2003).”  The plan goes on 
to recommend reaching out to orthopedic industry manufacturers in Warsaw.  Since the plan was not 
written by the NEIRP, the authors were not bound to restrict their consideration to firms within the 
counties it represented.  From that perspective, including the firms in Warsaw was only natural.  With  
 
                                                          
4
 The Bio-Crossroads Report included a detailed portrait of the bio-medical industry in Kosciusko County that 
defined the “Health and Biomedical Industry” as comprised of 11 sub-sectors each defined as a collection of 6-digit 
NAICS codes. 
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Figure C.2 – IEDC Regions counties in Northeast Indiana 
 
Figure C.3 – OMB-defined core-based statistical areas in Northeast Indiana 
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the creation of the NEIRP, and Kosciusko County’s reluctance to join, that the question of a biomedical 
cluster became more difficult. 
 At the creation of the NEIRP, 13 counties were considered as potential members.  The original 
nine that joined are shown in Figure C.1.  According to the first NEIRP annual report in 2006, the four 
counties immediately to the west – Elkhart, Kosciusko, Wabash, and Grant – were invited to join as well.  
Wabash and Grant counties eventually did join, though Grant later dropped out.  Despite its proximity 
and overtures from the NEIRP, Kosciusko County never did join.  Economic development practitioners in 
both regions felt that this reluctance was explained by the suspicions mentioned above.   
 An interviewee in Warsaw agreed with that assessment, but also felt that Warsaw was torn 
between seeing itself as part of the Ft. Wayne region, and seeing itself as a part of the South Bend 
region.  Ft. Wayne is about 40 miles from Warsaw, and South Bend is about 45.  There are no interstate 
freeway links through Warsaw connecting it to either larger city, but US Route 30 – a high-speed, 
controlled access route – does connect Warsaw and Ft. Wayne.  On the other hand, Warsaw is in the 
South Bend media market, so local news covers South Bend more than Ft. Wayne.  The IEDC divides the 
state into different regions for purposes of planning and implementation.  It places Kosciusko County in 
region 2, which includes South bend, rather than region 3, which includes Ft. Wayne (Figure C.2).  The 
US Office of Management and Budget defines Kosciusko County as a Micropolitan Statistical Area that is 
adjacent to both the South Bend-Elkhart-Mishawaka, IN-MI Combined Statistical Area and the Fort 
Wayne-Huntington-Auburn, IN Combined Statistical Area (Figure C.3).  Though the consolidated 
statistical area of which it is a part is adjacent to The Warsaw Micropolitan Statistical Area, South Bend is 
more closely linked with counties just to the north of it in Michigan.  What these various classifications 
make clear is that while the NEIRP may have thought it natural for Kosciusko County to become a 
member county, officials in Kosciusko itself would not have seen that as an obvious choice even without 
the historical lack of trust between Warsaw and Ft. Wayne. 
As mentioned above, the 2007 marketing study commissioned by the NEIRP identified medical 
devices as a top-tier target industry, leading to its selection as one of the organizations six focus 
industries.  This introduced some confusion about the status of the medical device industry in the 
region.  The 2007 study was aimed at identifying potential targets, rather than simply describing 
industries in the region.  Accordingly, the existing concentration of an industry in the region was only 
one of many criteria considered when evaluating targets.  In addition, the methodology also gave weight 
to industry sectors that had already been identified as potential targets in existing efforts.  Since prior 
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cluster studies often used broadly-defined industrial sectors like “Biomedical” and “Life Sciences” and 
covered a diverse array of geographic areas that may or may not have included Warsaw, it is possible 
that the authors considered “Medical Devices” to have been “identified through existing efforts.”  The 
NAICS codes included in the medical devices target are shown in Table C.2 along with upper and lower 
bounds of their 2007 employment as reported by the US Census Bureau.  Though adopting the target 
industries as clusters proved less problematic with the defense aerospace cluster, doing so with medical 
devices put the NEIRP in the position of focusing on a cluster that wasn’t really there. 
Table C.2 – 2007 employment and establishments in NEIRP counties in Medical Device target sectors 
identified in the 2007 study 
Industry 
Min. 
Emp.5 
Max. 
Emp. Establishments 
  3254 Pharmaceuticals and Medicine 0 0 0 
  3391 Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing 248 469 26 
  6215 Medical and Diagnostic Laboratories 104 325 29 
TOTAL 354 794 55 
 
The NEIRP’s approach to the medical device industry reflected the dual conception of it as a 
target and a cluster.  As a target, the NEIRP advertised its member counties’ proximity to the orthopedic 
device companies and Warsaw in its marketing materials.  By using phrases such as “proximity to the 
orthopedic capital” and “supporting the orthopedic capital,” the NEIRP was able to take advantage of 
the name recognition afforded by Warsaw and the companies located there within its own materials.  
The inclusion of maps showing Kosciusko County, in a different color, on NEIRP marketing materials 
along with distances to it from cities in the NEIRP region supported this message. 
In focusing on medical devices as a cluster, the NEIRP was on less certain ground, so they 
engaged in two research efforts to identify and better understand the industry in the region.  The first of 
these was sponsored by the Indiana Health Industry Foundation (IHIF), a state level trade group that 
supports the health and life science industries in Indiana.  In 2008, the IHIF engaged in a statewide 
project to create asset maps of public and private entities including businesses, hospitals, and 
                                                          
5
 The employment estimates were compiled from the US Census County Business Patterns dataset by the author.  
These data are suppressed in smaller areas if reporting them would reveal the employment or payroll of a 
particular company.  In cases of suppression, ranges are provided instead.  These estimates are created by 
summing over all counties using the extreme values within the range where actual data are suppressed.  Zero 
values are accurate and indicate that there was no employment in that sector. 
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educational institutions, that engaged in or supported life science industries in Indiana.  The IHIF 
partnered with the NEIRP to carry out this project in those counties that were members of the 
partnership.  The research included several surveys and focus groups administered by the county 
economic development offices that were members of the NEIRP.  The result of the effort was a detailed 
list of companies in the region along with information about their connection to the wider biomedical 
and life sciences industry, broadly defined to include “healthcare delivery, medical devices and 
equipment, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and veterinary products, private sector and university research, 
and support services” (IHIF report).  The portion of the IHIF report that focused on the medical device 
industry identified 91 companies within the NEIRP region that were engaged with the medical device 
industry including manufacturers of raw materials and finished products and wholesalers.   
The apparent discrepancy between the 55 establishments shown in Table C.2 and the 91 found 
by the IHIF report can be explained by the different analytical methods used by each.  The 2007 report 
used secondary data, specifically NAICS codes, and not very specific ones at that.  In contrast, the IHIF 
report surveyed experts in the region and built a picture of the cluster from the bottom up.  That 
allowed them to include not only producers of finished goods but also upstream suppliers in the plastics 
and metalworking industries, without ever relying on fixed NAICS categories.  As a trade association, the 
IHIF was able to leverage its strong contacts in the industry to identify new firms in the region in a 
process that took fuller advantage of local knowledge and relationships than analysis of data by NAICS 
or SIC code.  To NEIRP staff, these findings raised the possibility that there might be a viable medical 
device cluster within the NEIRP region, one they could point to without having to reference Warsaw.  
The study did not provide much more than a list and rough classification of firms, though these proved 
useful in marketing materials.  The NEIRP began to include those companies in its marketing materials, 
while still highlighting the region’s proximity to Warsaw. 
The medical device industry was also one of three to be studied intensively in a 2009 study 
commissioned by the NEIRP (Table C.1).  In its introduction, that report states that its purpose was, “to 
investigate the potential to establish an independent economic development cluster based on the 
manufacture of medical instruments in Northeast Indiana.”  Buoyed by the recent IHIF report, the NEIRP 
had high hopes that the study would point the way toward the growth of a medical device cluster in the 
NEIRP region.  However, the report, whose authors reviewed many previous studies and talked to 
stakeholders in the region, did just the opposite.  It dispelled any notion that there might be an 
independent medical device cluster in the NEIRP region and stated, “. . . it is immediately self-evident 
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that many [. . .] companies [in the NEIRP region] already belong to a cluster – the medical device cluster 
centered in Warsaw.”  In support of this claim, the authors argued that many of the companies 
identified in the IHIF report shared a common relationship to the large firms in Warsaw more than 
anything else.  One interviewee recalled,  
“I remember the date that [someone] came to me and told me, ‘you need to read this report 
and read this conclusion here that we are not a medical device cluster.’  And I had to digest it a 
little bit and think what does that mean to us if we now admit that we, Northeast Indiana, are 
not a cluster without Warsaw?” 
The report went on to recommend that the NEIRP focus on the wider biomedical industry, essentially 
disentangling considerations about how the organization might support that industry from 
preoccupations about whether or not the region had a viable medical device cluster.  The report’s 
authors recommended that the NEIRP “should concentrate its efforts on both supporting the existing 
Warsaw medical device cluster and developing and growing its own pockets of opportunity in life 
science.”   
 In making the case that the NEIRP region lacked a medical device cluster, the authors of the 
2009 report presented several findings that would eventually lead the NEIRP and others to see the 
medical device industry in northeast Indiana in a different way.  One, mentioned above, was that many 
of the 91 medical device companies in the region supplied goods to the larger companies in Warsaw.  A 
second was that many of the employees of the Warsaw firms actually lived in counties in the NEIRP 
region.  This made clear that the health of the NEIRP region, and some firms within it, were entwined 
with the health of the Warsaw cluster.  Even as the NEIRP came to appreciate this fact, the 
circumscribed geographical mandate of the organization made it difficult to determine what to do about 
it.  Additionally, the uneasy relationship between the NEIRP and economic development officials in 
Warsaw complicated matters.  However, around the same time as the results of the cluster study were 
released, the organizational landscape was changing in Warsaw. 
 Economic development in Kosciusko County had been led for some time by the Kosciusko 
County Economic Development Corporation (KEDCO).  However, in 2009 the Lilly Family Foundation 
commissioned a study of what they termed the orthopedic cluster in Warsaw.  That study 
recommended that Warsaw create a specific organization to foster the orthopedic industry in Warsaw.  
In noting the potential for such an organization, the report noted that the orthopedic companies had 
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already begun to collaborate on non-competitive issues, such as the joint support for establishing a 
master’s degree program in regulatory affairs in the orthopedic industry at Warsaw’s Grace College.  
Following the recommendations in the report, the Lilly Family Foundation decided to push for the 
formation of a group to advocate for the needs of the orthopedic cluster in Warsaw.  Their effort 
resulted in the formation of a new organization, OtrthoWorx, that had considerable support from the 
big three orthopedic manufacturers.   
 OrthoWorx was smaller than the NEIRP, with only four employees in 2012.  The organization 
began working to identify and address issues relevant to the orthopedic cluster.  In one instance, they 
worked with the orthopedic industry and the local community college to develop training in 
manufacturing that was tailored more specifically to the needs of that industry.  Doing so involved 
adding a great deal of industry-specific information on quality control and process management.  In the 
course of developing their manufacturing training program, representatives of OrthoWorx met with 
representatives of the advanced manufacturing center at the community college in Ft. Wayne and with 
some NEIRP staff.  Though some representatives of both organizations had known each other before, 
the discussions around training in manufacturing was noted by several people as the first time that 
collaboration between the two organizations had seemed possible. 
  In addition, several other factors came together to make collaboration between OrthoWorx and 
the NEIRP more likely.  One was the retirement of some of the people in Warsaw who were most wary 
of the NEIRP’s motives.  Another, according to an interviewee in Warsaw, was the publication of the 
2009 study of the medical device industry in the NEIRP region and its recommendation that the NEIRP 
do what it could to support the success of that industry in Warsaw, since the medical device firms in the 
NEIRP region were part of supply chains that ended in Warsaw.  Seeing that recommendation in a report 
that came out of Ft. Wayne went some way toward reassuring OrthoWorx staff that the NEIRP were 
aware that support for Warsaw was in their own interest.  Finally, there were individuals in both 
OrthoWorx and the NEIRP that were pushing for collaboration between the two.  That included some of 
the representatives of NEIRP counties located between Ft. Wayne and Warsaw, and a regional bank that 
happened to be a supporter of both organizations.  The circumstances of both likely made cooperation 
between the two organizations more sensible than an “us versus them” approach. 
 In 2011, OrthoWorx and the NEIRP invited each other to their respective meetings as guests, 
and also began to occasionally meet informally.  They eventually decided that they should solidify their 
relationship by each investing in the other, which would give each a vote for who would serve on the 
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other’s board.6  The decision to formalize the relationship grew out of the understanding that while they 
represented different political entities, they were linked through the medical device industry.  Both are 
aware that the big three companies in Warsaw are the anchor of the industry, and that their continued 
health and presence is critical to people and companies throughout the larger region.  Further, 
Orthoworx staff acknowledge that the presence of Ft. Wayne provides urban amenities that Warsaw 
simply cannot offer, and that such amenities are important for attracting and retaining employees at 
companies in Warsaw.  As an example, speaking of recent plans to revitalize the riverfront in Ft. Wayne 
one interviewee mentioned that an OrthoWorx staffperson had said that such investment on the part of 
Ft. Wayne was critical to Warsaw’s ability to attract and retain the talent that they need to support that 
industry.  Throughout the interviews, both groups played down questions of geography and instead 
point to the relationship as a strategic partnership. 
 The collaboration between OrthoWorx and the NEIRP is still quite new.  They first attended each 
other’s board meetings as members in early 2012.  There hadn’t yet been any major new initiatives as of 
mid-2012, but the fact that they are partnering at all is a major step.  The NEIRP, over several years, 
gradually came to the realization that their interest in the medical device industry as a cluster, as 
opposed to a target, could not be rationalized without acknowledging the central role of companies in 
Warsaw.  The creation of OrthoWorx changed the organizational landscape in Kosciusko County 
economic development, and presented a more willing potential partner for the NEIRP.  The NEIRP still 
works with medical device companies in its region, and it still works to attract similar such companies, 
but it is able to do that while supporting OrthoWorx’s goal of a healthy medical device industry in 
Warsaw. 
5. The NEIRP and Logistics – Target or cluster?  
 NEIRP staff on several occasions pointed out that the only real cluster wholly in the region, as 
manifested by a stand-alone organization, was the defense/aerospace industry.  The rather unique 
circumstances around the medical device industry are covered in the prior section.  Of the four 
remaining clusters – insurance, transportation and logistics, advanced manufacturing, and food 
processing – only insurance was a focus of the staff person assigned to cluster programs.  This section 
focuses how the NEIRP came to understand the role of transportation and logistics in the regional 
economy. 
                                                          
6
 As independent organizations, both the NEIRP and OrthoWorx select their boards through a ballot open to 
investors over a certain level. 
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 As with the NEIRP’s other clusters, transportation and logistics was originally identified as a 
potential target for attraction in the 2007 study, and it had been on lists of clusters and key industries in 
the region since at least the mid-1990s.  As one of the six clusters, it was in the second round of in-depth 
studies contracted in 2011 that were funded jointly by the NEIRP and the workforce investment board 
(Table C.1).  Until then, the information that the NEIRP had about the transportation and logistics sector 
was anecdotal.  A number of distribution facilities were located along Interstate 69.  As it had with other 
proposed targets, the 2007 study defined the transportation and logistics target as a selection of NAICS 
codes.  These, along with their employment in 2007, are reported in Table C.3. 
 The authors of the 2011 study on the transportation and logistics cluster defined it 
differently than the authors of the earlier study, and they looked at both a wider range of industry 
sectors and employment in occupations related to transportation and logistics.  The authors justified the 
use of a wider set of industry sectors within the cluster with the claim that logistical expertise and 
functions had become integrated throughout supply chains as the latter have become more fragmented.  
As a result, their definition of the transportation and logistics cluster includes all employment in 
transportation, warehousing, and wholesaling.  In support of this claim, they noted that most 
distribution centers built in the US in the decade leading up to the report had been classified as 
wholesale operations by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The authors found that these industries 
included over 10% of regional employment in 2009.  They also found above average concentrations of 
trucking and warehousing, which had location quotients of 5.1 and 2.0, respectively.  The report also 
included the results of several focus groups with leaders in the logistics industry and an analysis of the 
locational advantages of the region with respect to distribution costs. 
The report concluded with three main findings.  The first was that the northeast Indiana region 
had no real advantage as a logistics hub compared with many similar areas in the wider Midwest.  The 
second was that the logistics industry in the region was for the most part attached to local 
manufacturing more than it was a stand-alone industry.  The third was that logistics firms in the region 
would face a shortage of workers in the near future, even though many of the jobs paid higher wages 
than other jobs available to low-skilled workers.  The report recommended addressing the workforce 
shortages and investing in rail and road infrastructure in the region. 
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Table C.3 – Ft. Wayne MSA 2007 employment in transportation and logistics target sectors identified 
in the 2007 study7 
Industry  Employment Establishments 
  423860 Transportation equipment and supplies 0 0 
  482 Rail transportation 0 0 
  4832 Inland water transportation 0 0 
  484 Truck transportation 3,866 220 
  486 Pipeline transportation <20 1 
  488 Support activities for transportation 365 42 
  493 Warehousing and storage 451 23 
  541614 Process, physical distribution, and logistics 
consulting services 
89 15 
TOTAL  4,771-4,791 301 
 
 From the perspective of NEIRP staff, the main takeaway from the report seemed to be that 
there was little need to aggressively market to logistics companies.  According to their thinking, the 
presence of Interstate 69 would likely continue to attract distribution centers, as it had in the past.  This 
is a bit ironic, since the report was ostensibly about logistics as a cluster, rather than a target.  Despite 
their claim of six clusters, the NEIRP had a working definition of a cluster as an organized group of 
private sector firms, something like NIDIA.  The organization had the resources and expertise to engage 
in marketing, and they had the interest and some experience working with other organizations like 
NIDIA and OrthoWorx to address the needs of clusters.  Logistics did not fit either model.  The 
recommendation in the report, that the region focus on transportation infrastructure, was something 
that interviewees spoke of supporting, but it was an area with which the NEIRP had little experience.  In 
short, the recommendations of the logistics report did not fit well with the organizational capacity of the 
NEIRP. 
 As mentioned above, the NEIRP was not the only sponsor of the 2011 report.  The other funder, 
the workforce investment board, did respond to the specific recommendations in the report.  
Specifically, it designed a number of training programs to meet the expected shortage or workers in the 
logistics sector.  Following the finding that logistics in the region was connected to local manufacturing, 
                                                          
7
 As with the data in Table C.2, these estimates are prepared by the author from US Census County Business 
Patterns.  In this case, however, the figures are for the Ft. Wayne Metropolitan Statistical Area rather than for all 
counties in the region because use of the later figures results in such a high incidence of suppressed data that 
estimates of actual employment become too unreliable.  These data give only a rough idea of the size of this sector 
relative to the regional economy. 
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the workforce investment board coordinated with manufacturing firms to design some of those 
programs.  One example of this is a local manufacturer of high-end handbags that does all of its shipping 
from the region, and whose large workforce is split evenly between manufacturing and logistics.  The 
workforce investment board was in a position to act on some of the recommendations of the report that 
the NEIRP was not. 
6. Background to the Rockford, Illinois, case 
 The Rockford Area Economic Development Council (RAEDC) was originally part of the century-
old Rockford Chamber of Commerce under a single CEO.  In the early 1980s, the Chamber of Commerce 
created an economic development corporation to fund projects in the region, and a Council of 100, 
which was a group of local business and community leaders that functioned as its economic 
development arm (Elazar and Marbach 2004).  The RAEDC began to take its current form around 2003, 
and was fully independent of the Chamber of Commerce by 2004.  By 2005, the RAEDC had 40 investors 
on its board.  The organization gets the majority of its funding from the private sector, though the major 
local governments are all contributors as well. 
 The geographic scope of the RAEDC proper is limited to Winnebago County.  However, the 
RAEDC has created or co-created several other organizational entities that allow it to work beyond 
Winnebago County’s borders.  One of these is an Economic Development District (EDD) formed with 
Boone County, adjacent to the east.  The RAEDC knew that the EDD designation would open 
opportunities to new sources of federal funding, but the Economic Development Administration 
requires that EDDs be regional in scope.  The economy of Boone County is tied to that of Winnebago, 
since the former is home to a large Chrysler manufacturing plant, a major regional employer.  The 
RAEDC applied for and received designation as an EDD with Boone County, and has since successfully 
obtained several federal grants.  Another group with which the RAEDC is involved is the Tri-State 
Alliance, which brings together representatives from Rockford, Dubuque, IA, and Janesville, WI to 
address regional transportation issues, primarily rail. 
 The RAEDC initially identified potential clusters in a manner similar to the NEIRP.  In 2006 they 
hired a consultant to identify targets for marketing, and the resulting report recommended seven target 
industries.  The RAEDC never referred to these targets as clusters, but some of the findings in the report 
did note concentrations of industries in the region.  In particular, the report noted the presence of 81 
companies related to the aerospace industry.  These included top tier manufacturers like Hamilton 
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Sundstrand, of which the RAEDC was well aware, but it also included smaller firms up the supply chain 
that produced metals, plastics, hydraulics systems, and other components.  According to one 
interviewee, until the publication of the report, there was no real awareness that the Rockford region 
might be home to a significant aerospace industry, all along the supply chain, as opposed to merely a 
few large manufacturers.  At the time the research was conducted, the RAEDC had ten people on staff 
working in a range of areas including marketing, retention and expansion, small business development, 
and international trade.  There was no specific staff person assigned to work with cluster development. 
Figure C.4 – Location of counties involved with the RAEDC and the EDD 
 
7. Strategic Planning at the RAEDC 
 The RAEDC did adopt a five year plan covering 2008-2012.  The document was fairly brief at 14 
pages, and was mostly a statement of general intentions.  The plan was organized around five priorities: 
improving the business climate, targeted marketing efforts, addressing workforce development, 
developing infrastructure, and creating a fund to address other issues as they arise.  The document 
doesn’t mention clusters except for once in passing, and does not name any one cluster in particular.  
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The plan itself was in some ways directed at an external audience, as a means of generating continual 
support, political and financial, for the work of the organization.  In interviews, it was mentioned as a 
means of generating support as much as it was as a source of information for decisions. 
8. The creation of the Rockford Area Aerospace Network (RAAN) 
 Before the results of the targeted industry study in 2006, the RAEDC had received funding from 
Winnebago County to fund three studies on the local economy.  Without a systematic review of the 
economy, the RAEDC decided to focus the first two of these, in June and November of 2005, on logistics 
and food processing, respectively.  When the target industry study came out in February of 2006, there 
was still funding available for one more study.  Based on the finding about the potential aerospace 
industry, the RAEDC decided to look into the aerospace industry in the third study.  That study, released 
in June of 2006, found several more companies in the region – 89 in total – and described the state of 
the aerospace industry in Rockford in far greater detail.  Among the findings of the report, one that 
stuck with RAEDC staff was that the Rockford region was a good place for aerospace components 
manufacturing, with dozens of small companies that traded with one another, but that the area lacked a 
robust technical education system to supply those companies with skilled manufacturing workers.  Over 
the course of the two studies, the RAEDC went from not knowing about the aerospace industry, to 
thinking of it as a potential target for marketing, to seeing that the industry might have concerns that 
the region should address. 
 Around the same time as the publication of the report on the aerospace industry, the RAEDC 
was coming to the realization that at least one of their targets, logistics, was less promising than they 
had hoped.  The location of a large distribution center had raised their hopes, but further research 
suggested otherwise.  The region would continue to attract logistics companies who found its location 
necessary for their distribution networks, but it had no absolute advantage.  That realization, according 
to one interviewee, opened up the possibility of a focus on other industries in the region, including 
aerospace. 
 The RAEDC did not embark on a major new aerospace initiative right away.  Instead, several 
staff of the organization began to ask about the industry in casual conversations with industry officials.  
One particularly important such conversation took place in late 2006.  RAEDC staff were meeting with 
Jeff Kaney, CEO of a small local aerospace firm, who would later go on to play a major role in the RAAN.  
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss some incentives that were available to the aerospace firm for 
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one of its projects.  RAEDC mentioned their new interest in the industry, and Kaney asked them to stay 
after the meeting to talk further about the industry in the region.  He mentioned that he wondered why 
the RAEDC didn’t take a more active role in the region, going as far as recommending that the RAEDC 
look into models of clusters initiatives with which he was familiar. 
 Seeing the interest in such an approach coming from someone in the private sector, the RAEDC 
decided to reach out to the CEOs of the two largest aerospace firms in the region to discuss the 
possibility of collaboration between the industry and the RAEDC.  The companies in question were 
investors in the RAEDC, but the meeting took months to set up.  It was helped by the enthusiasm of one 
of the executives who was planning to retire soon, a fact that some RAEDC staff thought explained his 
enthusiasm for sitting down with several rival companies.  The meeting, held in late 2007, consisted of a 
discussion between executives of several of the larger aerospace firms along with representatives of the 
local community college.  The discussion generated a wide range of ideas about the state of the 
aerospace industry, and ideas about how the RAEDC might go about bolstering it in the region.  
Specifically, the larger firms had a number of suggestions for strengthening the position of the upstream 
suppliers, from working with them to bid for larger contracts to training on doing business with the 
federal government.  What became clear was that the larger firms would support such initiatives since it 
would effectively create more suppliers for them in the immediate region.  On the other hand, the 
presence of large firms willing to share some insights about what they looked for in a supplier was 
something that smaller firms could use to their advantage.  The discussion even veered into discussions 
about the possibility of attracting additional aerospace firms to the area.  Though RAEDC staff feared 
that this might be met with hostility, at least one executive claimed that such an event would only bring 
more qualified engineers in the area, something he saw as positive. 
 Soon after that meeting, several other events in the region also built excitement around 
aerospace.  First, in 2008 Embry-Riddle University decided to build its third campus in Rockford.  This 
resulted from the fortuitous residence of one of the trustees of the university in Rockford, but was 
helped by enthusiastic support from the region.  Since then, Embry-Riddle has considered expanding the 
Rockford campus, but the plans have not yet come to fruition.  Second, in 2008, the RAEDC learned that 
Rockford was being considered as a location for a major aircraft manufacturer, a result of some effort 
within the private sector in the region.  The RAEDC visited the headquarters of the company in late 2008 
with a delegation of staff and local leaders, and was able to make what they felt was a compelling pitch.  
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As it turned out, Rockford was not chosen, but the fact that they had been seriously considered further 
bolstered their excitement about aerospace in the region. 
 By the end of 2008, the RAEDC was determined to create some sort of program to support what 
was now being called the aerospace cluster in Rockford.  By early 2009, the RAEDC was meeting 
regularly with a steering committee of aerospace industry leaders.  However, the path to the creation of 
RAAN was not without problems.  At one steering committee meeting, Jeff Kaney, the aerospace CEO, 
asked about the possibility of handing over some of the leadership to the private sector.  Though RAEDC 
staff felt that it was in the interest of the region to support the aerospace cluster, the RAEDC bylaws did 
not have any means of establishing independent committees focused on individual industries.  As one 
interviewee put it, the RAEDC was supposed to work with all industries.  To build support, and to make 
sure that they had the support of their investors, the RAEDC staff brought the issue to their board, who 
voted to amend the bylaws and allow for the creation of industry-specific committees.  There has been 
external pressure as well.  Several staff reported that once it became clear that the RAEDC planned to 
focus effort on particular industries, some local leaders pushed for the creation of cluster initiatives in 
other industries.  RAEDC staff tried to resist this, since they feared it had the potential to divert scarce 
resources, but it was not clear if their resistance would be sufficient. 
 Eventually, the organizational infrastructure was in place to create a committee at the RAEDC 
that would be private sector led and focused on the aerospace industry.  The Rockford Area Aerospace 
Network was started in 2010 with Jeff Kaney as Chairman.  More than just a committee, the RAAN is 
almost a separate organization dedicated exclusively to the aerospace industry in the wider Rockford 
region.  Though the organization is nominally part of the RAEDC, it has considerable leeway.  One 
example of this is in the structure of its members.  In order to officially be a member of RAAN, firms 
must be investors in the RAEDC, be within 75 miles of Rockford, and get the majority of their revenue 
from aerospace.  At the time of the research, the network had about 17 members including the four 
largest firms in the region and a collection of mid-sized suppliers. 
 In addition to this core group, though the RAAN was interested both in gaining further 
information about the aerospace industry, and in serving as a forum for the entire industry in Rockford.  
To accomplish this, RAAN set up the Rockford Aerospace Cluster, a network for aerospace firms in the 
Rockford region that required no membership fee and served mainly to boost the profile of the industry 
locally.  The cluster holds one or two trade fairs per year, where they bring a large manufacturer like 
Boeing in to present about what it takes to do business with them and to allow them to meet companies 
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in Rockford, and only requires that its members keep their company information up to date in a 
database.  The main intention, though, is to encourage aerospace firms in the Rockford area to make 
themselves known as a means of raising the profile of the industry.  With its low cost of membership, 
the Rockford aerospace cluster has even made connections with organizations outside of the Rockford 
region.  An organization representing forty or so aerospace firms in northern Wisconsin was recently 
allowed to join the cluster, since the firms it represents do some business with firms in Rockford.  It isn’t 
clear what will come of the relationship, but it shows how RAAN has made new types of contact and 
collaboration possible for aerospace companies in the region.  By 2012, the RAAN had over 200 
aerospace firms in the cluster. 
 The RAAN, in addition to managing the cluster, has also been involved in technical education in 
the region.  One interviewee stressed that the members of RAAN were not interested in being a 
networking organization, but that the thing that motivated all of them was a concern about the supply 
of skilled labor.  The RAAN and several of its member companies, along with the RAEDC and local 
education institutions have collaborated on the Joint Institute of Engineering Technology – Aerospace 
(JiET-A) program.  JiET-A brings together classes at local community colleges, Embry-Riddle, and nearby 
Northern Illinois University and internship programs at aerospace firms to create a pipeline of aerospace 
engineers that can supply labor to aerospace firms in the region. 
 RAAN in still only a few years old, but it has already managed to have an impact both on the 
local education system and on the profile of the Rockford aerospace industry.  As to the question of 
whether or not something like the RAAN could be replicated in other local industries, opinions are 
divided.  Some members of RAAN see it as a possibility, noting the success of their own industry, which 
includes several large firms that had never collaborated in that way before.  RAEDC staff are more 
reserved.  They recognized that the success of RAAN depends on highly motivated individuals willing to 
take leadership roles.  They also note that not all industries in the region are organized like aerospace, 
and so it isn’t clear that the model that fits that industry would work well with others.  Finally, one 
interviewee noted that there are additional things that the RAEDC could do to support aerospace in 
Rockford, such as ensure that its interests were represented in the state capital, that they simply lack 
the resources to do at this point. 
 
